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Summary 
The generation, transmission, and distribution of energy are among the most vital prerequisites for 
the functioning of modern societies (Antonsen et al., 2010). Today, information and communication 
technology (ICT) is used to monitor, control, and operate power generation plants and power 
distribution within electric power supply systems (Patel and Sanyal, 2008). Process control systems, 
e.g., supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA systems) and other ICT systems used 
within  electric power supply systems, are vulnerable to a multitude of physical, electromagnetic, and 
logical threats, both natural and man-made (Rodal, 2001). The recent trends are toward more 
general purpose software solutions; and toward use of the Internet for communication related to 
operations and management of remote processes and production systems. This increases efficiency 
and cooperation, saves time, and reduces costs. However, this also makes formerly isolated ICT 
systems vulnerable to a set of threats and risks they have not been exposed to before (Line and 
Tøndel, 2012). 
     Since the early 1990s, the energy sectors of Western societies have been through a process of 
institutional restructuring, where large state-owned monopolies have been divided into several 
independent organizations (Antonsen et al., 2010). Emergent control technologies, making intensive 
use of ICT, have been useful for dealing with the new situation of enlargement, open access, 
progressive integration of electricity markets, and intensification of cross-border trade. However, the 
full application of these technologies has demanded a new approach to system design and operation, 
and their integration within existing control infrastructures and practices has been a challenge (The 
GRID Consortium, 2007). 
     With this background as a point of departure, the thesis examines several important elements of 
safety and security management systems which have been emphasized in previous research 
(Rasmussen, 1997; Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008; Renn, 2014; Aven et al., 2004), i.e., 
government risk regulation, the use of technical standards for safety and security, risk perception 
among managers and employees, management commitment to safety and security, and awareness 
creation and training with regard to safety and security. The aim of the study is to follow up on 
previous research on challenges for safety and security management and to explore, describe, and 
discuss challenges for safety and security management of network (distribution/grid) companies 
within the electric power sector that arise due to the increased use of ICT to monitor, control, and 
operate electric power production and distribution. Thus, the main aim of the thesis is to answer the 
following question: 
 What challenges for safety and security management of network companies within the 
electric power sector have arisen in light of the increased use of ICT to monitor, control, 
and operate electric power production and distribution? 
Specific research questions have been derived from the main aim, and these research questions are 
addressed in the four articles included in the thesis. 
     The context for the study is the Norwegian electric power supply sector, and the research 
questions are answered by presenting results from a survey sent to 137 network (distribution/grid) 
companies in Norway, supplemented by results from interviews, observation studies, and document 
studies. The thesis focuses on companies involved in transmission and distribution of electricity, and 
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not generation (production). The generation system in the Norwegian electric power supply consists 
of many power stations distributed over the whole country. The structure is thus relatively robust, 
and the dependence on individual plants is small (Fridheim, Hagen, and Henriksen, 2001). However, a 
failure in the electricity networks and the transmission and distribution of electricity to critical 
infrastructures and important societal functions, as well as to individual households, would have a 
huge impact on societal safety (and security). 
 
     This thesis concentrates on organizational safety and security (risk) management within electric 
power supply network companies. However, network companies run critical national infrastructure, 
and the safety and security management of these companies can thus affect societal safety and 
security. Safety and security management of network companies is also affected by national 
regulations, and there is no longer a clear distinction between national regulations and safety and 
security management of network companies. Ideas about internal control and risk management have 
been increasingly commingled, and risk management and regulation are no longer seen as broadly 
contrasting methods of assuring safety and security (Power, 2007). 
 
     The results of the study show that finding the best balance between the use of detailed, 
prescriptive regulation versus functional regulation (self-regulation/internal control) as principles for 
controlling risk and ensuring safety and security is a challenge for the safety and security 
management of the network companies. Next, the thesis finds that technical standards for 
management of ICT safety and security pose a challenge for the network companies. These standards 
have both strengths and weaknesses, and both use and non-use of these standards can lead to 
challenges for the safety and security management of the network companies. The study also 
suggests that users (both managers and employees) of ICT systems (including SCADA systems) within 
the electric power supply network companies perceive the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in these 
systems as low, which can present a challenge for the safety and security management of the 
companies. Furthermore, the study finds a statistically significant correlation between management 
commitment to ICT safety and security and implementation of awareness creation and training 
measures in the companies; however, the use of awareness creation and training measures for ICT 
safety and security varies quite a bit among the network companies. The lack of awareness of a 
danger might lead to weak vigilance by users and a greater potential for abuse, which can be a 
challenge for safety and security management. The thesis also highlights that one main factor ‒ 
complexity ‒ influences all the different challenges studied.  
 
     The theoretical framework for the thesis (i.e., the sociotechnical perspective and institutional 
organizational theory) has helped to contextualize the studied phenomena, highlight aspects and 
elements that are important to consider in relation to safety and security (or risk) management, and 
show that many different factors can lead to challenges for safety and security management at every 
level of the sociotechnical system. The thesis illustrates why it is important to consider human, 
technological, and organizational factors, as well as the dynamic interaction between these factors. It 
is especially important to consider cultural-cognitive factors and be aware of how these elements 
affect safety and security management. Institutional organizational theory contributes to illustrate 
that there is no clear distinction between organizations and their environments and that many 
socially constructed and institutionalized aspects can influence organizations and create important 
challenges. Regulative (regulations), normative (technical standards), and cultural-cognitive 
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(sensemaking, risk perception, commitment, and awareness) processes are connected in complex 
and changing mixtures, and these processes shape organizational structures and activities. The use of 
institutional organizational theory also sheds light on the important fact that many issues related to 
safety and security seem to be taken for granted. 
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1. Introduction 
Today, information and communication technology (ICT) is increasingly becoming a part of all critical 
infrastructures (Line and Tøndel, 2012) and ICT is used for various power system applications, such as 
monitoring and control, protection coordination, and other vital functions. While these system 
applications have the potential for further improving system operation, flexibility, security margins, 
and overall cost, they are also subject to threats, both malicious and accidental, which are not fully 
understood and thus introduce additional vulnerabilities. The application of ICT systems contributes 
to increase power system vulnerabilities in a worldwide scenario where malicious threats against 
large and complex infrastructures are increasing (The GRID Consortium, 2007). 
     The current research is conducted in light of these risks and vulnerabilities, and the thesis focuses 
attention on challenges for safety and security 1  management of network (distribution/grid) 
companies due to increased use of ICT in the electric power supply sector, i.e., the authorities’ 
regulation of risk (managers’ and employees’ attitudes toward these regulations), the use (or non-
use) of technical standards for ICT safety and security, risk perception among users (both managers 
and employees) of ICT systems regarding threats to and vulnerabilities in these systems, and 
management commitment, awareness creation, and training measures for ICT safety and security 
within these companies. 
     The electric power supply is often said to be the most critical infrastructure in modern society, 
providing the basic infrastructure for all kinds of service production that depends on computers and 
electronic communication services (Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a). Today, critical infrastructures 
are increasingly connected and interconnected, and failures of critical infrastructures can represent a 
threat to people, the economy, and societal functions, as well as to national security (Hokstad, Utne, 
and Vatn, 2012). Since the early 1990s, the energy sectors of Western societies have also been 
through a process of institutional restructuring, where large state-owned monopolies have been 
divided into several independent organizations (Antonsen et al., 2010). Emergent control 
technologies, making intensive use of ICT, have been useful for dealing with the new situation of 
enlargement, open access, progressive integration of electricity markets, and intensification of cross-
border trade. However, the full application of these technologies has demanded a new approach to 
system design and operation, and their integration within existing control infrastructures and 
practices has been a challenge (The GRID Consortium, 2007).  
     In today’s power systems, ICT is involved at every level and in virtually all functions. Consequently, 
malfunctions of ICT or malicious attacks on the ICT systems that monitor, control, and operate power 
generation plants and power distribution within the electric power supply system can have serious 
impacts on the physical grid and result not only in a major financial disaster but also in devastating 
damage to public safety and health (Patel and Sanyal, 2008). 
     The context for the empirical studies in the thesis is the Norwegian electric power supply sector. 
The Norwegian power system is almost entirely based on hydropower generation (98%-99%); it also 
uses combined cycle gas turbine production and wind power. During the last three decades, the 
                                                          
1 The area of risk research has traditionally distinguished between the terms “safety” and “security” – this, in 
addition to other important concepts (i.e., risk, uncertainty, vulnerability, complexity, and safety and security 
management) will be further elaborated in Chapter 4. 
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Norwegian electric power supply system has become more complex due to large-scale 
implementation of new technology (i.e., electronic components and ICT systems). Furthermore, the 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), and later the smart grid, are being introduced in the 
Norwegian electric power system, as in other Western countries. This is expected to further increase 
the vulnerability of ICT systems used in electric power supply systems. According to the “Cyber 
Security Strategy for Norway” (Regjeringen, 2012a), threats related to ICT-based espionage and 
sabotage have increased in recent years, and we now must expect sophisticated attacks aimed at 
critical societal information, including ICT systems that operate industrial processes and critical 
infrastructure (Regjeringen, 2012b). 
1.1 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of two parts. Part I is structured in the following way: Section 1.2 outlines the 
research aim, how the challenges that constitute the focus areas in this thesis were selected, and the 
research questions that form the basis for the four studies (articles) that are part of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 describes the background and context of the thesis, and Chapter 3 provides an overview of 
related research. Chapter 4 discusses concepts that are essential for theoretical discussions of 
challenges for safety and security management. Chapter 5 outlines the theoretical framework chosen 
for this study, and Chapter 6 describes the research design and data collection methods applied in 
the thesis. Chapter 7 summarizes the research results from each of the four articles included in the 
thesis, and Chapter 8 presents a discussion of the research results related to the main research aim 
presented in the introduction. Chapter 9 discusses the contributions of the thesis, provides 
recommendations for measures that can be used to reduce the challenges for safety and security 
management of network companies and improve the safety and security of their ICT systems, and 
offers suggestions for future research. 
Part II presents the four research articles included in the thesis: 
Article 1: Skotnes, R. Ø. and Engen, O. A. (2015), Attitudes toward risk regulation – Prescriptive or 
functional regulation?, Safety Science, Vol. 77, pp. 10–18. 
Article 2: Skotnes, R. Ø. (2012), Strengths and weaknesses of technical standards for management of 
ICT safety and security in electric power supply network companies, Journal of Risk and Governance, 
Vol. 3, Iss 2, pp. 119-134. 
Article 3: Skotnes, R. Ø. (2015), Risk perception regarding the safety and security of ICT systems in 
electric power supply network companies, Safety Science Monitor, Vol. 19, Iss 1, article 4. 
Article 4: Skotnes, R. Ø., (2015), Management commitment and awareness creation – ICT safety and 
security in electric power supply network companies, Information & Computer Security, Vol. 23, Iss 3, 
pp. 302 – 316. 
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1.2 Research aim, selection of focus areas, and research questions 
This section outlines the research aim for the thesis, how the challenges that constitute the focus 
areas in the thesis were selected, and the research questions that form the basis for the articles 
included in the thesis. 
1.2.1 Research aim 
The aim of this thesis is to follow up on previous research on challenges for safety and security 
management and to explore, describe, and discuss challenges for safety and security management of 
network (distribution/grid) companies within the electric power sector that arise due to the 
increased use of ICT to monitor, control, and operate electric power production and distribution. I 
have chosen to focus on companies involved in transmission and distribution of electricity, and not 
generation (production). The generation system in the Norwegian electric power supply consists of 
many power stations distributed across the country. The structure is thus relatively robust, and the 
dependence on individual plants is small (Fridheim, Hagen, and Henriksen, 2001). However, a failure 
in the electricity networks and the transmission and distribution of electricity to critical 
infrastructures and important societal functions, as well as to individual households, would have a 
huge impact on societal safety (and security). 
 
     Thus, the main aim of the thesis is to answer the following question: 
 What challenges for safety and security management of network companies within the 
electric power sector have arisen in light of the increased use of ICT to monitor, control, and 
operate electric power production and distribution? 
Specific research questions have been derived from the main aim, and these research questions are 
addressed in the articles included in the thesis. 
     This thesis focuses on organizational safety and security (risk) management within electric power 
supply network companies. However, network companies operate critical national infrastructure, 
and the safety and security management of these companies can thus affect societal safety and 
security. Safety and security management of network companies is also affected by national 
regulations, and there is no longer a clear distinction between national regulations and safety and 
security management of network companies. Ideas about internal control and risk management have 
been increasingly commingled, and risk management and regulation are no longer seen as broadly 
contrasting methods of assuring safety and security (Power, 2007). 
1.2.2 Selection of challenges and research questions 
To select which types of challenges to focus on in this thesis, a combination of several approaches 
was used. First, I performed a review of previous literature on related problem issues and relevant 
documents (e.g., regulations, guidelines, reports, newspaper articles). In addition, I conducted two 
exploratory interviews with representatives from the contingency planning department of the 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) and observation studies at two 
conferences on ICT safety and security for the electric power supply sector to determine what 
representatives from both the authorities and the industry considered to be challenges related to the 
research aim of this thesis. I chose to discuss elements of safety and security (or risk) management 
systems that previous research has identified as important for ensuring ICT safety and security 
(Rasmussen, 1997; Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008; Lindøe, Baram, and Renn, 2014; Aven et 
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al., 2004). Last, factor analysis of survey data results also guided selection of the specific challenges 
discussed in this thesis. All these approaches will be thoroughly described in the following chapters. 
1.2.3 Research questions 
This research project includes four empirical studies (presented in four articles) with their own 
research questions, which all discuss important elements of safety and security management systems 
and important challenges for safety and security management of network companies due to the 
increased use of ICT. 
Article 1:  
Attitudes toward risk regulation – prescriptive or functional regulation? 
The aim of the first article was to address attitudes toward the use of functional versus prescriptive 
risk regulations. The context for the study was the use of functional internal control regulations for 
ICT safety and security in network companies within the Norwegian electric power supply sector.  
     Previous research has shown that ambiguity of results of internal control regulations may be 
explained by organizational size, where large companies have been seen as better suited to 
implement internal control than smaller companies (Hovden, 1998; Lindøe, 2001). However, the 
results of my survey revealed no statistically significant differences between large and small network 
companies regarding their attitude toward the internal control regulations for ICT safety and security 
in the Norwegian electric power supply sector. Managers and employees in both large and small 
network companies had diverging views on and varying attitudes toward internal control regulations, 
depending on the specific question asked. 
Hence, the following research question was discussed in the article: 
 What can explain varying attitudes toward the use of functional internal control regulations 
as the principle for regulating risks? 
Article 2: 
Strengths and weaknesses of technical standards for management of ICT safety and security in 
electric power supply network companies 
The aim of the second article was to study the use of technical standards for management of ICT 
safety and security in electric power supply network companies and to discuss the following research 
question: 
 What are strengths and weaknesses of technical standards for management of ICT safety and 
security? 
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Article 3: 
Risk perception regarding the safety and security of ICT systems in electric power supply network 
companies 
The aim of the third article was to provide insight into risk perception among users of ICT systems 
within electric power supply network companies and to discuss factors that can influence users’ risk 
perception. Perceived risk (i.e., subjective risk judgments) can be influenced by several factors and 
may deviate from "objective" risk. According to Rundmo (1996), biased perception of risk can cause 
misjudgments of potentially hazardous risk sources, and in a report from the project “Emerging 
systemic risks in the 21st century,” the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) pointed to risk perception itself as one factor that can delay or exaggerate precautionary 
measures (OECD, 2003). 
The following research question was examined in this article: 
 What factors can influence the risk perception of users (managers and employees) within 
electric power supply network companies regarding the risk of malfunctions in or attacks on 
their ICT systems? 
Article 4: 
Management commitment and awareness creation ‒ ICT safety and security in electric power 
supply network companies 
The aim of the fourth article was to follow up on previous research by studying the degree of 
management commitment to ICT safety and security within network companies in the electric power 
supply sector, implementation of awareness creation and training measures for ICT safety and 
security within these companies, and the relationship between these two variables. 
     Previous research has advocated for more training, awareness creation, and management 
commitment regarding ICT safety and security (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 
2008; Hagen, 2009; Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a). These studies have suggested that management 
involvement is important for the safety work within companies. If the management is engaged, it will 
be aware of the need for information security measures to comply with the law and assure that 
safety and security measures are implemented. The success of safety and security management 
systems often depends on the commitment of all staff, and all members must be aware of their 
responsibility for safety and security. Otherwise, the safety and security mechanisms may be 
bypassed or diminished by employees. 
     This article followed up on previous research that has shown a positive relationship between 
management commitment to ICT safety and security and implementation of awareness creation and 
training measures. The article addressed the following research questions: 
 To what degree is the management of network companies in the electric power supply 
sector committed to the safety and security of their organizations’ ICT systems? 
 To what extent are awareness creation and training measures for ICT safety and security 
implemented within network companies in the electric power supply sector, and what type 
of measures are implemented?
 Background and context  
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2. Background and context 
This chapter provides a description of the background and empirical basis for the problems of 
interest and the research context for the thesis. 
2.1 ICT systems and information security 
A central part of ICT is the information processed by the system. An information system is a discrete 
set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, 
dissemination, or disposition of information. Information system components include, but are not 
limited to, mainframes, servers, workstations, network components, operating systems, middleware, 
and applications (Swanson et al., 2010). 
     The work to protect ICT systems is usually called information security. The most common 
definition of information security involves the properties of confidentiality, integrity, and availability: 
x Confidentiality means that the information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. 
x Integrity means safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of assets so that no 
unauthorized modification can be made to the information or the system that handles the 
information. 
x Availability means that information is accessible and usable on demand by an authorized 
entity (Line and Tøndel, 2012). 
     However, information security is not strictly a technical issue. Hagen (2009) defined information 
security as essentially a management responsibility that includes using all available resources – 
human, technological, and organizational – to ensure availability of information and that there is only 
authorized access to and modification of companies’ information assets. 
2.2 Critical infrastructures 
As previously mentioned, the electric power supply is often said to be the most critical infrastructure 
in modern society; it provides the basic infrastructure for all kinds of service production that depends 
on computers and electronic communication services (Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a). Modern 
societies rely on the effective functioning of critical infrastructure networks to provide public 
services, enhance quality of life, sustain private profits, and spur economic growth. However, this 
growing dependence is accompanied by an increased sense of vulnerability to new and future 
threats, such as terrorism, climate change, and cyber attacks. According to Boin and McConnel 
(2007), the degree and criticality of critical infrastructures is bound to differ across systems and 
cultures, but it is widely thought that a breakdown of one or more of these critical systems has the 
potential to cause very serious problems. Furthermore, an infrastructural breakdown may present 
challenges that are well beyond the routine contingency planning2  and management capacities of 
public authorities. 
                                                          
2 Planning in advance for extraordinary scenarios allows organizational responders (at both operational and 
political levels) to shift gears, applying the procedures and rules of “crisis management” rather than those of 
“business as usual.” Anticipation of what may happen, coupled with the prior allocation of resources, 
personnel, equipment, crisis control rooms, tasks, responsibilities, and decision guidance/rules, is assumed to 
maximize the chances of a successful response in the event of a crisis. Broadly, such preparations are often 
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     Definitions of the term critical infrastructure vary widely, ranging from hardware such as cables 
and wires to networks for the generation and supply of energy sources (Boin and McConnel, 2007). 
Critical infrastructure is a term used by governments to describe assets that are essential for the 
functioning of a society and its economy. Since the word infrastructure refers to physical assets, 
other terms are often introduced focusing on what to achieve, such as societal critical functions. 
Societal critical functions can be defined as functions that are essential to ensure the basic needs of a 
society. The basic needs point to what is considered essential in a society, such as food, water, 
heating and cooling, and safety and security (Vatn, Hokstad, and Utne, 2012). 
     Various societal critical functions are required to ensure that the basic needs of society are 
fulfilled. The Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB) has proposed to limit critical functions 
to those functions where (1) a loss of the function for seven days or more will threaten basic needs 
and (2) such a loss occurs under disadvantageous conditions and/or in combination with other 
events. Based on this argument, the societal critical functions are water supply, food supply, heat 
supply, life and health, financial security, national security, crisis management, and law and order. 
The societal critical functions depend on infrastructure components. To some extent, infrastructure 
components may be replaced by substitutes; hence, their criticality depends on the organization of 
infrastructure components in the society. The following basic infrastructure components are often 
considered: electric power grids, ICT networks, water and sewage networks, telecommunication 
networks, and networks of roads, railways, and harbors. Finally, several input factors are required to 
provide the infrastructure elements and/or the societal critical functions, including labor, energy, ICT 
services, other services, transportation, telecommunication, and goods and products (Vatn, Hokstad, 
and Utne, 2012). 
 
     The interdependencies between infrastructures can be strong, and several types of dependencies 
should be taken into account. Three types of interdependencies and possible failures are:  
(1) Cascading failures, where a failure in one infrastructure causes disturbances in another 
infrastructure; in this situation there is a functional relationship between two or more infrastructures 
(e.g., water supply is dependent on electricity for water treatment), (2) Escalating failures, where 
failure in one infrastructure worsens an independent disturbance in another infrastructure; for 
example, a breakdown in the metro is significantly worse if a main road is unavailable due to a fire in 
a tunnel, and (3) Common cause failures, where two or more infrastructures are disrupted at the 
same time due to a common cause; for example, a fire in a culvert may cause interruption of 
electricity, water, and telecommunication at the same time (Vatn, Hokstad, and Utne, 2012).  
 
     When categorizing dependency and interdependency between critical infrastructures, the term 
functional interdependency is used in situations where there are cascading failures, the term impact 
interdependency is used in situations where there are escalating failures, and the term geographical 
dependency is used in situations where there are common cause failures. The term geographical 
dependency is used to explain such failures because one or several elements of the infrastructures 
are in close proximity so that external threats may knock out several infrastructures at the same time 
(Vatn, Hokstad, and Utne, 2012).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
referred to as contingency planning (or emergency response planning) and are widely considered to be an 
essential role of public authorities (Eriksson and McConnell, 2011). 
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     Rinaldi, Perenboom, and Kelly (2001) presented another framework of six dimensions to describe 
and analyze interdependencies: (1) type of interdependencies, (2) surroundings, (3) coupling and 
response behavior, (4) infrastructure characteristics, (5) type of failures, and (6) state of operation. In 
addition, they defined four categories of interdependencies:  (1) Physical interdependency, that is, 
physical coupling between inputs and outputs.  An example is that a commodity produced/modified 
by an infrastructure is required by another infrastructure to function. (2) Cyber interdependency, 
that is, the state of the infrastructure depends on the information transmitted through the 
information infrastructure, (3) Geographical interdependency, where one or several elements of 
infrastructures are in close proximity so that one event (e.g., fire) creates disturbances to the 
infrastructures, and (4) Logical interdependency, where two or more infrastructures have reciprocal 
effects without any physical, geographical, or cyber interdependency. 
 
     According to Olsen, Kruke, and Hovden (2007), an infrastructure is critical if its failure would lead 
to unacceptable human or economic consequences and affect societies’ capabilities of rescue, 
response, and recovery. Critical infrastructures are systems upon which we build new systems (e.g., 
of production).  Understanding the interconnections between critical infrastructures is a demanding 
task, and this is even more the case when one includes organizational contexts. Many organizational 
challenges have to be addressed when analyzing and managing risks that involve several 
infrastructure sectors. A few decades ago, most critical infrastructures in the OECD countries were 
publicly owned and run by integrated utility companies. However, this started to change in the late 
1980s with the dawn of a new era of public governance called new public management (NPM). Since 
then, NPM has influenced most public sectors, though to varying degrees in different countries 
(Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). 
  
     Broadly put, NPM is the introduction of a set of principles and methods for organizing from the 
private sector into the public sector. Functional splitting, outsourcing of work processes, and full-
blown privatization are the most typical organizational changes. New organizational forms confront 
existing forms as society faces new challenges. The NPM-based reforms of the 1980s and 1990s 
encouraging decentralization and structural devolution have increasingly been supplemented by 
arrangements that emphasize the need for more coordination across sectors and levels, labeled post-
NPM, Whole of Government, or Joined Up Government (Lango, Lægreid, and Rykkja, 2011). 
Nevertheless, decentralization still influences many critical infrastructures, and the infrastructures of 
today are often run by networks of private and public entities rather than single utility companies. 
Consequently, the number of organizations that need to be involved to map, analyze, and manage 
risks that cross sectors is increasing. The organizational changes also imply that work is managed and 
coordinated in ways that imply a stricter focus on efficiency and accountability with regard to core 
tasks and responsibilities. Technologies have become increasingly interconnected at the same time 
that the organizations managing them have become increasingly fragmented (Almklov, Antonsen, 
and Fenstad, 2012). 
2.3 Electric power supply systems 
According to De Bruijne (2006), the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity in many 
ways constitute the veins and arteries of Western societies. These societies also become increasingly 
dependent on electricity as different infrastructures become increasingly interdependent (referred to 
in Antonsen et al., 2010). According to Fridheim, Hagen, and Henriksen (2001), the electric power 
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system is a good example of mutual dependency in complex technological systems. In case of a 
power outage, most services stop, and a prolonged interruption of power supply (blackout) may have 
consequences for many critical functions in society. This can result in a major financial disaster and in 
damage to public safety and health (Patel and Sanyal, 2008). 
 
     Electricity is produced, or generated, by the turning of turbines. Once the turbines generate the 
electricity, its voltage is significantly increased by passing it through step-up transformers. Then the 
electricity is routed to a network of high-voltage transmission lines capable of efficiently transporting 
electricity over long distances. At the electric distribution substations that serve private homes, the 
electricity is removed from the transmission system and passed through step-down transformers 
that lower the voltage. The electricity is then transferred to local electric networks of distribution 
lines and delivered to homes. There, the electricity's voltage is lowered again by a distribution 
transformer and passed through the electric meter into people’s home network of electric wires and 
outlets (KAEC, 2014). The function of the power grid is to transport electricity from producers to 
consumers in the volume and at the time requested by consumers. Electricity must be generated the 
same second it is consumed. Consequently, a vital feature of the power system is establishing a 
balance between total generation and total consumption of power at all times, a so-called 
instantaneous balance (FACTS, 2013). 
 
     From around 1990 onward, the electricity industries in Western countries have been subjected to 
a massive institutional restructuring. Traditionally, the generation, transmission, and distribution of 
electricity were assembled in vertically integrated utilities, often state owned. However, since the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, all countries in Western Europe have, to various degrees, taken steps 
toward liberalizing their electricity industries. In this context, the term liberalization refers to 
attempts to introduce competition into some or all segments of the industry and to remove barriers 
to trade and exchange. The large, state-owned organizations have been divided into several smaller 
units, which are increasingly exposed to competition. The transition from being an infrastructure 
monopoly to becoming a form of “infrastructure market” represents a significant institutional 
restructuring of the industry (Antonsen et al., 2010). 
     Through this liberalization, the organizations responsible for the production and transmission of 
electrical energy have, to a large extent, gone from being bodies regulated by governments to being 
organized more like private companies subject to more indirect regulation. This process is commonly 
referred to as deregulation, but according to Antonsen et al. (2010), it would more accurately be 
described as “re-regulation” because the introduction of market forces often results in additional 
regulation. The development of privatization, liberalization, and deregulation is part of the 
aforementioned general trend of public sector restructuring that is heavily influenced by the ideal of 
NPM. A myriad of organizational variants exists, but the drift toward management by market 
mechanisms and commoditization of services is a common denominator. The objective of such 
restructuring is to improve cost-efficiency by introducing competition, and this is a radical shift from 
the traditional mode of organizing critical infrastructures. Competition has led to a focus on cost 
reductions and a more efficient use of assets. However, low investment levels, loss-of-supply 
incidents, and society’s increasing dependence on electricity have shifted the focus toward the 
quality and security of the supply in many Western countries. 
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     Today, ICT is used to monitor, control, and operate power generation plants and power 
distribution within electric power supply systems (Patel and Sanyal, 2008). Intricate 
interdependencies are probable outcomes of the computerization and automation of infrastructures 
of the last decades. In the digital age, society’s critical infrastructures rely on the functioning of ICT 
systems, as ICT software and hardware are integrated in the ability of other sectors to uphold their 
services. Computers and software depend on electricity, but the very same computers and software 
are strongly integrated in the production of electricity. The existence of such “feedback loops” means 
that the potential for cascading effects will be increasing at the same time that the intersections 
between infrastructures are becoming more and more opaque. This combination may lead to 
surprising interactional effects, and it is thus a vulnerability of increasing importance (Almklov, 
Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). 
     Emergent control technologies, making intensive use of ICT, have been useful for dealing with the 
new situation of enlargement, open access, progressive integration of electricity markets, and 
intensification of cross-border trade. However, the full application of these technologies has 
demanded a new approach to system design and operation, and their integration within existing 
control infrastructures and practices has been a challenge (The GRID Consortium, 2007). 
2.4 Process (industrial) control systems 
ICT infrastructure is used for controlling critical processes in other infrastructures, for example, 
through process (industrial) control systems (Line and Tøndel, 2012). Process control systems is a 
general term that encompasses several types of  control systems, including supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems and other control  system configurations often found in the 
industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. Process control systems are typically used in industries 
such as electric power supply, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, chemical, transportation, 
and food and beverage. These control systems are critical to the operation of highly connected and 
mutually dependent critical infrastructures (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). 
 
     Figure 1 shows the general layout of a SCADA system. SCADA systems are highly distributed 
systems used to control geographically dispersed assets, often scattered over thousands of square 
kilometers, where centralized data acquisition and control are critical to system operation. They are 
used in distribution systems such as electrical power grids, water distribution and wastewater 
collection systems, oil and natural gas pipelines, and railway transportation systems. A SCADA control 
center performs centralized monitoring and control for field sites over long-distance communications 
networks, including monitoring alarms and processing status data. Based on information received 
from remote stations, automated or operator-driven supervisory commands can be pushed to 
remote station control devices, which are often referred to as field devices. Field devices control 
local operations such as opening and closing valves and breakers, collecting data from sensor 
systems, and monitoring the local environment for alarm conditions (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 
2011). 
 
     SCADA systems are used to control dispersed assets where centralized data acquisition is as 
important as control. SCADA systems integrate data acquisition systems with data transmission 
systems and human-machine interface (HMI) software to provide a centralized monitoring and 
control system for numerous process inputs and outputs. SCADA systems are designed to collect field 
information, transfer it to a central computer facility, and display the information to the operator 
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graphically or textually, thereby allowing the operator to monitor or control an entire system from a 
central location in real time. Based on the sophistication and setup of the individual system, control 
of any individual system, operation, or task can be automated or performed by operator commands. 
SCADA systems consist of both hardware and software. Typical hardware includes a master terminal 
unit (MTU) placed at a control center, communications equipment (e.g., radio, telephone line, cable, 
satellite), and one or more geographically distributed field sites consisting of either a remote 
terminal unit (RTU) or a programmable logic controller (PLC), which controls actuators and/or 
monitors sensors (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). 
 
     Initially, process control systems had little resemblance to traditional information technology (IT) 
systems in that process control systems were isolated systems running proprietary control protocols 
using specialized hardware and software. Widely available, low-cost Internet protocol (IP) devices are 
now replacing proprietary solutions, which increases the possibility of cyber security vulnerabilities 
and incidents. As process control systems are adopting IT solutions to promote corporate business 
systems connectivity and remote access capabilities and being designed and implemented using 
industry standard computers, operating systems, and network protocols, they are starting to 
resemble IT systems. While this integration supports new IT capabilities, it also provides significantly 
less isolation for process control centers from the outside world than predecessor systems, creating a 
greater need to secure these systems. Security solutions have been designed to deal with these 
security issues in typical IT systems, but special precautions must be taken when introducing these 
same solutions to process control systems environments. In some cases, new security solutions are 
needed that are tailored to the process control system environment (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 
2011). 
 
     Although some characteristics are similar, process control systems also have characteristics that 
differ from traditional information processing systems. Many of these differences stem from the fact 
that the logic executing in process control systems has a direct effect on the physical world. Process 
control systems have unique performance and reliability requirements and often use operating 
systems and applications that typical IT personnel may consider unconventional.  The goals of 
efficiency sometimes conflict with safety and security in the design and operation of control systems 
(Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). 
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Figure 1. SCADA System General Layout, NIST (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). 
 
 
2.5 Threats to electric power supply companies’ ICT systems 
The evolution of ICT systems and their use within critical infrastructures has radically changed the 
threats to such infrastructures, and the increased dependence on ICT in critical infrastructures has 
resulted in the need to properly address the interdependencies that exist between these 
infrastructures and the ICT systems (Line and Tøndel, 2012). As previously mentioned, the logic 
executing in process control systems has a direct effect on the physical world, including significant 
risk to the health and safety of human lives and serious damage to the environment, as well as 
serious financial issues such as production losses, negative impacts to a nation’s economy, and the 
compromise of proprietary information (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). Downtime is 
increasingly critical, and our society has become more vulnerable to even short interruptions to 
systems and networks, increasing the importance of having a secure and robust ICT infrastructure 
(Regjeringen, 2012a). 
 
     Whereas the traditional ICT systems used in infrastructures were proprietary and not connected 
to the outside world, the recent trends toward more general purpose software solutions and 
increased networking have radically changed the benefits and risks involved (OECD, 2006; Line and 
Tøndel, 2012). Utilizing the Internet for communication related to operation and management of 
remote processes and production systems increases efficiency and cooperation and saves time and 
money in localization and correction of faults and errors. Using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
components (e.g., MS Windows) in control systems further reduces costs. However, the increased 
use of publicly available ICT systems instead of proprietary solutions, and the increased connectivity 
between different types of networks, makes formerly isolated ICT systems vulnerable to a set of 
threats and risks they have not been exposed to before.  
 
     According to Line and Tøndel (2012), the introduction of ICT results in an increased need to 
consider incidents caused by attackers and not only failures that occur by accident. The offline 
proprietary systems traditionally had an attack surface close to zero, as an attacker would have to be 
geographically in the same place as the target system and have detailed technical knowledge of the 
system to be able to do harm. However, today, when connecting these proprietary systems to the 
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outside world through ICT networks, this is no longer the case as the systems can be accessed from 
any location. In addition, the increased use of COTS systems results in production systems being 
easier targets. Although detailed technical knowledge is still required, there are far more experts of 
COTS systems worldwide than there are experts of proprietary systems. 
 
      A threat is a potential incident; thus, it has not yet occurred (Hagen, 2009). According to Line and 
Tøndel (2012), threats to ICT systems can be divided into three main categories: (1) unintentional 
incidents that are possible due to weaknesses in the ICT system, unfortunate employees, or external 
incidents, (2) general attacks that are not directly aimed at a particular ICT system, but rather attack 
ICT systems in general, and (3) targeted attacks that are directed toward a particular enterprise or 
system. Unintentional incidents occur by sheer accident. Examples include lightning, power failures, 
fire, disk crashes, communication failures, erroneous backups, and mistakes made by employees 
(Line and Tøndel, 2012). Employees can unintentionally misuse software, web mail, or e-mail and 
import infected information, or they can disclose confidential or sensitive information 
unintentionally (Hagen, 2009). Any lack of competence regarding how the systems should be used, 
and also the reliance on key personnel, can be a potential vulnerability (Line and Tøndel, 2012). 
Likewise, fire or flooding can destroy electronic equipment (Hagen, 2009). 
 
     General attacks are not aimed at a particular ICT system, but rather target a number of different 
ICT systems. Examples include the high volume of malicious software found on the Internet. Such 
software may, for instance, aim to gain access to computer resources or get hold of personal 
information like usernames/passwords and credit card numbers (so-called phishing). Although they 
do not directly target a system, they can still do a lot of harm, and the risk from general attacks 
increases as COTS components are incorporated into the systems and as connectivity increases. 
Typical high-risk activities include employees surfing on the Internet from systems with critical 
functionality (e.g., production systems), remote access to control systems, and connecting portable 
units (e.g., laptops, USB sticks) to critical systems (Line and Tøndel, 2012). 
 
     Targeted attacks are launched with the intent to harm one particular system or organization. They 
can range from physical attacks (e.g., in the form of burglary or vandalism of personal computers 
(PCs) and other ICT equipment that is not physically secured) to attacks performed via the Internet. 
The perpetrators may be located far away, but it is also possible for insiders to attack via the ICT 
systems. Disgruntled employees can intentionally misuse ICT resources and disclose information, and 
the consequences of insider attacks can be worse than the consequences of external attacks 
(Johnson, 2006; Hagen, 2009). Internal vandalism, theft, or misuse of the organization’s ICT resources 
by its own employees can be difficult to detect. This is partly because many businesses have bad or 
poor operating and administrative procedures or management is not entirely aware of what system 
privileges employees actually have. Internal attacks against a computer network can also be more 
difficult to detect than external attacks (Regjeringen, 2012a). Furthermore, physical attacks can be 
combined with online attacks. Some attacks will only be possible if the attackers have detailed 
knowledge of the ICT systems and thus require skilled and dedicated attackers. Such attacks may be 
unlikely but can still have a huge impact (Line and Tøndel, 2012). 
 
     There are many security measures on the path from the Internet to any process control system, 
and it is unlikely that any outside player would be able to breach these defenses and gain access to 
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the critical ICT systems in the electric power supply. However, since logical connections exist 
between the different ICT systems, skilled hackers may be able to penetrate defenses. When an 
attacker has exploited vulnerabilities, the threat becomes an incident or a security breach. Potential 
attackers can exploit weaknesses of employees, the organization, the network architecture, and 
physical security. External attackers can use the inherent weaknesses in human nature and trick 
employees into performing actions that lead to security breaches (social engineering) or attempt 
extortion. External attackers can also prey on weaknesses in network architecture and use software 
to perform automated attacks (Hagen, 2009). An external attacker can break into a process control 
(SCADA) system as well and take control of production and distribution processes through, for 
example, a back door installed earlier by malware (Line and Tøndel, 2012). 
     Attacks can be both economically and politically (e.g., espionage, sabotage) motivated or just be 
performed as jokes, and attacks can use malicious software (malware) such as viruses, worms, and 
Trojan horses. Attacks can be distributed attacks (e.g., viruses) or targeted attacks (e.g., hacking). The 
Internet enables criminals to commit crimes from locations far away and escape in a nanosecond. 
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are typical examples of external automated attacks that rely on 
connections in the Internet architecture (Hagen, 2009). Threats to process control systems can come 
from numerous sources, including adversarial sources such as hostile governments, terrorist groups, 
industrial spies, disgruntled employees, and malicious intruders, and from natural sources like 
system complexities, human errors and accidents, equipment failures, and natural disasters 
(Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). 
     In addition, reductions in staff and expertise within the power companies as a result of the 
restructuring and deregulation of the sector have led to increasing dependence on external 
competence. All enterprises that outsource their ICT operations must trust a third party and its 
employees and systems. Important security risks include weak preparation before signing the 
contract and weaknesses in follow-up management and the audit process. Work by external 
suppliers may often be carried out online, and this increases the need to tie all the different 
participants of the electric power supply together in a massive ICT network. The Internet has become 
an increasingly important part of this network (Hagen, Fridheim, and Nystuen, 2005).  
2.5.1 Examples of cyber attacks and blackouts 
Worldwide, there have been several incidents of cyber attacks during the last few years. The U.S. 
government identified the Titan Rain attacks on companies, national laboratories, and military 
targets well before 2003. Attackers from the Netherlands also successfully compromised some 34 
U.S. defense sites in 1990 (Johnson, 2014). In 2009, President Barack Obama declared America's 
digital infrastructure to be a "strategic national asset," and in May 2010 the Pentagon set up its new 
U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to defend American military networks and attack other 
countries' systems. The European Union (EU) has established the European Network and Information 
Security Agency (ENISA), and there are further plans to significantly expand ENISA's capabilities. The 
United Kingdom has also set up a cyber security and "operations center" based in the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the British equivalent of the National Security Agency (NSA) 
(Open Security Alliance, 2014). Furthermore, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members 
developed the Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in 2008 (Johnson, 2014). 
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     In February 2010, top American lawmakers warned that the "threat of a crippling attack on 
telecommunications and computer networks was sharply on the rise"; according to the Lipman 
Report, numerous key sectors of the U.S. economy along with those of other nations are currently at 
risk, including cyber threats to public and private facilities, banking and finance, transportation, 
manufacturing, medical, education, and government, all of which now depend on computers for 
daily operations. The federal government of the United States also admits that the electric power 
transmission is susceptible to cyber warfare, and in 2009 President Obama stated that "cyber 
intruders have probed our electrical grids." In April 2009, reports surfaced that China and Russia had 
infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid and left behind software programs that could be used to disrupt the 
system, according to current and former national security officials, even though China denies this 
(Open Security Alliance, 2014). 
 
     The last decade has seen a growing number of cyber attacks, for instance, on Estonia (2007), 
Belarus (2008), Lithuania (2008), Georgia (2008), and India (2009) (Johnson, 2014). In July 2009, a 
series of coordinated DoS attacks was launched against major government, news media, and 
financial websites in South Korea and the United States. In 2010, a group calling itself the Pakistan 
Cyber Army hacked the website of India's top investigating agency, the Central Bureau of 
Investigation. In addition, a group calling itself the Indian Cyber Army hacked websites belonging to 
the Pakistan Army and others belonging to different ministries. In 2011, the South Korean company 
SK Communications was hacked, resulting in the theft of the personal details (including names, 
phone numbers, home and e-mail addresses, and resident registration numbers) of up to 35 million 
people. Recent reports with respect to cyber security suggest that cyber attacks against U.S. 
governmental institutions are imminent. As predicted, a massive cyber attack in the form of a DoS 
attack hit the EU and U.S. computer systems on February 11, 2014, in protest of the recent spying by 
the NSA (TBSMUN, 2014). 
 
     Several attacks on ICT systems have had major consequences for critical infrastructures. In July 
2010, a new and advanced piece of malware, Stuxnet, was detected. This was the first occurrence of 
malware specifically targeted at process (industrial) control systems. Its goal was to reprogram 
systems of a specific type and hide any changes. It exploited vulnerabilities in a Windows-based 
software program used in industrial settings. Most Stuxnet infections were detected in Iran, where 
five organizations were specifically targeted. However, since Stuxnet was able to self-replicate, it also 
infected computers outside the target organizations and all over the world. Thus, Stuxnet is an 
example of a targeted attack that also resulted in a general attack. Stuxnet also demonstrated that it 
is possible to attack critical infrastructure, even infrastructure that is not connected to the Internet 
(Line and Tøndel, 2012).  
   
   In November 2009, an attack targeting the energy sector (oil, power, and petrochemical 
companies) was identified. This attack seemed to originate from China and was given the name Night 
Dragon. The goal appeared to be to collect information related to competitive proprietary operations 
and financial details regarding field bids and operations. In January 2008, several cities experienced 
power outages caused by hackers breaking into computer systems related to the power supply. Little 
information about this incident has been disclosed, but the motive is said to be extortion. The 
Slammer worm occurred in 2003 as a piece of malware exploiting a vulnerability in the Windows 
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Internet information server. Slammer infected a computer network at a nuclear power plant in Ohio, 
disabling a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours (Line and Tøndel, 2012). 
  
     The OECD report “Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk” (2011)3 concluded that very few single 
cyber-related events have the capacity to cause a global shock. However, the authors argued that 
governments nevertheless need to make detailed preparations to withstand and recover from a wide 
range of unwanted cyber events, both accidental and deliberate. There are significant and growing 
risks of localized misery and loss as a result of the compromise of computer and telecommunications 
services. In addition, reliable Internet and other computer facilities are essential in recovering from 
most large-scale disasters (OECD, 2011b). 
 
     Natural incidents or technical failures are also realistic sources of power blackouts, and we have 
many examples of this from the last decade (Hagen, Fridheim, and Nystuen, 2005). Several countries 
have experienced major electrical blackouts, and these have highlighted the society’s vulnerability 
and contributed to rising questions about the regulation and organization of the electricity sector. 
California experienced a major crisis in 1999, and the rolling blackouts, skyrocketing electricity prices, 
and lasting under-supply of electrical power exposed how vulnerable the society had become. The 
U.S. and Canada experienced blackouts in 2003 that affected 50 million people. The United Kingdom 
(U.K.) also experienced large loss-of-supply incidents in 2003 in London and Birmingham. In both 
cases, the supply was restored to all customers within an hour, but the incidents caused significant 
disruptions of activities, particularly for transport systems. In 2005, Sweden experienced severe 
damage to electricity lines in southern Sweden, caused by Hurricane Gudrun. These reports on major 
blackout events all underline the integrated nature of the power supply in the causal chain (e.g., in 
the case of cascading events) leading up to the events or in the restoration of supply (Antonsen et al., 
2010). 
2.5.2 Advanced Metering Infrastructure and Smart Grids 
ICT systems within electric power supply systems in the Western world are also becoming 
increasingly vulnerable due to the introduction of AMI and the smart grid. AMI is an integrated 
system of smart meters, communications networks, and data management systems that enables 
two-way communication between utilities and customers. Customer systems include in-home 
displays, home area networks, energy management systems, and other customer-side-of-the-meter 
equipment that enable smart grid functions in homes, offices, and factories. Time-based rate 
programs include different types of electricity pricing options for customers that are made possible 
by AMI and sometimes include customer systems (Smart Grid, 2014). 
     Smart grid is a term coined for a wide range of solutions for the electricity grids of the future 
(Fosso et al., 2014). According to Baumeister (2010), the current electrical power grid is an out-of-
date infrastructure. It has met our needs in the past; however, as our society advances 
technologically, so do our expectations of our electrical power delivery system. The smart grid 
reflects a movement to bring the electrical power grid up-to-date so it can meet the current and 
future requirements of its customers. However, updating the electrical power grids could introduce 
new security vulnerabilities into the systems. 
 
                                                          
3 The report is part of the broader OECD study, “Future Global Shocks” (OECD, 2011a). 
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     Smart grids introduce ICT components into the power distribution grid (e.g., sensors for 
monitoring and control, smart meters, two-way communication). Smart grids connect power plants 
and system control centers with all households, businesses, and buildings all over the country, as well 
as abroad. The power industry is thus moving toward a situation where the power distribution 
depends on ICT, while the ICT infrastructure itself depends on power. Such an evolution within 
critical infrastructures makes ICT an integrated part of all other industries, and it is thus not possible 
to make a clear distinction between the ICT systems and the industries that utilize these systems 
(Line and Tøndel, 2012). 
 
     According to Line and Tøndel (2012), there is an increasing need to include ICT in all the electric 
power supply companies’ risk assessments. In the smart grid vision, ICT systems are a part of the 
power distribution, monitoring and influencing the whole service delivery. As a result, it becomes 
obsolete to make a clear separation between, for example, ICT and power, ICT and oil/gas, and ICT 
and water distribution. All infrastructures are based on ICT, and specific ICT competence is therefore 
necessary in operations and management, in addition to competence related to the core business of 
the specific infrastructure. The electric smart grid promises increased capacity, reliability, and 
efficiency through the marriage of cyber technology and the existing electricity network. On the 
other hand, the scale and complexity of the smart grid, along with its increased connectivity and 
automation, make the task of cyber protection particularly challenging (Kundur et al., 2010). 
2.6 Societal safety and security 
As mentioned in section 2.2, an infrastructure is considered critical if its failure would lead to 
unacceptable human or economic consequences and affect societies’ capabilities of rescue, 
response, and recovery. This links the notion of critical infrastructures closely to the concept of 
societal safety and security. As previously stated, this thesis focuses on organizational safety and 
security (risk) management within electric power supply network companies. However, network 
companies run critical national infrastructure, and the safety and security management of these 
companies can thus affect societal safety and security. Safety and security management of network 
companies is also affected by national regulations, and there is no longer a clear distinction between 
national regulations and safety and security management of the network companies. Ideas about 
internal control and risk management have been increasingly commingled, and risk management and 
regulation are no longer seen as broadly contrasting methods of assuring safety and security (Power, 
2007). 
     In most industrial countries, the end of the Cold War marked a change in focus from preparedness 
for war to an increasing focus on civil society’s own vulnerability, safety, and security. This 
vulnerability stems from changes in the composition of hazards and new distributions of risk (Beck, 
1992; OECD, 2003). To meet these new threats and changing risks, there was a need for new 
analytical concepts and for establishing borders between societal safety and other safety-related 
areas, such as national security, sustainable development, human security, and incident 
management. The concept of societal safety was developed in Norway during the last decade and 
has been defined as the “society’s ability to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and 
health of the citizens and to meet the citizen’s basic requirements in a variety of stress situations” 
(White Paper 17 (2001-02) Societal Safety; referred to in Olsen, Kruke, and Hovden, 2007). 
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     According to Olsen, Kruke, and Hovden (2007), societal safety may be considered a process of 
applying scientific principles and practices to dealing with threats, dangers, risks, losses, and other 
dynamic side effects of modern society. It aims to be a systematic approach to understanding and 
responding to social problems such as accidents, emergencies, crises, and disasters, whether they are 
intentional or caused by accidents (and whether they originate within the organization or outside in 
the organization’s environment). Societal safety therefore entails coordination, organization, and 
assignment of clear roles to different actors at the international, national, and local levels. 
     NordForsk (2013) used the concept of societal security, which has a similar definition:  “(…) the 
ability of a society to sustain vital societal functions and secure its population’s life, health, needs and 
basic values under extraordinary stresses, known as crises.” The difficult but widely embraced 
concept of “resilience” may capture the essence of what is required to meet the grand challenges 
relating to societal security in the future. NordForsk defined resilience as “… the capability of a social 
system (e.g. an organization, city or society) to proactively adapt to and recover from both expected 
and unexpected disturbances.” 
     There is still disagreement about what the phenomenon of societal safety (and/or societal 
security) should include. In this thesis, I have chosen to use the term societal safety and security, 
define it by assessing events and stresses in light of a few general criteria, and understand societal 
safety and security as a combination of society’s resilience and vulnerability toward threats and 
stressors, as well as society’s ability to maintain trust in vital functions and institutions (Olsen, Kruke, 
and Hovden, 2007). Vulnerability is defined in different ways, depending on different research 
traditions, but it is most often conceptualized as being constituted by components that include 
exposure to perturbations or external stresses, sensitivity to perturbations, and the capacity to 
adapt. Vulnerability can be defined as society’s inability to resist or manage hazards and threats, and 
society’s vulnerability can be defined as vulnerabilities across sectors and governance levels 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Trust is essential for maintaining a resilient society and can be seen as the glue 
that maintains the functionality of important societal institutions. Trust in central societal functions is 
an important topic for understanding how people perceive different threats and society’s ability to 
handle unwanted events. Hence, trust, and not only the functionality (dependability) of critical 
societal functions, is paramount for maintaining societal safety and security. Consequently, lack of 
trust can be a societal vulnerability in itself (Juhl, 2009). 
2.7 Societal context – societal safety and security in Norway 
Norway is a parliamentary democracy and a unitary state with 5 million inhabitants. The country has 
a multi-party system that results in coalition governments or a single party coming into power. As in 
most European countries, there are three administrative levels: a national level (central 
government), a regional level (19 counties), and a local level (429 municipalities). The Norwegian 
central government consists of 16 different ministries, including the Prime Minister’s Office. A 
ministry works as a secretariat for the political staff, manages agencies, and is responsible for 
administrative tasks within its portfolio. The ministries at the central level are relatively small. 
Agencies report to different ministries and are located outside the ministries (Lægreid and Rykkja, 
2013).  
 
     In Norway, three crucial principles guide the authorities responsible for internal safety and 
security: the principle of liability, the principle of decentralization, and the principle of conformity (or 
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similarity). However, according to Christensen, Lægreid, and Rykkja (2012), the liability and 
decentralization principle in particular create tensions between different coordination forms. The 
liability principle implies that every ministry and authority is responsible for internal security and 
safety within its own sector. This is closely related to the doctrine of individual ministerial 
responsibility and emphasizes strong sector ministries and vertical coordination. The decentralization 
principle, on the other hand, emphasizes that a crisis should be managed at the lowest operational 
level possible. Here, specialization by geography is an important organizing concept, and local 
democracy and authority are relatively strong values in the Norwegian polity. Consequently, the 
county governors and municipalities are given an important function in risk assessment and crisis 
management (Lango, Lægreid, and Rykkja, 2011). A fourth principle relating to rescue services is also 
relevant. A principle of collaboration implies mobilization of the private sector and civil society 
organizations to enhance the capacity to handle disasters and major crises (Christensen, Lægreid, 
and Rykkja, 2012). 
 
     However, these principles also lead to an important (organizational) paradox: The principle of 
liability implies strong vertical coordination. The decentralization principle, on the other hand, 
implies strong horizontal coordination across sectors at a low level. The principle of conformity (or 
similarity) creates further organizational pressure in that it stresses that the organizational forms in a 
crisis situation should be as similar to the daily organizational forms as possible, which can be 
particularly difficult to maintain in “extraordinary” crises. According to Christensen, Lægreid, and 
Rykkja (2012), it is crucial to supplement existing formal organizations with improvisation and create 
temporary organizations when a major disaster occurs. 
 
     The most important developments in Norwegian internal security and safety policy since the Cold 
War have been the gradual strengthening of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security’s overall 
coordination responsibilities and the establishment of new directorates, agencies, and more ad hoc 
organizational arrangements under the ministry. This includes establishment of the Directorate for 
Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB). Strong sectoral ministries and relatively weak super-
ministries responsible for coordination across ministerial areas characterize the central government 
in Norway. The Prime Minister’s Office has traditionally been small with weak coordination power 
due to the principle of individual ministerial responsibility, which means that each minister bears the 
ultimate responsibility for actions within the ministry and subordinate agencies. Specialization by 
purpose or task is a dominant principle, making it difficult to establish coordinated arrangements 
across ministerial areas (Christensen, Lægreid, and Rykkja, 2012). 
 
     Nevertheless, Norway is characterized by a consensus-oriented and collaborative decision-making 
style. This may modify both vertical and horizontal fragmentation. Cooperative arrangements of 
consulting and participating and compromises are more common than confrontations. Norway is also 
a high trust society, where generalized trust among citizens, as well as citizens’ trust in government 
and mutual trust relations between politicians and bureaucrats and between different public bodies, 
is generally high. Added to this, Norway is regarded as a safe haven on the periphery of Europe, 
where until 20114 there had not been any major crises or terrorist attacks. High trust also 
                                                          
4 On July 22, 2011, Norway was struck by a terror attack of unprecedented magnitude. A bomb explosion in the 
Central Government Complex destroyed several central ministries and, at the same time, a terrorist shot a 
large number of young people from the Labor Party’s youth organization attending a camp on the island of 
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characterizes the field of crisis management and internal security (Christensen, Lægreid, and Rykkja, 
2012). 
 
     In Norway, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has overall responsibility for national 
security in peacetime, including a coordination role with regard to the protection of critical networks 
and systems. DSB, the technical arm of the ministry, has an underlying department dedicated to 
national contingency planning which elaborates contingency plans and risk and vulnerability 
assessments. In less severe or cross-cutting crises, responsibility lies with the authorities within the 
sector or administrative level most affected, according to the liability principle. The Cabinet Crisis 
Council supports the government during severe crises and is normally summoned by the most 
affected ministry. The Council has five permanent members, comprising the top-level staff (director-
generals) with the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of 
Defense, the Ministry of Health and Care Services, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In particularly 
severe crises, the heads of all the ministries can be summoned. Constitutional and ministerial 
responsibility still rests with each ministry (Lango, Lægreid, and Rykkja, 2011). 
 
     The Crisis Support Group, an administrative resource designated to support the lead ministry, is 
summoned in certain demanding crisis situations. The main operative units under the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security are the Directorate of the Police (PD), the Police Security Service (PST), 
and the Joint Rescue Coordination Centers. At the local level, police districts are responsible for 
tactical decisions and operations. The PD is responsible for the professional direction and follow-up 
of the police and can assist the local chief of police in a crisis situation. There are 2 main rescue 
coordination centers and 28 local branches (Lango, Lægreid, and Rykkja, 2011). The Norwegian 
National Security Authority (NSM) coordinates preventive ICT security measures in Norway (OECD, 
2006). NSM is responsible for taking protective measures against espionage, sabotage, and terrorism, 
as well as for supporting affected agencies by identifying and managing hostile ICT incidents. The 
Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) is responsible for assessing the intentions and capabilities of 
foreign actors and PST is responsible for preventing and investigating incidents where there is 
suspected involvement by foreign states, as well as for assessing threats to Norway and Norwegian 
interests (NSM, 2011).  Last, several public agencies, which report to different ministries, are 
responsible for supervision and inspections to ensure that enterprises follow regulatory 
requirements. 
2.7.1 Organizational context - the Norwegian electric power supply sector 
The Norwegian power system is almost entirely based on hydropower generation (around 98%-99%); 
it also uses combined cycle gas turbine production and wind power. Hydropower is the production of 
electricity based on water, and the volume of water and the head determine the potential energy in 
a waterfall (FACTS, 2013). Norway is the world’s sixth largest hydropower producer and the largest 
hydropower producer in Europe. 
     The Norwegian power grid is separated into the transmission grid, the regional grid, and the 
distribution grid. The transmission grid comprises the highways of the power system that link 
producers and consumers in a nationwide system. The transmission grid also includes international 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Utøya. In total, 77 people died, and many were seriously injured. The attack was a terrible shock in a country 
seen as a peaceful and open democracy that had never experienced anything like this before (Rykkja, Fimreite, 
and Lægreid, 2011). 
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interconnectors, which make it physically possible to export and transport power as needed. The 
transmission grid has high capacity; the voltage level is normally 300 to 420 kV, but some power lines 
are 132 kV in certain parts of the country. The transmission grid is about 11,000 km. The regional grid 
is the link between the transmission grid and the distribution grid, and it covers about 19,000 km. 
The distribution grid consists of the local power grids that normally supply power to end users, such 
as households, services, and industry. The distribution grid has a normal voltage of up to 22 kV, but 
the voltage is reduced to 230 V for delivery to the general electricity consumer. The distribution grid 
over 1 kV is just under 100,000 km. Large power generation plants can be connected to the 
transmission grid, while smaller generation units can be connected to either the regional grid (small 
wind farms or small-scale power plants) or the distribution grid (minor small-scale power plants). 
Minor consumers are connected to the distribution grid while major consumers, such as power-
intensive industry, can be directly connected to the regional or transmission grids (FACTS, 2013). 
     Norway began restructuring its electricity industry in 1991, with the unbundling of activities and 
the establishment of an open market which other Nordic countries joined during the second half of 
the 1990s. Restructuring and deregulation of the electric power supply sector was undertaken to 
intensify price competition and increase efficiency (Antonsen et al., 2010). Throughout the 
Norwegian energy business, integrated companies have, by law, been separated into network/grid 
companies (owning and operating the grid) and energy and brokering firms. Electric grid operations 
are closely connected activities that are separated by law to avoid undesirable cross-subsidizing 
between grid operation (network companies), which is a natural monopoly, and production, which is 
not (Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012).  
     Building power grids is expensive; the average cost per transported unit declines with increased 
use of the grid until it approaches maximum capacity. This means that it is not profitable for a society 
to build parallel power lines when there is sufficient transport capacity in the existing lines. Parallel 
lines can also lead to inappropriate land use and disfigure the landscape unnecessarily. One 
consequence of the network companies’ natural monopoly is that users are tied to their local 
network company. The authorities have established extensive monopoly supervision to prevent the 
network companies from exploiting this position and to regulate the network companies’ activities. 
The goal is to ensure that users do not pay too much for the grid, while also making sure that grid 
investments are sufficient to ensure capacity and quality. Grid companies engaged in operations 
other than grid activities must maintain separate accounts for their monopoly operations. The 
monopoly supervision aims to ensure that costs related to the generation and sale of electricity are 
not charged to the grid activities (FACTS, 2013). 
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     Figure 2 shows the state organization of energy and water resources activities in Norway. The 
Storting (Norwegian parliament) defines the political framework for energy and water resources 
management in Norway. The government has executive authority and exercises this through various 
ministries: 
 
• The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has the overall administrative responsibility. 
• The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for the external environment and planning 
legislation. 
• The Ministry of Finance is responsible for power plant taxation, various taxes on energy, and the 
state’s expenditures. 
• The Ministry of Trade and Industry has ownership responsibility for Statkraft SF (FACTS, 2013). 
 
     The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy has the overall responsibility for managing the energy and 
water resources in Norway. The ministry’s job is to ensure that this management is carried out 
according to the guidelines provided by the Storting and the government. The ministry’s Energy and 
Water Resources Department has ownership responsibility for the state-owned enterprises Enova SF 
and Statnett SF (FACTS, 2013). NVE holds the managing responsibility according to the Energy Act 
(1990) and the Water Resources Act (2000), makes individual decisions, and performs preparatory 
procedures in cases to be resolved by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. NVE has the legislative 
power to issue regulations for companies within the electric power supply sector, is responsible for 
supervision, and performs regular inspections to ensure compliance with regulations (NVE, 2014a). In 
addition, NVE is responsible for issuing licenses. A license is a document granting permission to a 
specified company to develop and run power stations, dams, and power lines outlined in the license, 
including conditions and rules of operation (NVE, 2014b). 
 
     Enova is a state-owned enterprise that manages the assets in the Energy Fund5. Enova’s objective 
is to promote environmentally friendly conversion of energy consumption and generation and to 
develop energy and climate technology.  Statnett is a state-owned enterprise responsible for building 
and operating the central (main) electricity grid. The enterprise is the transmission system operator 
(TSO) for and owns more than 90% of the transmission grid. Statnett is the system coordinator for 
both the short and long term, which entails responsibility for ensuring the instantaneous power 
balance, as well as facilitating satisfactory quality of supply throughout the country (FACTS, 2013). 
 
  
                                                          
5 The Energy Fund is financed via a small additional charge to electricity bills. In addition, the Energy Fund has 
been allocated the proceeds from "The “Green Fund for Climate, Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Measures” (http://www.enova.no/om-enova/rammebetingelser/lover-og-regler/vedtekter-for-
energifondet/vedtekter-for-energifondet/257/308/) (accessed 11 September 2015). 
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Figure 2. State organization of energy and water resources activities in Norway (from FACTS, 2013). 
 
      
 
     The Norwegian power sector is characterized by a large number of stakeholders within different 
areas of activity. The sector is organized around power generation, grid, and trading. In addition, 
considerable numbers of district heating suppliers have also been established over the last 10 years. 
Public bodies are considerable owners in the sector (e.g., about 90% of Norwegian hydropower 
production is owned by public entities). The combination of considerable public ownership and a 
diversity of stakeholders is distinctive for the Norwegian power sector (FACTS, 2013). In this study, I 
have chosen to focus on ICT safety and security in network companies (distribution/grid companies) 
because a failure in the electricity networks/grids and the transmission and distribution of electricity 
to critical infrastructures and important societal functions, as well as to individual households, would 
have a huge impact on societal safety (and security). 
 
     As mentioned, Statnett is the transmission system operator in Norway. Thus, Statnett must ensure 
a balance between generation and consumption of electricity at all times. The enterprise is 
responsible for prudent socioeconomic operation and development of the transmission grid and is 
subject to the NVE’s monopoly supervision. Statnett is responsible for continuously assessing and 
developing necessary policy instruments to ensure instantaneous balance in severe power situations. 
These policy instruments include agreements on energy options in consumption and use of reserve 
power plants. Statnett is also responsible for continuously assessing whether new policy instruments 
are necessary to ensure the instantaneous balance in a better manner than currently provided. 
Furthermore, Statnett plays a key role in development and operation of cross-border 
interconnectors. This includes extensive cooperation with transmission system operators and 
regulators in other European countries (FACTS, 2013). 
    Norway is part of a joint Nordic power market with Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, which is in turn 
integrated in the European power market through interconnectors to Germany, the Netherlands, 
Estonia, Poland, and Russia. The transmission system operators cooperate through the European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). Nord Pool Spot AS organizes the 
physical power trading on the Nordic power exchange. Nord Pool Spot is owned by Nordic 
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transmission system operators, who have the largest ownership interests, and transmission system 
operators in Estonia and Lithuania. The Latvian system operator will become an owner when the 
Latvian power market opens (FACTS, 2013). 
     As previously stated, all power producers, grid owners, and/or traders must have a license from 
NVE. In 2012, 183 companies produced power in Norway, and 58 were solely producers. The 10 
largest production companies by megawatts (MW)-installed capacity in Norway in 2012 controlled 
more than 75% of the country’s mean production capacity and installed about 74% of the overall 
capacity. As of December 31, 2010, 154 companies were carrying out grid activities at one or more 
levels (distribution grid, regional grid, or main (transmission) grid). Of these, 44 were pure grid 
(network) companies. Most network companies are wholly or partially owned by one or more 
municipalities, while Statnett, which owns about 90% of the main grid, is owned by the state. Private 
companies, county authorities, and municipalities also own parts of the main grid, and municipalities 
and county authorities own most of the regional grids and distribution grids. There are private 
ownership interests within all activity areas: production, grid activity, and trading. Foreign ownership 
interests are relatively limited in the Norwegian power supply, but some foreign companies have 
been granted trading licenses in Norway. In addition to production companies and network 
companies, there are also trading companies that purchase power in the market for re-sale, vertically 
integrated companies that engage in activities within power production, power transmission, and/or 
power trading, and district heating companies (FACTS, 2013). 
     The Power Supply Preparedness Organization (PSPO) includes all the units undertaking production 
with appurtenant watercourse regulation, transmission, and distribution of electrical power and 
district heating pursuant to the Energy Act. The PSPO prepares, establishes, and maintains a 
structure giving all relevant levels in the power supply system tasks and responsibilities so as to 
efficiently handle extraordinary situations in the power supply system and appurtenant watercourse 
structures. According to NVE, 137 of the companies included in the PSPO in 2012 were classified as 
network (distribution/grid) companies (some practicing both monopoly and competitive activities). 
Of these 137 network companies, 10 were registered as having more than 100 employees. 
Furthermore, 23 of the network companies were organized in large corporate groups with several 
subsidiaries or daughter companies. NVE classifies installations into three classes according to their 
importance for the nation’s power supply system. Class 1 is for installations of lesser importance, 
class 2 is for installations of importance to maintenance of the power supply system at the county 
level or for operation of regional grids, and class 3 is for installations of importance for the power 
supply system in a part of the country or region, for operation of the central (main) grid, or for large 
population groups, important infrastructure, or other special considerations (NVE, 2013). 
2.7.2 Threats to Norwegian network companies’ ICT systems  
In 2008, a group was established to coordinate efforts by NIS, PST, and NSM to achieve a more 
comprehensive understanding and assessment of the ICT risk scenario in Norway. This group has 
fostered a great deal of cooperation, which has led to the uncovering of major challenges. According 
to them, the digitization of Norwegian society makes the dependence on ICT and the Internet a 
strategic challenge. In peacetime, the greatest threat to Norwegian interests is the theft of 
commercial data and intellectual property. Such thefts could affect, for example, the country’s 
competitive advantage, the ability to compete, the ability to negotiate, decision-making, stock 
market prices, industrial performance, and infrastructure. Foreign parties could also infect systems 
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with malware that, in a time of crisis or conflict, could be used to disrupt or destroy systems and 
processes so as to limit the Norwegian government's room to maneuver. Several countries have 
developed offensive capacities that in a crisis situation can destroy essential services and critical 
infrastructure. This means that political and economic decision-making processes, as well as defense 
capabilities, might be affected by a data attack (NSM, 2011). According to PST’s annual threat 
assessment for 2012, there is a danger that foreign intelligence services' computer and Internet-
based intelligence activity could severely affect Norwegian intelligence targets (PST, 2012). In 
addition, NIS presented a report on national security in February 2013 and, according to its security 
threat assessment, cyber terror is one of the main threats to national security (NIS, 2013).  
     The Norwegian Business and Industry Security Council (NSR) serves the Norwegian business sector 
in an advisory capacity on matters relating to crime and works actively to prevent loss (NSR, 2014). 
NSR conducts the Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey (Mørketallsundersøkelsen) 
through the Computer Crime Committee (Datakrimutvalget). The survey’s goal is to map out the 
scope of data crime and ICT safety and security incidents in Norwegian organizations, the awareness 
of ICT safety and security, and the scope of implemented ICT safety and security measures. Results 
from the 20126 survey showed an increasing gap between threats and safety and security measures 
in Norwegian organizations at the same time that ICT dependence is increasing (NSR, 2012).  
     In December 2012, the Norwegian government launched the Cyber Security Strategy for Norway 
(Regjeringen, 2012a). According to the action plan that accompanied this national strategy, the 
Norwegian authorities’ annual threat assessments ascertained that threats related to ICT-based 
espionage and sabotage have increased in recent years and, as previously mentioned, we now must 
expect sophisticated attacks aimed at critical societal information, including ICT systems that operate 
industrial processes and critical infrastructure (Regjeringen, 2012b). In addition, the Data Protection 
Authority, NSM, and Office of the Auditor General have revealed weaknesses in risk assessments 
conducted by public administration. They pointed out that existing security measures are often 
unsystematic and fragmented and that information security efforts neither have enough support 
from management nor are well integrated into business management (Regjeringen, 2012a). 
     Furthermore, in 2013, one of the largest Norwegian newspapers, Dagbladet, published a series of 
articles called “Null CTRL” (“No CTRL”). The newspaper articles examined online devices in Norway 
and revealed how a lack of computer security can affect us all at home, at work, and in public spaces. 
The newspaper has so far alerted the authorities and network owners and/or providers of more than 
2500 Norwegian control systems (used in, for example, the armed forces and the health, oil, and 
transport sectors) connected to the Internet with little or no protection. NVE has also been 
interviewed in connection with these articles and has warned that the vulnerability of ICT systems 
used in electric power supply systems is expected to increase during the next few years because of 
the implementation of AMI (smart meters) in all Norwegian households by 2019 and, later, the smart 
grid (Dagbladet, 2013). Moreover, a report from 2012 on terror toward the U.S. electrical grid 
concluded that a few well-informed persons may be able to black out large areas over a long period 
of time, with devastating and life-threatening consequences. According to NVE, this threat is just as 
great for Norway as for the U.S. (Teknisk Ukeblad, 2012). 
                                                          
6 The Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey from 2012 was the eighth survey conducted by NSR. 
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     The Norwegian Computer Emergency Response Team (NorCERT) is a department of NSM, and one 
of the organization’s principle tasks is to coordinate response to cyber attacks on critical 
infrastructure in the public and private sectors in Norway (OECD, 2006). According to NorCERT, there 
are a lot of challenges, both technical and organizational, when it comes to ICT safety and security in 
the organizations within the Norwegian electric power supply system. Examples of technical 
challenges include that safety and security in closed systems is falling behind according to the current 
risk picture, patching can be a challenge for production systems, operational networks are linked to 
other ICT networks in the organizations, wireless communication (Bluetooth) has been introduced, 
and operational networks are increasingly linked to the Internet. Examples of organizational 
challenges are a lack of communication between the ICT department and operational departments in 
the organizations, ICT often having a low priority in the safety management of the organizations, 
many organizations lacking a comprehensive overview of their own safety and security status, and 
many organizations lacking procedures and routines for handling ICT safety and security incidents 
and incident reporting that results in weak management commitment.7 
     Mnemonic AS is one of the largest providers of IT information security services within the Nordic 
region and has been hired by many Norwegian network companies to assess their ICT safety and 
security. According to representatives from Mnemonic, they hear a lot of the same claims from the 
organizations that hire them. These claims are: “We are not a target for attacks,” “We have never 
experienced an attack on our ICT systems,” “Our SCADA systems are completely isolated from the 
Internet or other ICT systems,” and “We are very good at following Microsoft’s programs for 
updating the systems.” However, according to Mnemonic, techniques for attacking SCADA systems 
have already found their way to online “hacker manuals” such as Metasploit, there is a lot of 
evidence of attacks on these types of systems, it is possible to use USB sticks and go online from the 
computers used for the process control systems, and there are always some computers that for some 
reason do not have their systems updated (e.g., the computer is too old, the computer is mostly not 
in use).8 
 
     As in other countries, the electricity sector in Norway has experienced an increased focus on 
profitability stemming from the deregulation in 1991. Maintenance practices, investment level, the 
organization of activities, and the interface between government bodies have been important 
discussion topics in Norway. Critics have questioned whether restructuring and outsourcing have led 
to deterioration of the network companies’ competence to maintain a reliable system. Network 
companies must have the competence necessary to fulfill their roles as service buyers, including 
high-quality specifications and control routines, and ensure their ability to coordinate efforts during 
major breakdowns. Reduced local knowledge and personnel, in combination with an aging 
infrastructure, are areas of concern (Antonsen et al., 2010). 
  
                                                          
7 “Det nasjonale IKT-trusselbildet” (“The national ICT threat picture”), Torgeir Vindsnes, Norwegian National 
Security Authority. Presentation at conference – “Kraft IS 2011: Informasjonssikkerhet i kraftsektoren” 
(“Information security in the electric power supply sector”), November 9-10, 2011. 
8 «Hvor vanskelig er det egentlig å ta over elementer i prosessnettet uten utdelte tilganger?» (“How difficult is 
it really to take over elements in a process control network without access rights?”), Espen Martinsen, 
Mnemonic. Presentation at conference – “Kraft IS 2011: Informasjonssikkerhet i kraftsektoren” (“Information 
security in the electric power supply sector”), November 9-10, 2011. 
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     In 2014, NSM uncovered an extensive cyber attack on companies in the Norwegian oil and energy 
sector. The attack consisted of e-mails carrying malware and, according to NSM, its detection 
systems showed that these e-mails were sent to around 50 Norwegian companies. Statnett, the 
transmission system operator in Norway, was one of the companies attacked; however, one of 
Statnett’s employees was vigilant and reacted to both the content and the sender of the e-mail. 
Nevertheless, NSM found that Norwegian companies are not doing what they should to ensure 
better security in their ICT systems. Most companies do not keep a log of access to their systems, 
which means they do not know whether an attack has occurred (e.g., if they have a virus in their 
systems) and, if they should find a virus, they have no possibility of tracing its origin or effects. 
According to NSM, the cyber attack in 2014 was the biggest attack in Norway’s history, but it has not 
been taken seriously by Norwegian companies. The extent of hacking, espionage, and other serious 
computer crimes was expected to double from 2013 to 2014, but most Norwegian companies did not 
check whether they had been exposed to espionage. Five hundred companies in the Norwegian oil 
and energy sector received a warning from NSM and were advised to check for malware in their 
systems, but only 27 companies reported back to NSM that they had found malware, even though at 
least 50 companies were actually attacked. Thus, NSM recommends increased monitoring and 
control of ICT systems and increased awareness of ICT safety and security among the companies’ 
employees. 
2.7.3 Regulation of safety and security in the Norwegian electric power supply sector 
Compliance with regulation of ICT safety and security is a challenge for safety and security 
management of the network companies discussed in this thesis. Therefore, this section provides a 
brief description of the regulation of safety and security (which includes ICT safety and security) in 
the Norwegian electric power supply sector. Safety and security in the Norwegian electric power 
supply system is based on functional regulation (enforced self-regulation), where internal control9 is 
essential.  Hence, risk management is required by law, in the Internal Control Regulation (1997),10 
and for the electric power supply sector the requirement for risk management is further reinforced 
through several different regulations. Contingency planning is regulated by the Energy Act (1990),11 
the Energy Act Regulations,12 and the Contingency Planning Regulations.13  
     Several regulations require organizations to have an information security management system 
(e.g., Electronic Public Administration Regulations) that apply to the entire public sector. Regulations 
relating to the Personal Data Act apply to both the private and public sector. In addition, the 
Norwegian Security Act14 applies to the entire public sector and parts of the private sector. Several 
regulations state that security efforts must be tailored to the risk. Thus, it is crucial for organizations 
to conduct comprehensive risk and vulnerability analyses15 (Regjeringen, 2012a). ICT safety and 
                                                          
9 Internal control gives companies responsibility to monitor and implement an updated safety (and security) 
management system (see sections 5.4.1.1 and 5.4.1.2). 
10 January 1, 1997: Regulation concerning Systematic Health, Environment and Safety Activities at Enterprises 
(Internal Control Regulation).  
11 Act no. 50 of June 29, 1990. 
12 REG. no. 1990 of December 7, 1990. 
13 Reg. No. 1157 of December 7, 2012: Regulations relating to contingency planning in the power supply 
system. 
14 Act no. 10 of March 20, 1998: Regulations relating to Protective Security Services. 
15 In this thesis, I have chosen to use the term risk and vulnerability analysis because this term closely 
resembles the term used in the contingency planning regulations for the Norwegian electric power supply (i.e., 
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security is further reinforced through §6 and §7 of the contingency planning regulations for the 
electric power supply system. Furthermore, NVE develops regulatory guidelines for the contingency 
planning regulations. The guidelines are to be continually developed and quality assured based on 
feedback from the electric power supply companies. 
2.8 Summary 
The electric power supply is said to be the most critical infrastructure in modern societies, and our 
societies are vulnerable to the consequences of damage and breakdowns in the electric power 
supply systems. ICT systems are critical infrastructures in themselves, and these critical 
infrastructures are in turn used for controlling critical processes in other infrastructures through, for 
example, process (industrial) control systems (e.g., SCADA systems). After the introduction of NPM, 
technologies have become increasingly interconnected at the same time that the organizations 
managing them have become increasingly fragmented. SCADA systems are used to control dispersed 
assets where centralized data acquisition is as important as control.  Although some characteristics 
are similar, these process control systems also have characteristics that differ from traditional ICT 
systems, which mostly stem from the logic executing in process control systems having a direct effect 
on the physical world. This direct effect leads to significant risk to humans, the environment, and the 
economy. SCADA systems support many aspects of our day-to-day lives and, in many cases, are 
critical to our well-being and the very existence of our economy (Nicholson et al., 2012). 
     The shift from proprietary hardware to standardized and less expensive operating systems and 
security products, with commonly known vulnerabilities, has dramatically increased the number of 
systems subject to attack. SCADA systems are vulnerable to several different types of attacks (both 
intentional and unintentional) and malfunctions, and threats to process control systems can come 
from numerous sources. The last decade has seen a growing number of cyber attacks and attacks on 
ICT systems have had major consequences for critical infrastructures. Natural incidents or technical 
failures are also realistic sources of power blackouts, of which there are many examples from the last 
decade. Furthermore, ICT systems within electric power supply systems in the Western world are 
also becoming increasingly vulnerable due to the introduction of AMI and the smart grid. The context 
for the studies of different challenges for safety and security management of network companies due 
to the increased use of ICT is the Norwegian electric power supply sector. As in other Western 
countries, Norwegian network companies’ ICT systems are vulnerable to a number of threats, both 
natural and man-made.
                                                                                                                                                                                     
risiko- og sårbarhetsanalyse). However, the term risk and vulnerability assessment often describes the same 
process and will be used in this thesis when referring to other research. 
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3. State of the art 
This chapter provides an overview of related research on problem issues similar to those discussed in 
the current study. 
3.1 Research on ICT safety and security 
Information and communication have experienced tremendous technological changes in the past 
decades. However, according to the OECD (2006), security considerations were largely overlooked in 
the early phases of development of technologies and products. Most companies currently have a 
system portfolio that is far more complex than just a few years ago. ICT is now part of almost all new 
products and systems, and it is often taken for granted that these new products and systems will 
interact seamlessly with other systems and across organizations and sectors. It is a challenge to keep 
track of all the interdependencies and potential vulnerabilities. The increasing complexity of systems 
and networks has also made it more difficult for procurers of ICT systems to set clear and precise 
security requirements (Regjeringen, 2012a). 
     Several different terms are commonly used when discussing ICT safety and security and threats to 
ICT systems (e.g., information technology, IT safety and security, information security, computer 
safety, computer crime, data safety, cyber safety, cyber security, cyber threats, cyber crime, cyber 
terror, logical threats). In this thesis, I mainly use the term ICT safety and security, but different terms 
are used when referencing other research studies. According to Siponen and Oinas-Kukkonen (2007), 
research on information security has traditionally been dedicated to technological aspects and more 
research on the non-technical aspects is needed. Von Solms (2001) stated that information security 
has moved away from its singularly technical image and now includes a wide range of facets (e.g., 
organizational, technical, legal), all of which must be considered in creating a secure environment 
(referred to in Hagen, 2009). However, according to Dhillon and Backhouse (2001), computer and 
information security has focused mainly on technological solutions to prevent vulnerabilities and 
attacks and has not yet fully adopted a sociotechnical approach16 that addresses human and 
organizational aspects of computer and information security (referred to in Kraemer, Carayon, and 
Clem, 2009). 
 
     According to Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009), the concept of cyber security appeared on the post-
Cold War agenda in response to a mixture of technological and changing geopolitical conditions.  
Cyber security was first used by computer scientists in the early 1990s to highlight a series of 
insecurities related to networked computers, but the concept moved beyond a mere technical 
conception of computer security when proponents urged that threats arising from digital 
technologies could have devastating societal effects. These warnings were increasingly validated 
throughout the 1990s by prominent American politicians, private corporations, and the media. The 
terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, further spurred attention to computers, 
information technology, and security, as well as questions of digital infrastructure protection, 
electronic surveillance, terrorists’ use of hacking, and the Internet as a networked platform for 
communication across and against states (Latham, 2003, referred to in Hansen and Nissenbaum, 
                                                          
16 A thorough description of the sociotechnical perspective on risk management will be given in section 5.2. 
 
 State of the art  
30 
 
2009). Central to cyber security is the manner in which the referent objects of “the network” and 
“the individual” are linked to national and regime/state security. 
     Issues related to ICT safety and security have been mentioned in many studies of risk, safety, 
security, and organization. According to Rasmussen (1997), the rapid development of ICT leads to a 
high degree of integration and coupling of systems and the effects of a single decision can have 
dramatic effects that propagate rapidly and widely through the global society. Weick (2001) claimed 
that the use of computer systems has created unusual problems in sensemaking for managers and 
operators (employees) and, according to Leonardi and Barley (2010), one of the most critically 
important questions for students of organizing is: How is the shift to a computational infrastructure 
shaping the way people work and organize? These issues will be explored further in Chapter 5. 
 
     Line and Tøndel (2012) suggested that several problems related to the security of ICT systems are 
rooted in the quality of existing solutions. Experience shows that software contains a lot of 
vulnerabilities, some of which attackers can use to perform general untargeted attacks. Several 
nations are developing computer network attack (CNA) capabilities so as to shut down ICT systems or 
manipulate critical data. The ICT industry itself has started to address many of these security 
concerns (Hagen, Fridheim, and Nystuen, 2005). Soon after a vulnerability is identified, software 
producers often develop a corrective “patch” that they make available free of charge. Applying 
software patches to computers can protect information systems from an estimated 95% of all 
intrusions. However, patch application is still far from being immediate and universal. ICT 
administrators often find it difficult to keep up-to-date with corrective patches, and the time lag 
between the moment a vulnerability is announced (and a patch made available) and the moment 
hackers start to exploit it is also shrinking (OECD, 2006). 
 
     According to Albrechtsen and Hagen (2009), the widespread use of computers has made it 
increasingly important to attend to the human element of information security. Humans threaten the 
security level by accidental and intentional failures and by social engineering attempts and deliberate 
malicious acts. However, at the same time, humans are also an important resource to prevent 
incidents and individuals’ information security performance is influenced by a wide range of formal 
and informal factors (e.g., security technologies, formal organizational structures, education, 
awareness, values and norms, social relations and interactions).      
3.2 Research on risk regulation 
Hovden (1998) studied the introduction of internal control of safety as the main principle for 
controlling safety in Norway from the 1980s. The Norwegian experiment with the so-called internal 
control reform was an attempt to develop new approaches and means to cope with new challenges 
of misfits between technology and regulation, partly caused by the rapid development of production 
and information technology. At the end of the 1990s, the contents and results of the Norwegian 
internal control of safety, health, and environment (SHE) reform was ambiguous and included a 
mixture of successes and failures in implementing the reform. In 1993, more than 90% of the big 
companies classified as high hazard industries by authorities had established internal control systems 
according to the regulations. However, small enterprises and the service sector were far behind the 
big hazard industries in complying with the intentions of the reform. The auditing methods used by 
the authorities and within the enterprises were mainly based on the principles of quality assurance. 
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These methods seemed to best fit big, stable bureaucratic organizations and gave lower ratings to 
flexible dynamic organizations and small enterprises with few formal procedures. 
     Lindøe (2001) discussed the integration of occupational health, environment, and safety 
management with management systems. In Norway, internal control includes occupational health 
and safety (OSH) and the external environment practices. Thus, the term health, environment, and 
safety (HES) was used in the revision of the internal control regulations from 1997. Results from one 
study showed that in contrast to the bigger industries there seemed to be a mismatch between the 
HES requirements and small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). These findings were consistent 
with results from other countries reporting that a successful implementation of occupational health 
and safety management (OSHM) depended on the specific characteristics of the enterprises. Large 
companies with a bureaucratic form, clear lines of authority, and expertise in OSH should be well 
suited to such implementations. Implementing OSHM in SMEs, on the other hand, was also reported 
to be difficult in other countries. One argument was that the internal control system was not able to 
adjust to radical changes in employment and labor market relations; however, Lindøe (2001) found 
that the process may succeed under certain conditions. 
     In 2013, an expert group appointed by the Norwegian government reviewed the regulatory 
strategy and the health, safety and environment (HSE) regulations for the Norwegian petroleum (oil 
and gas) sector through an extensive interview study with relevant organizations and agencies. The 
relationship between functional and prescriptive risk regulations is an area of conflict between the 
different actors within this industry. The industry in general considers the functional regulations as 
well functioning and wants as few detailed requirements as possible. However, contrary to this, the 
labor unions and the government want to increase the minimum requirements. New companies 
within the industry are also requesting more guidance and detailed requirements from the 
authorities (Engen et al., 2013). 
3.3 Research on technical standards for ICT safety and security 
Previous research has shown that even though information security guidelines are of a prescriptive 
nature and an imperative for the users, users still often fail to apply the guidelines as intended. This 
result suggests that the guidelines may not be effective in influencing human behavior and attitudes 
(Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008). According to Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000), practicing a 
standard is mostly about adapting practice so that the standard describes it with reasonable 
accuracy. Substantial differences may exist between presentation and practice, between formal 
structure and actual operations, and between what people say and what they do. Actors may have 
dual systems that are decoupled from each other, and they may argue that they follow a standard 
while not doing so in practice. However, standardizers (e.g., national standards organizations) do not 
seem to notice this phenomenon, or at least they seldom discuss it in public. Standardizers seem to 
assume that standards that change presentation always change practice.  
     According to Hagen (2011), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards 27001 
and 27002 provide a good framework for developing a management system for information security, 
and in addition they provide management commitment and ensure that routines and plans are in 
place. However, these technical standards are still no guarantee that a company will achieve a good 
effect because the standards say nothing about the quality of each individual measure. Awareness 
regarding ICT safety and security among the companies’ managers and employees is also necessary, 
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and management needs to focus on ICT safety and security and demonstrate commitment to these 
issues both through their activities and through a dedicated budget. 
     The aforementioned expert group that reviewed the regulatory strategy and the HSE regulations 
for the Norwegian petroleum sector in 2013 also discussed the use of technical standards. The 
guidelines to the regulations in the Norwegian petroleum industry refer to recognized technical 
standards as a way to meet functional requirements. However, with a steadily growing number of 
technical standards, considerable knowledge and technical skill are required to use them, and 
renewing these standards also requires a lot of resources. The technical standards used in the 
petroleum industry are developed by Norwegian, foreign, and international organizations (e.g., 
Standards Norway/NORSOK, American Petroleum Institute, ISO), and several of the interview groups 
in the study found the regulatory regime to be too complicated, with overlapping of standards in 
some areas. A number of actors in the industry struggled with the complexities of the standards and 
claimed that this complexity leads to unnecessary additional costs and diminished efficiency. Some of 
the interview groups also felt that the technical standards were not sufficiently updated and were 
not keeping up with the fast-paced technological and organizational development (Engen et al., 
2013). 
3.4 Research on risk perception 
According to Andersson (2011), individuals make well-informed decisions and expose themselves to 
an optimal risk level if they have accurate perceptions of risk (i.e., knowledge of the true levels of risk 
they face). To some extent, perceived risk is a reflection of “objective” (real) risk, especially when 
risks are well known (Sjöberg, 2000). Humans are influenced by their surroundings, and the 
environment affects cognition as well as behavior and individual decisions. Perceived risk concerns 
how an individual understands and experiences a phenomenon (Oltedal et al., 2004). 
 
     Several factors influence risk perception. Whether people perceive a risk the same as technical risk 
estimates (most often calculated from statistics and probability distributions) depends on subjective 
probability. Heuristics, probability judgment biases, and frequent media exposure influence the level 
of perceived risk (Sjöberg, 2000). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) introduced a program of research on 
judgment under uncertainty which has come to be known as the heuristics and biases approach. 
They suggested that intuitive predictions and judgments are often mediated by a small number of 
distinctive mental operations, called judgmental heuristics. These heuristics are often useful, but 
they sometimes lead to characteristic errors or biases (referred to in Kahneman and Tversky, 1996). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) criticized expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision 
making under risk and developed an alternative model, called prospect theory. When faced with a 
complex problem, people employ a variety of heuristic procedures to simplify the representation and 
valuation of prospects (referred to in Tversky and Kahneman, 2000). Examples of perceptual biases 
include biases in people’s judgments of time saved by increasing the speed of an activity (Svensson, 
2008). Time gain is one motivator for drivers to speed up, and in turn speeding increases the risk of 
having an accident (Eriksson, Svensson, and Eriksson, 2013). 
 
     Several studies have found that company size influences risk perception within companies (Eakin, 
1992; Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Hagen, Sivertsen, and Rong, 2008). Hagen, Sivertsen, and Rong 
(2008) presented a selection of findings from the Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey 
from 2006. According to their study, smaller businesses are less likely to have extensive security 
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arrangements in place. The constraints of small businesses include that they generally do not have 
the diverse ICT staff typical of larger companies, and many managers in small businesses also have 
little understanding of information security threats and risks. Smaller enterprises may, however, be 
exposed to several kinds of computer crime incidents due to weaknesses in access control measures 
and data protection.  
 
     All enterprises that outsource their ICT operations have to trust a third party and its employees 
and systems. According to Hagen (2009), important security risks include weak preparation before 
signing the contract and weaknesses in the follow-up management and audit process. When 
outsourcing ICT functions, it is important for the contract to include requirements regarding access 
control, confidentiality, technical safety and security measures, availability, access to documentation, 
economic liability for incidents, and possible sanctions if the requirements are not followed. 
However, the Norwegian Computer Crime Survey (2012) found a steady decline (for both public and 
private enterprises) in all of these areas from 2008 to 2012, though larger organizations seemed to 
set stricter requirements for their vendors (suppliers). These findings suggest that managers not only 
outsource functions but also the responsibility for ICT safety and security, which are worrying results. 
Only half of the enterprises answered that they had allocated internal resources with ICT knowledge 
to follow up on the contracts with and deliveries from their vendors and subcontractors. This does, in 
turn, support the claim that the enterprises are not thorough enough when it comes to monitoring 
the quality of the services they purchase, which might affect risk perception. 
 
     According to Mearns et al. (1997), a relationship exists between risk perception and accident 
involvement, and having had an accident or having experienced an attack can influence the current 
perception of risk. In a study of fishermen’s risk perception (subjective assessments of risks), Brooks 
(2005) found that they did not consider it necessary to conduct emergency procedures (e.g., capsize, 
abandon ship) and that this may be related to the absence of capsizes in recent times.  According to 
Goodhue and Straub (1991), it often takes a major loss from computer abuse to initiate or reinforce 
security management. 
     How a security incident is handled can depend on how serious the security violation is perceived 
to be (Hagen, 2009). According to Hagen, the way employees interpret (make sense of) a security 
situation depends on the extent of their security knowledge. According to Besnard and Arief (2004), 
humans may be biased in perceiving actual levels of risk and rarely have exhaustive knowledge of the 
systems with which they interact. The Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey from 2012 
found that Norwegian enterprises, especially their managers, lack knowledge of ICT safety and 
security and do not have an overview of threats and incidents. This may explain why many of the 
enterprises have not implemented available safety and security measures or focused on their 
organization’s safety and security culture. 
 
     According to Sjöberg (2000), the risk target is of paramount importance in risk studies; people do 
not make the same estimate when they rate the risk to themselves, to their family, or to people in 
general. Risk denial is an important feature, and this phenomenon has been related to what has been 
called unrealistic optimism. People tend to estimate the general risks to be larger than the personal 
risks. Familiarity with the source of danger, control over the situation, and the dramatic character of 
the events can also influence risk perception (Oltedal et al., 2004). 
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     Marek et al. (1985) measured “feelings of safety” (risk perception) in four occupational groups 
working on the Norwegian Statfjord A platform and found that each group lived and worked in its 
own “worlds of risks.” Mearns et al. (1998) measured perceptions of the job situation (e.g., work 
pressure, job security, risk-taking at work), risk perception, satisfaction with safety measures, and 
safety attitudes in a survey of 722 UK offshore employees on 10 different installations. They 
concluded that employees’ responses to the questionnaire reflected different safety climates as 
evidenced by perceptions of the state of safety on each installation and, furthermore, perceptions of 
the safety climate were also, in part, determined by the particular subculture to which the individuals 
belonged (both referred to in Mearns, Flin, and O’Connor, 2001). The concepts of safety climate and 
safety (or security) culture will be further discussed in section 5.5.3. 
 
     Goodhue and Straub (1991) studied the level of security concern among ICT system users and 
focused on users’ perceptions of the security of their systems. Previous studies found that neither 
end-users nor information security staff believed that there were persuasive reasons to be 
concerned about security. This lack of concern was alarming in the face of mounting empirical 
evidence that a significant number of security breaches has occurred. A lack of awareness of the 
danger might lead to weak vigilance by users and a greater potential for abuse. 
3.5 Research on users of ICT systems and management commitment, 
awareness creation, and training with regard to ICT safety and security 
According to Hagen (2009), the success of an information security program depends on the 
commitment of all staff (users of ICT systems), and all members of an organization must be aware of 
their responsibility for security. Albrechtsen (2008) demonstrated how organizations can measure 
cultural aspects such as awareness, behavior, and management commitment by using surveys and 
experiments (referred to in Hagen, 2009). The effectiveness of an organization’s security culture has 
been evaluated by measuring compliance with the existing security policy and written guidelines. 
Administrative measures and documents may, however, be taken for granted, and one of the major 
challenges for a safety and security management system is to enhance the behavior of people (both 
management and employees) (Johnson, 2006). The effectiveness of a safety and security policy has 
been assumed to depend on the way the safety and security contents are addressed in the policy 
document and how the content is communicated to users (Höne and Eloff, 2002, referred to in 
Hagen, 2009). A safety and security policy is not effective unless it is supported by management 
(Kemp, 2005, referred to in Hagen, 2009). 
3.5.1 Users of ICT systems 
According to Dhillon and Backhouse (2000), the role, responsibility, and integrity of users are 
important principles of information security management. A user can be characterized as a person 
with legitimate access to the organization’s information (and communication) systems (referred to in 
Albrechtsen, 2007), such as end-users, security officers, managers, and designers (Besnard and Arief, 
2004). Users play an important role in the information security performance of organizations through 
their security awareness and cautious behavior (Albrechtsen, 2007). 
     According to Albrechtsen (2007), a user’s view on information security is created by several 
interlocking organizational, technological, and individual factors. The context of a user’s work may 
create information security trade-offs (e.g., individuals tend to emphasize efficient and least-effort 
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work instead of loss prevention). Social norms and interactions at the workplace influence individual 
understanding of information security, and the quality of information security management also 
affects users’ awareness, motivation, and behavior. Technological information security solutions 
influence users, and individual factors such as motivation, knowledge, attitudes, values, and behavior 
also influence individual views on information security. Last, but not least, how people perceive risk 
is a part of the explanation of users’ view on information security.      
     Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) conducted a study of a possible information security digital divide 
between information security managers and users of ICT systems. A digital divide in information 
security can be viewed as consisting of existing differences with regard to information security skills 
and knowledge, perceptions of information security, social norms, and interpersonal relationships, 
any or all of which can result in differences in information security performance among individuals. 
Albrechtsen and Hovden pointed out that users can cause adverse incidents through malicious or 
unintentional behavior. Users often assume that the responsibility for ICT safety and security rests 
with the technology and with the ICT safety and security managers, and they do not realize the 
benefits of ICT safety and security measures. In addition, users often trade off ICT safety and security 
against efficiency and functionality, which can be caused by efficiency demands, emphasis on 
minimum-effort work, and poor quality of ICT safety and security training and education resulting in 
insufficient skills and knowledge. For employees, the responsibility for acting in a manner that is safe 
and secure for the organization comes on top of other demands they face in their everyday work. 
     The important role of ICT system users has also been emphasized in studies of safety and security 
in electric power supply systems. From 2001 to 2008, Roe and Schulman (2008) conducted a 
longitudinal analysis of California’s electricity system (California Independent System Operator). This 
system is the transmission manager of California’s high-voltage electrical grid, one of the largest, 
most complex, and economically important electricity systems in the world. One of their key 
conclusions was that the reliability of these types of electricity systems depends on the performance 
of skilled control room operators (users of ICT systems) handling disturbances and variations. An 
implicit consequence of this was also an accompanying reliance on the functioning of ICT equipment, 
such as sensors and remote controls (process control systems/SCADA systems) without which these 
professionals cannot operate (Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). 
3.5.2 Management commitment to ICT safety and security 
According to Rasmussen (1997), management’s commitment to safety and security has been a major 
problem and led to the related efforts of society to control management incentives through safety 
and security regulation. Research on safety climate has also indicated that the safety levels of 
organizations are influenced by managers’ attitudes toward safety and the perceived priority given to 
safety training (Antonsen, 2009). As previously mentioned, the safety climate represents employees’ 
perceptions of organizational support, particularly management’s commitment to safety in the 
organization. According to Skogdalen and Tveiten (2011), managing an organization’s safety requires 
a long-term approach focused on the key determinants of the safety culture, and one of the prime 
factors is the degree of management commitment to safety at all levels, from first-line supervisors to 
managing director. Managers should also check whether their safety commitment is being 
transmitted to others and, according to Flin, O’Dea, and Yule (2002), this can be achieved with the 
use of safety climate surveys. 
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     Hagen (2009) argued that information security should be embedded in all management processes 
and should include incident reporting and organizational learning. Organizational policies and user 
guidelines require the commitment of top-level managers and should be directly linked to the 
company’s business strategies. The top management must demonstrate commitment to ICT safety 
and security through its activities and through a dedicated budget. An organization’s safety and 
security policy should contain a letter of commitment from the top management showing 
commitment to ICT safety and security within the organization and assign the responsibilities of each 
member of the organization, particularly line management, top management, and safety and security 
professionals (Johnson, 2006). 
3.5.3 Awareness creation and training 
According to Furnell (2007), one of the essential aspects of good information security management is 
an effective security culture that includes consistent, appropriate attention to employee security 
awareness, training, and education (referred to in Hagen, 2009). A lack of safety and security 
awareness by users has been cited as the top obstacle for effective ICT safety and security. If people 
(management and employees) do not handle and protect ICT systems in a safe and secure manner, 
even the best technologies will be ineffective.  
     Previous research has also suggested that the impact of ICT safety and security breaches coming 
from people inside an organization is bigger than all other sources combined (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, 
2009). Hagen and Albrechtsen (2009a) performed a comparative study of the regulation of 
information security and the impact on top management commitment in the electric power supply 
sector versus the finance sector in Norway. Their results showed that a larger number of electric 
power supply companies reported incidents typically caused by insiders (e.g., abuse of ICT systems, 
unintentional use violating security) compared with financial companies. The researchers found that 
higher organizational security awareness corresponded with less exposure to insider threats. The 
results of the study also showed that high management engagement corresponded with a high 
degree of adopted security measures and a lower degree of insider incidents. 
     According to Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009), both the ICT safety and security managers and the 
end-users of ICT systems that were interviewed in their study agreed that end-users often do not 
have the knowledge or skills needed for safe and secure behavior. Both groups believed this 
shortcoming to be the result of insufficient training. Users of ICT systems often do not realize the 
benefits of information security; they consider practicality and efficiency as far more important in 
their work. Both the interviewed managers and end-users also agreed that the best measures to 
raise awareness regarding ICT safety and security were interactive, face-to-face measures (e.g., 
personal meetings or presentations). However, this type of measure was also among the least 
frequently used approaches by the companies in the study. Formal one-way communication 
methods, such as information material and electronic information (e.g., screen savers, e-mail 
messages, leaflets) were extensively used because these measures are simple and cheap. 
     Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) found that employee participation is valuable for measures 
influencing user performance as well as for other parts of information security management. 
Practical learning (through interaction) rather than formal education is likely to be the most effective 
way to improve knowledge on how to act safely and securely. Thomson and von Solms (1998) argued 
that social psychological principles must be introduced to improve the effectiveness of security 
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awareness programs. The use of role-playing exercises and the use of examples related to the 
employee’s own work situation were suggested as good techniques to achieve information security 
awareness among users of ICT systems. Use of e-learning can also strengthen individual security 
awareness and behavior. Hagen and Albrechtsen (2009b) discussed the effects of a computer-based 
security training program (using e-learning software) which was introduced in a multinational 
commercial organization in 2008. The study documented significant improvements in information 
security knowledge, awareness, and behavior of the employees who participated in the training 
program. 
    Johnsen (2012) studied key safety and security challenges in a complex industrial setting, i.e., the 
use of integrated operations (IO) in the Norwegian onshore and offshore petroleum sector. IO is a 
new technology that involves the integration of traditional ICT systems with the process control 
systems (SCADA systems) used in production, and the systems are distributed between onshore and 
offshore. Johnsen’s research was performed through a survey of all 46 offshore oil and gas 
installations in the North Sea, and one result found in the data analysis and discussions was an 
absence of systematic knowledge sharing and awareness training. Information about undesirable 
ICT/SCADA incidents had not been shared among the relevant stakeholders, and systematic 
awareness training related to ICT/SCADA security had not been performed. According to Johnsen, 
this would affect both anticipation and attention and might reduce the resilience of the system. 
Jaatun et al. (2009) also studied the use of IO within the petroleum industry on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. Although the petroleum sector has experienced few incidents in relation to its 
SCADA systems, being unprepared for higher risk factors and new and unforeseen threats will, 
according to their study, be very costly in an industry that depends on virtually no downtime for its 
productions systems. 
 
       As previously mentioned, the Data Protection Authority, NSM, and Office of the Auditor General 
have revealed weaknesses in risk assessments conducted by Norwegian public administration. They 
pointed out that existing security measures are often unsystematic and fragmented and that 
information security efforts neither have enough support from management nor are well integrated 
into business management (Regjeringen, 2012a). According to the action plan for the Cyber Security 
Strategy for Norway (2012), awareness regarding ICT safety and security has significant potential for 
improvement among top management, middle management, and employees in many organizations.  
 
     Similarly, results from the national Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey from 2012 
showed an increasing gap between threats and safety and security measures in Norwegian 
organizations at the same time that ICT dependence is increasing. According to the survey, citizens, 
employees, and managers in Norwegian enterprises/organizations should be safety and security 
conscious and must increase their knowledge of ICT safety and security. Everyone should have access 
to information regarding safety and security challenges and safety and preventive measures, and 
everyone needs to understand that measures must be implemented. Organizations need to have the 
necessary procurement expertise for purchasing new ICT tools and services, using external 
consultancy, and outsourcing enterprise services. Recommendations from the survey included 
establishing an ICT safety and security culture in organizations through continuous training and 
awareness creation activities for all employees; ICT safety and security awareness and knowledge 
among managers must also be increased. 
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4. Conceptual clarifications 
This chapter provides an overview of and discusses several concepts that are essential for theoretical 
discussions of challenges for safety and security management (i.e., risk, vulnerability, uncertainty, 
complexity, safety and security). In the literature, these concepts are used in various ways and there 
exists no common accepted terminology (Vatn, Hokstad, and Utne, 2012). However, the concepts of 
risk, uncertainty, vulnerability, and complexity are often seen as closely linked, and these concepts 
are again closely linked to the concepts safety and security. 
4.1 Risk, uncertainty, vulnerability, and complexity 
The concept of risk can be given many different definitions which represent different ways of looking 
at risk. In this thesis, I have chosen to understand the concept of risk as a perspective from which to 
analyze the uncertain consequences of future developments and changes in societies. Uncertainty 
refers to the difficulty of predicting the occurrence of events and/or their consequences, and 
uncertainty may result from an incomplete or inadequate reduction of complexity (Aven and Renn, 
2010). However, as mentioned previously, it is important to acknowledge that perceived risk (i.e., 
subjective risk judgments) can be influenced by several factors, which will be further discussed later 
in this thesis. 
     Specific uncertainties become risk objects that need to be managed, and organizations can be 
seen as processors of uncertainty. According to Power (2007), institutionalized (cultural) frames 
underwrite social accounts of the control and manageability of risks. The organization of uncertainty 
involves the creation of ideal frames for the management of issues under the description of risk; 
organizations must be seen to act as if the management of risk is possible. Visions of risk 
manageability constitute a new space of responsibility and actionability; the organization of 
uncertainty in the form of risk management designs and standards is related to expectations of 
governance and demands for defendable, auditable processes. Since the mid-1990s, there has been 
an expansion in discourses of risk and its management and, according to Power, the dominant 
discourse of risk management has shifted from the logic of calculation to that of organization and 
accountability; this represents a shift from a discipline with its foundations in analysis and calculation 
to a more general governing framework both for risk analysis and for management in general. 
     The concept of vulnerability relates to complexity and interdependencies in technological and 
social systems. As stated in section 2.6, vulnerability is defined in different ways depending on 
different research traditions, but it is most often conceptualized as constituted by components that 
include exposure to perturbations or external stresses, sensitivity to perturbation, and the capacity 
to adapt. Vulnerability can be defined as society’s inability to resist or manage hazards and threats, 
and society’s vulnerability can be defined as vulnerabilities across sectors and governance levels 
(Rasmussen, 1997). Vulnerability is closely linked to concepts of risk (Renn, 2008); however, public 
policies to mitigate the impacts of unwanted events still differ depending on whether they focus on 
reducing risk or reducing vulnerability. Risk-based approaches do not depend on reduction of 
vulnerability for their success (Sarewitz, Pielke, and Keykhah, 2003), and society’s ability to manage 
events through ordinary routines can be strongly influenced by vulnerability in critical technological 
and social systems (i.e., how these systems influence and depend on each other).  
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     According to Aven and Renn (2010), the degree of complexity and uncertainty are two aspects 
that can be used to distinguish between different types of risk problems (situations). Here complexity 
refers to the difficulty of identifying causal links between a multitude of potential causal agents and 
specific effects, and uncertainty refers to the difficulty of predicting the occurrence of events and 
their consequences. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a part of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and responsible for developing standards and guidelines for providing 
adequate information security for all agency operations and assets in the U.S. NIST has developed a 
guide to process control systems security, and one of the threats to process control systems listed in 
this guide is complexity. As previously mentioned, process control networks are often more complex 
than traditional ICT networks and require a different level of expertise (e.g., control networks are 
often managed by control engineers, not ICT personnel). Process control systems can have very 
complex interactions with physical processes, and consequences in the process control system 
domain can manifest in physical events (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). 
     Some unwanted events can have cascading effects far beyond the system in which they occurred, 
which means that single events can affect several societal functions simultaneously. Events in 
technological and social systems can thus spread quickly to other sectors and/or systems. Among the 
best examples of complex technological systems are the focus areas of this thesis: energy supply 
systems and ICT systems, or failure in such systems, that depend on energy and ICT (e.g., financial 
systems, transport systems, hospitals) (OECD, 2003). Cyber risk can be seen as a systemic risk, an 
emerging risk, and a possible transboundary crisis. Systemic risks are risks that affect the systems on 
which society depends. According to the OECD, changes likely to affect risks and their management 
in the future may occur in four contexts: demography, the environment, technology, and 
socioeconomic structures. These will reshape conventional hazards and create new ones, modify 
vulnerability to risks, transform the channels through which accidents spread, and alter society's 
response. Furthermore, cyber crime, terrorist attacks, and some natural catastrophes call for a 
critical look at both the safety and security of networked systems and the social infrastructure that 
makes them vulnerable. The sheer complexity of today’s world requires a broad approach to the 
subject of systemic risks (OECD, 2003). Systemic risks cross the boundaries between different 
infrastructure sectors, as well as different levels in those sectors (Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 
2012). 
 
   The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC, 2010) has defined emerging risk as “a risk that is 
new, or a familiar risk in new or unfamiliar conditions. Emerging risks are issues that are perceived to 
be potentially significant but which may not be fully understood and assessed.” Definitions vary 
according to the sector under scrutiny. Emerging risks may challenge efforts to maintain societal 
security based on cross-sectorial and multi-level governance. According to the OECD report “Future 
Global Shocks – Improving Risk Governance” from 2011, shocks in the future may arise from 
previously unknown hazards for which there are no data and no model for likelihood and impacts, 
the so-called unknown-unknown events. The working definition of future global shocks in this report 
is “a rapid onset event with severely disruptive consequences covering at least two continents” 
(OECD, 2011a). Important examples of these future global shocks are cyber risks, as well as 
pandemics, financial crises, and geomagnetic storms. 
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     According to Ansell, Boin, and Keller (2010), in recent years crises and disasters have become 
increasingly transboundary in nature. Examples of transboundary crises are epidemics, financial 
crises, ice storms, and oil spills. These crises affect multiple jurisdictions, undermine the functioning 
of various policy sectors and critical infrastructures, escalate rapidly, and morph along the way. 
Energy blackouts and cyber attacks are also considered transboundary crises. All crises and disasters 
require a rapid response which must be delivered under conditions of collective stress and deep 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, according to Ansell, Boin, and Keller, these challenges become more 
difficult to manage when a crisis spreads across geographic borders and policy boundaries. More 
participants become involved, and these participants tend to be more dispersed, have more 
divergent agendas, and be less acquainted with each other. 
 
     As previously mentioned, based on numerous examples, failures in one infrastructure can lead to 
disruptions in other infrastructures and in the process lead to serious human, material, and economic 
consequences. The existence of such cascading effects highlights the tight couplings between various 
infrastructures and also the degree of complexity that makes these interconnections difficult to 
identify and manage (Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). 
4.2 Safety and security 
Risk research has traditionally distinguished between the terms safety and security, but their 
meaning can vary considerably from one context to another.  This can lead to serious 
misunderstandings when individuals from different technical communities collaborate. According to 
Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet (2010), the critical infrastructure protection domain is particularly 
prone to such difficulties. Safety and security are core, omnipresent concepts in the domain at both 
policy and technical levels, and the complexity of critical infrastructure systems involves the 
coordination of multiple actors from multiple engineering disciplines. Each discipline has its own 
understanding of the terms safety and security (e.g., the meaning of security to an electrical engineer 
differs from the meaning to a computer scientist, and both meanings differ from the meaning to a 
nuclear expert). 
     Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet found that two relevant and representative distinctions can be 
identified (the SEMA referential framework). The first is the system versus environment distinction 
(S-E), where security is concerned with the risks originating from the environment and potentially 
affecting the system, whereas safety deals with the risks arising from the system and potentially 
affecting the environment. The second is the malicious versus accidental distinction (M-A), where 
security typically addresses malicious (intentional) risks, while safety addresses purely accidental 
(unintentional) risks (p. 59). 
     According to Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet, the power grid sector and data (ICT) networks 
provide good examples of multiple definitions that can be clarified by SEMA. Electrical transmission 
and distribution networks are highly technical systems that evolve rapidly and involve diverse 
security and safety issues and challenges. In the power grid sector, the involved actors have different 
backgrounds, making it a good example of a thematic area that is full of traps and potential 
ambiguities with regard to the terms safety and security. The term safety is consistently used in the 
sector to denote the prevention of accidental harm from the power system and its components to 
humans and the environment. The term security is much more ambiguous. From a strict electrical 
engineering perspective, security is usually understood as the ability to survive disturbances (e.g., 
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short-circuits, unanticipated loss of system elements) without interruptions in customer service. The 
nature of the cause is usually not considered. The malicious dimension is not explicitly excluded but 
is considered marginally, and the impact of the system on the environment is not in scope because it 
is treated as a safety aspect. Nevertheless, growing critical infrastructure protection concerns which 
were reinforced in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, have led to numerous efforts 
to address malicious risks, especially regarding terrorist and external threats. In this perspective, the 
term security is associated with a different meaning which is often delimited by the malicious versus 
accidental distinction. 
     As previously stated, the increased dependence of the power grid on ICT coupled with the global 
interest in the AMI and smart grid has introduced new types of malicious risks. Cyber security 
concerns have caused the term security to be viewed in another manner. Moreover, internal threats 
are in some cases treated as separate issues. All critical infrastructures are highly dependent on 
telecommunications and data networks, and the protection of these assets is referred to as critical 
information infrastructure protection. Consequently, use of the terms security and safety in this 
context reflects the pervasiveness of telecommunications and data networks in the various critical 
infrastructure sectors and varies accordingly. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), recognized 
as one of the principal technical bodies in the Internet domain, gives no relevance to the malicious 
versus accidental distinction. Safety is seen as a system-to-system issue, whereas security is 
potentially much broader. Definitions of security in the ISO/International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) series of standards on information security also cover malicious and accidental 
aspects. However, the ISO/IEC documents (technical standards) do not mention safety, which may 
explain the conceptual width given to the term security (Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet, 2010). 
     Avoiding ambiguities in the meaning of the terms security and safety can be important for system 
design, risk assessment, policy-making, and collaborative research. With regard to safety, the 
importance of information-sharing and learning from previous accidents is often emphasized; 
however, secrecy is often emphasized when it comes to security issues (especially according to the 
malicious versus accidental distinction). Methods and tools involved in risk assessments can also be 
highly dependent on the chosen distinctions. For example, stochastic modeling is a well-established 
method for assessing accidental risks in industry, whereas it is unusual to model malicious behavior 
using this method because of its very different nature (Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet, 2010). 
    Using the malicious versus accidental distinction, Sivertsen (2007) argued that studies of risk and 
vulnerability in ICT systems should discuss both safety and security (p. 16) and, according to Aven 
(2007), both accidental threats (hazards) and threats of intentional origin need to be covered when 
discussing the massive use of ICT devices, the complexity of modern infrastructures, and the 
increasing interconnectedness among systems and organizations.  According to the OECD, 
governments are vulnerable to a wide range of unwanted cyber events, both accidental and 
deliberate (OECD 2011b), and the U.S. NIST emphasizes that the personnel responsible for operating, 
securing, and maintaining the process control system must understand the important link between 
safety and security (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). Furthermore, according to the Norwegian 
Computer Crime and Security Survey (2012), it is possible for data to fall into the wrong hands and be 
misused and manipulated without it being the result of a deliberate attack (NSR, 2012). 
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     Many definitions of safety build on the idea that safety can be linked to risk – the lower the risk 
the higher the safety, and vice versa; however, this idea has also been challenged by several 
researchers. Aven (2014), for his part, held that for broad risk perspectives, which highlight 
uncertainties beyond probabilities and expected values, safety can in fact be considered the antonym 
of risk, and safe can be defined by reference to acceptable risk. An example of such a risk perspective 
is risk understood as uncertainty about and severity of the consequences of an activity (Aven and 
Renn, 2010), that is, the risk perspective applied in this thesis. According to Aven, seeing safety as the 
antonym of risk leads to simple and easily understandable definitions of safety, and we avoid the 
introduction of a double set of definitions for risk and safety and safe. However, this common 
platform for the risk and safety concept needs to be based on sufficiently broad risk perspectives that 
give due attention to the uncertainties. Using this risk interpretation, we acknowledge that being 
safe is a subjective judgment dependent on institutional processes to determine what is acceptable 
risk and what is not. 
     According to Aven, there is no problem technically to extend the safety definition (of safety as the 
antonym of risk) to also include intentional situations and events, as the risk concept does not 
distinguish between intentional and unintentional. The same might be said about the system versus 
environment distinction, and it may not be possible to make a clear distinction between safety and 
security. Accordingly, this thesis discusses both safety and security. Both safety and security issues 
are important with regard to ICT systems, which are vulnerable to both attacks and accidents (e.g., 
technical malfunctions), and risks that may arise within the organizations and in the organizations’ 
environment. The focus in this project is on organizational risk (which affects societal safety and 
security), and not on occupational safety and health (HSE) and personal risk. However, as mentioned 
earlier, threats to organizations operating critical infrastructure may also lead to serious 
consequences for public safety, security, and health. 
4.3 Safety and security (risk) management 
According to Aven et al. (2004), the term safety (and/or security) management system (or risk 
management system) can be used to describe all measures that are implemented to achieve, 
maintain, and develop a level of safety and security in accordance with defined safety and security 
goals. According to Boin and McConnell (2007), preventing all extreme threats from materializing is 
not possible. We cannot know every conceivable “worst case” that may unfold, and there are 
political, cognitive, informational, cultural, and resource barriers to being able to prevent any 
possible threat to our critical infrastructures. The same is said about information security: Much 
vulnerability may be minimized or eliminated through management, operational, or technical 
controls as part of the organization’s resiliency effort; however, it is virtually impossible to 
completely eliminate all risks. Contingency planning is designed to mitigate the risk of system and 
service unavailability by providing effective and efficient solutions to enhance system availability 
(Swanson et al., 2010). Organizations must attempt to develop broad and comprehensive defenses 
for all relevant threats, to identify successful attacks and their consequences, and to plan for 
extraordinary incidents with potentially large consequences.  
 
     Rasmussen (1997) discussed risk management in a modern dynamic society and introduced the 
sociotechnical system involved in risk management. Many levels of politicians, managers, safety 
officers, and work planners are involved in the control of safety (and security) by means of laws, 
regulations, rules, and instructions that are formalized means for the control of hazardous physical 
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processes. The purpose is to motivate workers and operators (employees) and to educate them, 
guide them, or constrain their behavior by rules and equipment design so as to increase the safety of 
their performance. In addition to the use of regulations, rules, and instructions, Rasmussen discussed 
cognitive control of behavior and, according to him, important questions with regard to risk 
management were: Will decision makers be committed to safety? Is management prepared to 
allocate adequate resources to the maintenance of defenses? Do regulatory efforts serve to control 
management priorities properly? Are decision makers aware of safety constraints? A more thorough 
description of the sociotechnical perspective on risk management will be given in section 5.2. 
 
     According to Power (2007), the organization of uncertainty in the form of risk management 
designs and standards is related to expectations of governance and demands for defendable, 
auditable processes. Public demands for risk regulation and greater transparency and accountability 
in risk handling have led to a shift from risk analysis to risk governance, a shift toward a form of risk 
governance that is more corporate in form and constitutes the governance of risk management. Risk 
governance refers to a complex of coordinating, steering, and regulatory processes conducted for 
collective decision-making involving uncertainty. The term governance comprises both the 
institutional structure (formal and informal) and the policy process that guides and restrains 
collective activities of individual groups and societies. Its aim is to avoid, regulate, reduce, or control 
risk problems (Renn, 2014). 
 
     As previously mentioned, ideas about internal control (functional self-regulation) and risk 
management have been increasingly commingled, and risk management and regulation are no longer 
seen as broadly contrasting methods of assuring safety and security (Power, 2007). Regulatory 
agencies seek to harness organizations’ risk management systems as regulatory assets (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992, referred to in Scheytt et al., 2006), and incentives of various kinds can be used to 
get organizations to internalize regulatory objectives, including the promise of a lower burden of 
inspection (Scheytt et al., 2006). Risk management is a part of the risk-governing process and is based 
on different regimes, that is, the set of rules and standards that govern the handling of risk in a 
specific regulatory context (Renn, 2014). 
 
     Traditionally, industrial safety has focused its effort on preventing incidents that had occurred in 
the past. More recently, the aim has become to identify and evaluate potential threats before they 
realize their catastrophic potential (Mearns et al., 1997). Safety (and security) management programs 
often include risk and vulnerability assessments, management strategies, training, information, and 
technical design (Aven et al., 2004). In earlier years, risk and vulnerability analyses of technological 
systems (e.g., the electric power supply system) were mostly concentrated on technical factors, but 
during the last decades human and organizational factors have also become important parts of the 
analysis (Fridheim and Hagen, 2007). Organizations have to implement different preventive 
measures based on the results of the risk and vulnerability analysis. 
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     According to Hood et al. (2002, referred to in Renn, 2014), risk management for technological 
systems requires technological, organizational, and behavioral measures for reducing risks: 
x Technological measures relate to the inclusion of active and passive safety devices. 
x Organizational measures include emergency and contingency plans, guidelines, monitoring 
requirements, and provisions for assuring accountability and competence. 
x Behavioral measures include all educational and training efforts to improve personal 
performance, increase sensibility toward safety issues, and strengthen the feeling of 
responsibility and accountability among the staff (safety culture). 
     With regard to information security management (ICT safety and security), Hagen, Albrechtsen, 
and Hovden (2008) also distinguished between technical security measures and organizational 
security measures. Technical security measures comprise firewalls, antivirus software, passwords, 
spyware, and malware protection, for example. In addition, a wide range of different organizational 
information security measures and activities exists. Hagen, Albrecthsen, and Hovden categorized 
these measures into four main groups: 
x The security policy, which is the foundation of any security regime. This policy specifies the 
strategies behind an organization’s information security approach through a written 
document, directly linked to the overall strategy of the company. 
x Procedures and controls, which are directly derived from the security policy. This group of 
measures consists of documents guiding individual and organizational behavior such as user 
instructions, security plans, and non-disclosure agreements, as well as control and follow-up 
activities of the documented systems. 
x Administrative tools and methods include both proactive and reactive means such as asset 
classification, risk analysis, audits, and incident reporting systems. 
x Creation and maintenance of security awareness, which includes both individual and 
collective activities, that is, education and awareness-raising initiatives (e.g. e-mails, 
pamphlets, mouse pads, formal presentations, e-learning, discussion groups). 
     According to Leveson et al. (2009), organizational factors play a role in almost all accidents and are 
a critical part of understanding and preventing them. Technologies enable growth and promise global 
prosperity but may also cause major disruptions and undesirable long-term consequences. We need 
to understand not only the technologies, but also the organizations and institutions that implement, 
sustain, and co-evolve with the technologies. The way safety is managed in an organization, or 
regulated by a regulatory authority, depends heavily on the beliefs and assumptions that managers 
and safety professionals have concerning organizational behavior and safety (Reiman and 
Rollenhagen, 2011). In this thesis, I have chosen to study several important elements of safety and 
security management systems which have been identified in previous research (Rasmussen, 1997; 
Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008; Renn, 2014; Aven et al., 2004); i.e., government risk 
regulation, the use of technical standards for safety and security, risk perception among managers 
and employees, management commitment to safety and security, and awareness creation and 
training with regard to safety and security.
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5. Theoretical foundations 
This chapter starts with a summary of various theories within the safety science field, and then goes 
on to describe the main theoretical framework of this thesis (i.e., the sociotechnical perspective and 
institutional organizational theory). Last, different theories about regulation, standards, 
sensemaking, risk perception, safety culture, and management commitment and awareness are 
explored in relation to the theoretical framework. 
5.1 Safety science 
Safety science can be viewed as knowledge about safety-related issues and the development of 
concepts, theories, principles, and methods to understand, assess, communicate, and manage safety 
(Aven, 2014). Certain theories have been popular in the safety science community in recent decades, 
as evidenced by their widespread citation. Three theories in particular are often cited: normal 
accident theory, high reliability theory, and resilience engineering (Hopkins, 2014). 
     Charles Perrow introduced the normal accidents theory in 1984. He detailed the concepts of 
coupling and complexity and claimed that failures may be inevitable as systems grow increasingly 
complex. The main problem is that it is impossible to predict the widespread impacts if one system 
component fails. Systems can be described by their complexity and by the tight coupling of their 
components and processes. Perrow’s framework was not initially designed to address infrastructure 
interdependencies; however, his key concepts can be instrumental in highlighting some of the 
challenges related to infrastructure interdependencies. Coupling can refer to the degree of 
interconnectedness in technological systems (i.e., the extent to which failures are able to escalate 
rapidly and spread to other parts of the system or other technological systems). The concept of 
complexity here refers to the nature of interactions between parts of a system or between 
infrastructures. In a system of complex interactions, its processes will be characterized by “unfamiliar 
sequences, unplanned and unexpected sequences, and either not visible or immediately 
comprehensible” (Perrow, 1984, referred to in Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). 
     In relatively simple systems – where only a few elements and their relationships and 
interconnections are well understood – it is relatively easy to determine how an event will 
propagate. This is not the case in complex systems. Indeed, it can be extremely difficult to 
understand propagation in complex systems because they are “composed of many parts that interact 
with and adapt to each other and, in so doing, affect their own individual environments and, hence, 
their own futures. The combined system-level behavior arises from the interactions of parts that are, 
in turn, influenced by the overall state of the system. Global patterns emerge from the autonomous 
but interdependent mutual adjustments of the components” (OECD, 2009). According to Hagen, 
Fridheim, and Nystuen (2005), most societal services and critical infrastructure adhere to Perrow’s 
description of complexity and tight couplings, and this is especially true for critical ICT systems. Large 
interconnected infrastructures are characterized by high complexity, and ICT is both a critical 
infrastructure in itself and at the same time an important component of other critical infrastructures, 
which further increases the complexity (Line and Tøndel, 2012).  
     One can argue that several critical infrastructures are becoming both more tightly coupled to each 
other and at the same time more interactively complex (Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). 
According to Utne, Hassel, and Johansson (2012), the largest challenge when it comes to modeling 
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and simulating interdependent infrastructures is the vast complexity. Even if we only consider a 
single infrastructure, the complexity is significant. Extrapolating this to the system of systems, a set 
of interdependent critical infrastructures, the complexity is manifold. According to Leveson (2004), 
technology today (especially digital technology) is changing faster than the engineering techniques to 
cope with the new technology are being created. Lessons learned over centuries about designing to 
prevent accidents may be lost or become ineffective when older technologies are replaced with new 
ones. The time to market for new products has significantly decreased, and carefully testing systems 
and designs to understand all the potential behaviors and risks before commercial and scientific use 
is often no longer possible. Interactive complexity is increasing in the systems we are building, and 
we are designing systems with potential interactions among the components that cannot be 
thoroughly planned, understood, anticipated, or guarded against. Thus, the degree of uncertainty is 
also high (Aven and Renn, 2010), which can create challenges for safety and security management of 
organizations. 
     The theory of high reliability organizations (HROs) is another widely known theory, popular both 
inside and outside academia. HROs have been seen as organizations that operate with hazardous 
technology in a “nearly accident-free” manner or with many fewer accidents than might have been 
expected (Hopkins, 2014). For Weick and Sutcliffe (2001), HROs (which they called “mindful 
organizations”) manage the unexpected through five processes: 
x Preoccupation with failures rather than successes 
x Reluctance to simplify interpretations 
x Sensitivity to operations 
x Commitment to resilience 
x Deference to expertise, as exhibited by encouragement of a fluid decision-making system 
Together these five processes produce a collective state of mindfulness (referred to in Hopkins, 
2014). 
     According to Roe and Schulman (2008), the study of reliability in critical systems is the study of 
strategic balances that must be struck between efficiency and reliability, between learning by trial 
and error and the prevention of risky mistakes, and between maximizing our anticipation of shocks 
and maximizing our resilience to recover after them. High reliability management also concerns how 
these balances are achieved and sustained. Roe and Schulman’s framework for understanding high 
reliability management highlights the crucial role of reliability professionals – control room 
operators, key technical department heads, and support personnel. Their special cognitive skills and 
flexible performance modes maintain reliable operations even in the face of widely varying and 
unpredictable conditions. Westrum (1992) argued that organizations conducting potentially 
hazardous operations need requisite imagination (i.e., a diversity of thinking and imagining that 
matches the variety of possible failure scenarios). Having this requisite imagination characterizes 
high reliability organizations. High reliability organizations can manage and sustain almost error-free 
performance despite operating in hazardous conditions where the consequences of errors could be 
catastrophic. According to Westrum (2004), these organizations can also be described as having a 
generative culture. A generative culture requires that alignment, awareness, and empowerment 
replace suspicion, isolation, and passivity. An open and generative culture will mean better uptake of 
innovations and better response to danger signals.  
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     A third perspective that has become popular in recent years is resilience engineering (Hopkins, 
2014). According to Hollnagel et al. (2010), resilience engineering can be defined as the “intrinsic 
ability of a system to adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so 
that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions" (p. xxxvi). 
The development of resilience engineering has focused on four abilities that are essential for 
resilience: the ability to (a) respond to what happens, (b) monitor critical developments, (c) 
anticipate future threats and opportunities, and (d) learn from past experience, successes as well as 
failures. Working with the four abilities provides a structured way of analyzing problems and issues, 
as well as of proposing practical solutions (concepts, tools, and methods). According to Hopkins 
(2014), resilience engineering is quite similar to HRO theory. 
5.2 Sociotechnical dimensions of safety 
 As shown in the previous section, the past 30 years of research on accidents have built an 
understanding of ensuring safety that goes beyond technical rationality and traditional engineering 
models. In 1997, Rasmussen introduced a sociotechnical perspective, where stressors from the 
environment affect the organizations’ management. Sociotechnical systems involved in risk 
management include several levels ranging from legislators through managers and work planners to 
system operators. These systems are stressed by the fast pace of technological change, by an 
increasingly aggressive, competitive environment, and by changing regulatory practices and public 
pressure. According to Rasmussen, risk management must be modeled by cross-disciplinary studies, 
considering risk management to be a control problem and serving to represent the control structure 
involving all levels of society, which requires a system-oriented approach (Rasmussen, 1997). 
     Figure 3 shows Rasmussen’s (1997) model of the sociotechnical system. At the top of the 
sociotechnical system, society seeks to control safety through the legal system, where safety has a 
high priority but so have employment, production, and trade balance. Legislation makes explicit the 
priorities of conflicting goals and sets boundaries of acceptable human conditions. The next level is 
authorities and industrial associations, workers (trade) unions, and other interest organizations. Here 
the legislation is interpreted and implemented in rules to control certain hazardous activities for 
certain employees. The rules must also be interpreted and implemented in the context of particular 
companies, where the work processes and equipment applied can be considered. Many details from 
the local conditions and processes need to be added to make the rules operational. At the bottom 
level are design of the productive and potentially hazardous processes and equipment and the 
development of standard operating procedures for the relevant operational states, including 
disturbances. 
     According to Rasmussen, the usual approach to modeling sociotechnical systems was by 
decomposition into elements that are modeled separately. However, he emphasized the need for 
more studies of the vertical interaction among the levels of sociotechnical systems with reference to 
the nature of the technological hazard they are assumed to control. In addition, practically speaking, 
laws, rules, and instructions are never followed to the letter. As previously mentioned, legislation 
and rules must be interpreted and implemented in the context of particular companies, and 
modifications of instructions are repeatedly found. The study of decision making cannot be 
separated from a simultaneous study of the social context and value system in which it takes place 
and the dynamic work process it is intended to control. Thus, it is important to include cognitive 
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science in studies of risk (or safety and security) management (e.g., processes of sensemaking, 
perception, awareness, and commitment). 
     Using the sociotechnical approach we have to consider factors related to man, technology, and 
organization (MTO) in investigations of accidents or attacks in the past and in the risk assessment of 
the future (Johnsen, 2012). According to Albrechtsen and Hovden (2007), information security is a 
less mature field than industrial safety when it comes to sociotechnical approaches. Hagen (2009) 
argued that research on information security management has much to learn from the sociotechnical 
theoretical approach when it comes to dealing with the human factor in organizations. Good 
information security performance can be achieved through a dynamic interaction among technology, 
individuals, and organizational factors. However, according to Dyreborg (2006), it is important to 
expand on the sociotechnical perspective so that it opens up to understand that not only does the 
environment influence organizations, organizations also influence their environments. 
     According to Dyreborg (2006), research on risk and safety has evolved from being dominated by a 
formal rational perspective through a bounded rational perspective to a cultural open perspective 
where social and cultural factors increasingly are seen as important for the understanding and 
analysis of safety. This corresponds well with Reason’s (1997) discussion of three approaches to 
safety management: the person model directed at reducing personal injury events, the engineering 
model focusing on the human-machine interface and system reliability, and the organizational model 
that deals with the integrity of defenses and broader systemic factors (p. 239). Dyreborg argued that 
it is important to develop a better understanding of the mechanisms that can influence 
organizational safety and that preferences and decisions are related not only to individuals but also 
to social and cultural mechanisms. In addition, research on organizational safety should apply an 
open organizational perspective to be better able to capture the increasing importance of the 
external dynamic boundaries for organizations’ management of safety. It is important to understand 
organizational safety (and security) in connection with the organizations’ environment, as well as 
how interactions play out in practice between organizations and their environment on the one side 
and between organizations and individuals/groups on the other.  
     Thus, my research in this thesis is consistent with the sociotechnical perspective on risk (or safety 
and security) management where stressors from the environment affect the organizations’ 
management, and I include and discuss several levels of the sociotechnical system from 
legislators/regulators (regulatory authorities) through managers and employees. The socio-technical 
approach means that we must explore theories from several research domains (Johnsen, 2012). In 
the present study, I have chosen to apply institutional organizational theory to expand on the 
sociotechnical perspective. As in the sociotechnical perspective, the institutional organizational 
perspective (an open organizational perspective) emphasizes regulative, normative, and cognitive 
aspects that can influence safety and security management. In addition, I explore theories from 
industrial safety and elements from information security research. 
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Figure 3. Collaboration in the sociotechnical system to improve risk management according to 
Rasmussen (1997) (from Johnsen, 2012). 
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5.3 Institutional organizational theory – organizations and their 
environments 
Organizational forms affect which issues get attention and which are ignored, how the issues are 
grouped together, and how they are separated. Organizational arrangements therefore have vital 
importance for risk management. Furthermore, external pressures, developments, and shocks 
(crises) may well be influential and result in new perceptions and organizational or procedural 
changes (Lango, Lægreid, and Rykkja, 2011). Many approaches to understanding the relationship 
between organizations and uncertainty (risk) focus on the organization-environment relationship 
(Power, 2007). In this thesis, I have chosen to apply institutional organizational theory (or 
organizational institutionalism) as part of my theoretical framework, which emphasizes that 
organizations are open systems strongly influenced by their environments. Organizations are 
embedded in society and are affected by institutions, ideas, rules, and legitimate patterns of action 
that are generally taken for granted. Attention is directed toward forces that lie beyond the 
organizational boundary in the realm of social processes (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983, 1991; Hoffman, 1999). Organizations and environments are interdependent; 
environments influence organizations but organizations also influence environments, and thus the 
sharp distinction between organization and environment is blurred (Power, 2007). 
     Modern societies contain many complexes of institutionalized rules and patterns (e.g., products of 
professional groups, the state, public opinion), and these are seen as socially constructed realities 
which provide frameworks for the creation and elaboration of formal organizations (Scott, 1998). The 
roots of the social constructionist approach are found in the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, 
and in Berger and Luckman’s (1966) The social construction of reality, which challenged realist 
approaches by arguing that rationalized social and economic laws are subjective social phenomena 
derived from experience rather than objective natural phenomena revealed through experience 
(Dobbin, 1994).  Organizations are not seen as conforming to institutional demands, but as making 
sense of them, adapting them, enacting them, and working upon them (Glynn, 2008, referred to in 
Greenwood et al., 2008). 
     The use of institutionalism with other theories and topics rather than in isolation is, according to 
Greenwood et al. (2008), a conspicuous and significant strength. Institutional theory has an 
important capacity to stimulate contextualization. It aids us in contextualizing the phenomena we 
study, whether that context encompasses regulatory, historical, political, cognitively tacit, or socially 
embedded settings. Such contextualization (which includes the understanding that knowledge is 
socially constructed within a broader context) is a distinguishing feature of institutional theory and 
research. In this thesis, institutional organizational theory is mainly used to contextualize and 
structure the studied phenomenon (i.e., challenges for safety and security management). 
     According to Engen and Olsen (2010), changes in technological systems are characterized by a 
complex institutional embeddedness. The environmental contexts in which organizations exist are 
constantly changing, and at an increasing rate. These changes lead to increasing complexity, 
especially under the impact of fast-paced technological change. Future threats to society are not 
limited to specific sectors or areas, but stem from complex interactions among economic, 
technological, social, and cultural factors (Olsen, Kruke, and Hovden, 2007). Moreover, a growing 
consensus suggests that micro-electronically based information technologies are altering the way we 
live, work, communicate, and organize our activities. Orlikowski and Barley (2001) argued that 
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information technology research can benefit from incorporating institutional analysis from 
organization studies, and organization studies can benefit by following the lead of information 
technology research in taking the material properties of technologies into account. Technologies are 
embedded in complex interdependent social, economic, and political networks and are consequently 
shaped by such broader institutional influences. At the same time, changes are occurring in the 
nature of work and organizing that cannot be understood without taking into account changes in the 
technological infrastructure on which economic and organizational activity rests. It is important to 
consider both the technological changes and the institutional contexts that are reshaping economic 
and organizational activities. 
     Institution is a complex concept, and institutional scholars have not reached agreement on its 
definition. Different institutional scholars accord priority to different institutional elements. In the 
introduction chapter to The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, Greenwood et al. 
(2008) used the term to refer to “(…) more or less taken-for-granted” repetitive social behavior that 
is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social 
exchange and thus enable self-producing social order” (p. 5). Since the conceptual beginnings of 
modern organizational institutionalism in the late 1970s, the term institution has acquired two 
different meanings: institutions as cultural models and institutions as regulatory frameworks. Scott 
(1995) brought order to the various strands of institutional analysis by distinguishing between the 
regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive “pillars” or elements/aspects that underpin institutions 
(Greenwood et al., 2008). According to Scott (2008), “Institutions are comprised of (sic.) regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, 
provide stability and meaning to social life” (p. 48). This thesis builds on Scott’s definition of 
institution. 
     According to Scott, institutions are transported by various carriers – cultures, structures, and 
routines – and operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction (Hoffman, 1999) from the world system to 
interpersonal interaction. Although rules, norms, and culture-cognitive beliefs (symbolic systems) are 
central ingredients of institutions, the concept must also encompass associated behaviors and 
material resources. Rules, norms, and meanings arise in interaction and are preserved and modified 
by human behavior. Institutions impose restrictions by defining legal, moral, and cultural boundaries, 
setting off legitimate from illegitimate activities. However, institutions also support and empower 
activities and actors; they provide guidelines and resources for taking action (Scott, 2008). The 
institutional influences on organizational behavior can take several forms, but taken together they 
guide the interpretation of issues as they emerge and persist (Hoffman, 1999).  
     The institutional aspects (or pillars) are not operationally distinct, but rather overlap; development 
of one aspect influences the development of other aspects (Hoffman, 1999). However, Scott 
acknowledged that the cultural-cognitive pillar provides the deeper foundations of institutional 
forms (i.e., the infrastructure on which not only beliefs, but also norms and rules rest). Scott also 
urged researchers to specify which pillars are operative in which settings, how they unfold, and with 
what effects (Scott, 2004, referred to in Greenwood et al., 2008). 
     The regulative aspects of institutions most commonly take the form of regulations, which guide 
organizational action and perspectives by coercion or threat of legal sanctions. The normative 
aspects of institutions generally take the form of rules-of-thumb, standard operating procedures, 
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occupational (technical) standards, and educational curricula. Their ability to guide organizational 
action and beliefs stems largely from social obligation or conformance to norms. The cognitive (or 
cultural) aspects of institutions embody symbols (words, signs, and gestures), cultural rules, and 
frameworks that guide understanding of the nature of reality and the frames through which that 
meaning is developed. Organizations will often abide by them without conscious thought (Hoffman, 
1999); that is, they take them for granted. Institutions are viewed as including both formal structures 
and informal rules and procedures that structures conduct (Scott, 2008). 
     Greenwood et al. (2008) were somewhat critical of the definition of institutions as regulatory 
frameworks of states and professional agencies. According to them, accounts of how regulatory 
agencies (institutions) shape organizational behavior are incomplete institutional explanations unless 
they show how regulatory frameworks embody, enact, or transmit taken-for-granted societal norms 
and values. Otherwise, referring to regulatory frameworks as “the institutional context” risks 
confusing institutional theory with resource-dependence or political-economy explanations. 
However, they still conclude that in the interests of guarding the epistemological pluralism the scope 
of contributors to institutional theory’s growth seems to indicate they favor the broader construct 
definition of institutions put forward by Scott. Scott’s definition increased specificity but encouraged 
continued application of institutional theory to multiple levels, topics, and settings. 
     Institutions exist at the level of the individual, the organization, the field, and the society, but 
organizational institutionalism has primarily been interested in institutions and institutional 
processes at the level of the organization and the organizational field (Greenwood et al., 2008). An 
organizational field refers to those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area 
of institutional life (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Organizations operate within fields (or societal 
sectors) that shape, constrain, and empower them, but are also influenced by the interests and 
activities of their own participants. The concept of the organizational field builds on the more 
conventional concept of industry, but adds to this focal population other and different organizations 
that critically influence their performance, and this includes regulators. The concept of organizational 
field expands the framework of analytic attention to encompass relevant actors and governance 
structures that empower and constrain the actions of participants in a delimited social sphere (Scott, 
2008). 
     Ultimately, organizational institutionalists believe that organizations are penetrated by 
environments and deeply embedded in institutional contexts. A given organization is supported and 
constrained by institutional forces. Moreover, a given organization incorporates a multitude of 
institutionalized features in the form of symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts 
(e.g., technology) within their own boundaries. Hence, according to Scott (2008), it is appropriate to 
speak of the extent to which organizational components or features are institutionalized, and these 
views are shares by all or the great majority of institutional theorists. In addition, the subset of 
theorists endorsing a cultural-cognitive perspective has added an additional assertion: The very 
concept of an organization as a special-purpose, instrumental entity is a product of institutional 
processes – constitutive processes that define the capacities of collective actors, both generally and 
as specialized subtypes. 
     According to the theoretical approach employed in this thesis, technology’s effects on 
organizations are socially constructed. Artifacts can be defined as a discrete material object, 
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consciously produced or transformed by human activity under the influence of the physical and/or 
cultural environment. Artifacts are created by human ingenuity to assist in the performance of 
various tasks. The most important characteristic of artifacts is that they all embody both technical 
and symbolic elements (Suchman, 2003, referred to in Scott, 2008). Users draw on familiar schemas 
and frames to make sense of a new technology. The formal organization can be considered an 
institution with accompanying rules and instructions for its incorporation and employment in a social 
setting. Institutions are taken for granted in that they are both treated as relative fixtures in a social 
environment and accounted for as functional elements of that environment (Jepperson, 1991).  Once 
a technology is developed and deployed, it tends to become reified and institutionalized, losing its 
connection with the human agents that constructed it and gave it meaning, and appears to be a part 
of the objective, structural properties of the organization (Roberts and Grabowski, 1996). 
     Institutions can shape technological trajectories, but technologies can also shape organizations 
(Leonardi and Barley, 2010). Technology can be defined as “the process whereby actors (or teams) 
operate tools to solve certain tasks” (Engen and Olsen, 2010, p. 336). According to Hughes (1992), 
technology is a core element in technological systems. A technological system is defined as a 
complex of cultural, organizational, and technological phenomena jointly focused on a particular 
productive or political goal (e.g., the system for generating, distributing, and using electricity). As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, Leonardi and Barley (2010) argued that one of the most critically important 
questions for students of organizing is: How is the shift to a computational infrastructure shaping the 
way people work and organize? By computational infrastructure, they suggested that work done in 
organizations is increasingly accomplished via ICT that store, transmit, and transform information. 
Organizations often come to take for granted the way a technology should be used. Network 
companies might, for instance, take for granted that process control systems (e.g., SCADA systems) 
are used to improve system operations and not be adequately aware of the additional vulnerabilities 
introduced by using these ICT systems. 
5.4 Regulative and normative aspects 
Regulation is central to any discussion of the relationship between organizations and the 
management of risk (Scheytt et al., 2006). Organizations are embedded in society, which makes them 
susceptible to rules that come from their environment (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). Regulation 
can be seen as being inherently about the control of risks; however, a number of core challenges lies 
at the heart of any regulatory decision on the handling of risk, ranging from the definition and 
identification of risks and critical debates about the principles inherent in any regulatory activity to 
fundamental questions on the appropriate institutions for risk regulation.  How risk is perceived and 
what regulatory solutions are proposed are fundamentally shaped by underlying worldviews and 
understanding of cause-effect relationships (Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge, 2012). A substantial variation 
in risk regulation approaches is evident from one domain to another in an international context, 
between states within the same area of risk, and across policy domains within a national context 
(Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin, 2001). 
     From an organizational institutional perspective, legislation can be seen as a reflection of cognitive 
schema that is historically contingent. In some studies, organizations have instrumentally invoked or 
evaded the law and looked to the law for normative and cognitive guidance as they sought their 
place in a socially constructed cultural reality. These studies discussed how policies and practices 
become constructed as enhancing efficiency, and thus as “rational” behavior, and eventually are 
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taken for granted. These studies did not assume that new practices/models exist. Instead, they 
pointed to the reciprocal relationships involving professions, regulators, and organizational managers 
in constructing business models in response to ambiguous legislation. According to Scott (2004), this 
implies a transmutation over time of regulative into normative and cultural-cognitive elements 
(referred to in Greenwood et al., 2008).  
     Some groups of researchers within organizational institutionalism have focused not on the role of 
the state, but on the emergence of “soft” regulations. For these theorists, the institutional change of 
interest is the displacement of coercive, state-level regulations by more voluntary regulations such as 
standards, rankings, and accreditations. These softer regulatory structures are developed and applied 
by non-governmental agencies and elicit compliance because they provide legitimacy (Greenwood et 
al., 2008).This research can be linked to research on risk regulation. During past decades, a marked 
change has occurred in the way safety legislation is framed in many industrialized countries. The 
current trend is toward functional rules that emphasize the required outcomes of safety 
management, allowing considerable freedom on the part of organizations to identify the means by 
which these ends will be achieved (Reason, 1997). 
     Modes of risk regulation can be seen as a discussion of the pros and cons of rule compliance 
versus risk management (Hopkins, 2011), with a distinction between “hard regulation” based on 
“command and control” with prescriptive rules and “soft regulation” with concepts coined as “self-
regulation” (Sinclair, 1997; Short and Toffel, 2010) and “meta-regulation” (Gilad, 2010), for example. 
Command and control regulation was for a long time the dominant type of government regulation 
and has often resulted in a complex web of legislation, agency rules, permit procedures, standards, 
judicial decisions, and other enforceable policies underpinned by a variety of sanctions. Command 
and control regulation has been referred to as an instrumental model of regulation, a deterministic 
regulation regime, detailed regulation, and prescriptive regulation. Despite its position as the 
dominant policy response, command and control has routinely been subjected to criticism, which has 
sparked considerable interest in various types of regulatory alternatives. These range from the 
replacement of command and control with economic incentives to the greater use of property rights 
and markets, as well as information-based strategies, voluntarism, and self-regulation (Sinclair, 
1997). 
     An important question is whether these modes of regulation represent a dichotomy or whether 
they are complementary, as presented in Figure 4.  The argument in this thesis follows Sinclair 
(1997), stating that the dichotomy is false. These modes represent two extremes or ideal types. In 
practice, risk regulation regimes combine responsibilities and roles in a public-private partnership 
with a top-down approach with legal, binding norms and a bottom-up approach with industrial 
(technical) standards and “best practices.” The use of legal standards becomes a “linking pin” that 
brings the two approaches together, as indicated in the right-hand part of Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Two modes of risk regulation. 
 
 
5.4.1.1 Functional regulations 
Function-based regulation relies on some form of discretionary criteria that are considered legal 
standards and provides some special interpretation challenges. The term legal standard refers to 
words or phrases in a law claim that stipulate a scale or norm beyond the law (i.e., a particular 
practice, widespread attitudes in the community, or other conditions that change with time). All the 
while these phenomena change over time, the contents of the law do not. The use of legal standards 
aims to achieve an appropriate regulation of complex fields in constant development. It can also be 
seen as an expression of respect for the importance of expert knowledge to ensure safety and quality 
in key areas of society. Legal standards are likely to safeguard the goal of safety and quality better 
than if they had been fully formulated in laws and regulations. The underlying measure of the legal 
standards is based on an understanding of the issues, terminology, and solutions that are understood 
in the professional and scientific community. Through stakeholder involvement in the process of 
developing these norms, the use of legal standards may enjoy greater legitimacy than rules based on 
legal terminology and legal text (Lindøe and Engen, 2013). 
     A consistent application of a function-based regulation requires a comprehensive and systematic 
review of how the various provisions are to be understood and how the appropriate standards 
should be used to meet the requirements. Procedures must provide relationships between laws and 
regulations and technical/professional standards to comply with the laws and provide predictability 
in relation to supervisors' evaluations. For regulatory authorities and inspectors, this can be a 
demanding and comprehensive system to maintain because it requires that the standards keep pace 
with developments and new knowledge. Comprehensive guidelines may also be an excuse for 
companies to not take responsibility in monitoring and implementing new and recognized expertise 
and scientific knowledge (Lindøe and Engen, 2013). 
5.4.1.2 Internal control 
When using functional internal control regulations, instead of designing detailed rules and control 
systems, the regulatory authorities prescribe safety goals and permit companies to develop and 
enforce their own detailed rules. As previously mentioned, this provides more capacity for the 
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authorities to work on other important tasks and at the same time contributes to a heightening of 
the individual company’s sense of responsibility for its own safety and security. When self-regulation 
is used to assure safety, enterprises are obliged to identify and assess risks and hazards embedded in 
their operations (Lindøe, Olsen, and Lie, 2006), and internal control gives companies the 
responsibility to monitor and implement an updated safety management system. 
     According to Hovden (1998), internal control means both “top down and bottom up” (i.e., top and 
line management involvement and responsibility combined with participation and industrial 
democracy). Internal control represents a shift to meta-regulations by society and delegation of 
direct rule-based control to the industry itself, and each enterprise is free to tailor it to its own needs, 
routines, organization, and culture. Power (2007) suggested that internal control systems embody 
both the potential of greater efficiency and coordination on the one hand and greater sensitivity to 
social responsibility issues on the other. The latter refers to a view of internal control systems as the 
basis for more substantive improvement of, for example, health, safety, and environment. 
     Organizations have an incentive to comply with principles of internal control because the 
regulatory process can focus on desired outcomes rather than regulating detailed processes, with 
regulatory intervention as a last resort. In cases of breach or dissatisfaction, the regulatory body has 
options to escalate its enforcement process with more serious consequences for the regulated 
organization. Some regulatory systems are linked to licensing privileges (including the regulatory 
system for the Norwegian electric power supply system), where a license to trade or conduct an 
activity is conditional on compliance with formal or procedural norms, such as having “effective” 
internal control. The sanction of withdrawing a license is usually a last resort and an outcome of 
extensive prior negotiation (Power, 2007).     
5.4.1.3 Standards 
According to Power (2007), institutional capacities to organize in the face of uncertainty have been 
challenged and threatened by failures, scandals, and disasters. In response, visionary documents and 
designs in the form of standards and guidelines for individuals and organizations have been produced 
to maintain perceptions of control and manageability. These recipes and recommendations have 
constituted a new normativity for risk management. The organization of uncertainty in the form of 
risk management designs and standards is related to expectations of governance and demands for 
defendable, auditable processes. The institutional construction of a risk management process is 
expressed and materialized in standards and guidelines. Standards formalize the fundamental design 
principles for the organizational self-management of risk and establish baselines against which 
organizations must evaluate themselves. Technologies are shaped by and embody normative 
processes, and trade and industrial groups often convene to set standards for a wide range of 
machines and technical equipment (Scott, 2008). 
     Along with hierarchies (or formal organizations) and markets, standardization can be seen as one 
of the primary forms of social coordination, control, and choice. These elements prescribe 
procedures for human interaction and guide the behavior of various actors.  Standardization, along 
with organizations and markets, is a fundamental societal institution that includes defined patterns 
of action, rules, and beliefs. On a general and abstract level, standards constitute rules about what 
those who adopt them should do (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000).  Applied to the variety of safety 
issues, the hierarchy of norms can be enforced as laws, regulations, regulatory guidelines, legal 
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standards, and mandatory or voluntary technical (industrial) standards. In a functional regulatory 
regime, the use of legal, binding norms is minimized, but connected by legal standards to relevant 
and applicable technical standards (Lindøe and Engen, 2013). 
     A significant feature of standards and standardization is that expert knowledge is stored in rules 
and technical solutions, and technical standards have been introduced in more and more areas. A 
partial explanation is the need for control and supervision, which follows from the reliance on 
decentralized and deregulated systems. Standardizers have usually been founded with the backing of 
a state or large companies. However, the mission of these national standards organizations has been 
to develop standards for aspects of industrial activity which are not subsumed under a formal 
organization.  The vast need for global coordination in the absence of a strong global organization or 
world state may explain the growing importance of global standardization in recent decades. 
Standards are explicit and in written form, most are voluntary, and standardizers cannot sanction 
those who do not comply with their standards. However, some standards become institutionalized in 
that in practice actors take it for granted that they should be followed (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 
2000). 
5.5 Cultural-cognitive aspects 
Many institutionalists, especially new institutionalists, stress the centrality of cultural-cognitive 
elements of institutions: the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the 
frames through which meaning is made. As previously mentioned, Scott acknowledged that the 
cultural-cognitive pillar provides the deeper foundations of institutional forms, i.e., the infrastructure 
on which not only beliefs, but also norms and rules rest. The concept of risk perception is connected 
to cognition, mental processes, sensemaking, and culture. Thus, I start this section with a short 
account of sensemaking theory before describing theories of risk perception, safety culture, 
management commitment, and awareness. 
5.5.1 Sensemaking 
According to Weick (2001), new technologies such as complex production systems that use 
computers (e.g., electric power supply systems) have created unusual problems in sensemaking for 
managers and operators (employees). Sensemaking comes from preexisting symbols, norms, and 
social structures that people reproduce and transform rather than create from scratch. Proponents 
of new institutional organizational theory claim that institutions are both antecedent to and 
emergent from sensemaking processes. Institutions enter meaning-making processes in three ways: 
Institutions serve as the building blocks or substance of sensemaking, institutions dynamically guide 
and edit action formation, and institutions are continually enacted and accomplished in ongoing 
sensemaking processes (Weber and Glynn, 2006). 
     According to Weick (2001), organizational members selectively attend to their environments and 
then, in interaction, make collective sense of what is happening. Weick’s ideas are consistent with 
ideas of the scholars within organizational institutionalism who emphasize the diffusion of ideas 
through a process of “translation.” Instead of treating institutionally prescribed structures and 
practices as “out there” and as adopted more or less “as is,” translation assumes that ideas and 
practices are interpreted and reformulated during the process of adoption. This approach is faithful 
to the social constructionist principles of institutional thought. Organizations are not seen as 
conforming to institutional demands, but as making sense of them, adapting them, enacting them, 
 Theoretical foundations  
58 
 
and working upon them. Thus, the institutional context may be an important part of sensemaking 
within organizations, and the micro-dynamics of sensemaking offer an opportunity for institutional 
organizational theory to develop a richer theory of the intersubjective processes of perception, 
interpretation, and interaction that establish the core of a micro-level understanding of 
institutionalization (Greenwood et al., 2008). 
     The use of computer systems involves the self-contained, invisible material process that is actually 
unfolding, as well as the equally self-contained, equally invisible imagined process that is mentally 
unfolding in the mind of an individual or a team. There is also continuous intervention improvement 
and redesign (technological innovations) in computer technologies, which means that the 
implementation state of development never stops, and these technologies require ongoing 
structuring and sensemaking if they are to be managed (Weick, 2001). It is difficult to establish a 
complete system description of these complex systems, and the lack of understanding might lead to 
“inaccurate” risk perception. Leblebici et al. (1991) noted that new technologies invoke the use of 
analogies; that is, existing cognitive frameworks are used to make sense of ambiguous or novel 
events (referred to in Greenwood et al., 2008). 
5.5.2 Risk perception 
Risk professionals still debate the nature of risks: Are risks social constructions or real phenomena? 
Do technical risk estimates represent “objective” probabilities of harm or do risks only constitute 
mental constructions? According to Aven and Renn (2010), it is important to deal with both the 
“physical” and “social” dimensions of risk and avoid the naive realism of risk as a purely objective 
category, as well as the relativistic perspective of making all risk judgments subjective reflections. 
They argued that it is essential to complement data on physical consequences with insights into risk 
perception when one is dealing with complex and uncertain risk problems. Studies of risk perception 
have examined the opinions that people express when they are asked to characterize and evaluate 
hazardous activities and technologies. Perceived risk (i.e., subjective risk judgments or a person’s 
own estimate of risk) may deviate from "objective" risk. “Objective” risk is the risk that exists 
independent of an individual’s knowledge and concerns about the source of the risk (Ulleberg and 
Rundmo, 1996, referred to in Oltedal et al., 2004). 
 
     The study of risk perception has a cognitive stance with a focus on perception as mainly a 
cognitive process. People's risk judgments are related to cognitive processes, for example, how one is 
able to comprehend the given information (Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, 1982). This approach 
makes up the foundation of the psychometric paradigm in risk perception. According to this 
paradigm, risk can be understood as a function of general properties of the hazard (risk object) 
(Sjöberg, 2000). The psychometric model is based on a number of explanatory scales (e.g., new risk 
versus old risk, involuntary risk versus voluntary risk, dreaded risk, number of people exposed) where 
the subjects are asked to rate a number of hazards on each of the scales. The cultural theory of risk 
perception launched by Douglas (1966, 1978) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) has also been an 
important theoretical contribution. According to cultural theory, risk perception is not governed by 
personality traits, needs, preferences, or properties of the risk objects. It is a socially or culturally 
constructed phenomenon. What is perceived as dangerous, and how much risk to accept, is a 
function of one’s cultural adherence and social learning (referred to in Oltedal et al., 2004). Sjöberg 
(2000), on the other hand, saw attitude as a crucial factor in risk perception, in addition to risk 
sensitivity and specific fear. 
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     According to Aven and Renn (2010), intuitive risk perception is based on how information about a 
risk is communicated, the psychological mechanisms for processing uncertainty, and earlier 
experience of danger. This mental process results in perceived risk, a collection of notions that 
people form regarding risk sources in relation to the information available to them and their basic 
common sense (Jaeger et al., 2001, referred to in Aven and Renn, 2010). This thesis will focus on risk 
perception among managers and employees within organizations (electric power supply network 
companies); in an organization, risk perceptions may influence risk behavior and hence influence 
“objective” risk or safety (Rundmo, 1996). Trust is of crucial importance for the understanding of risk 
perception (Sjöberg, 2000). Trust in an expert, an agency, or a corporation has been assumed to be 
determined by perceptions of a number of attributes, among them competence and expertise 
(Peters, Covello, and McCallum, 1997, referred to in Oltedal et al., 2004). 
5.5.3 Safety culture 
 As shown in the previous sections, the concept of risk perception is connected to cognition, mental 
processes, sensemaking, and culture. According to Windschitl and Wells (1996), uncertainty is a 
psychological construct that “exists only in the mind; if a person’s knowledge was complete, that 
person would have no uncertainty” (referred to in Sjöberg, Moen, and Rundmo, 2004, p. 7). As 
mentioned earlier, the cognitive (or cultural) aspects of institutions embody symbols – words, signs, 
and gestures – as well as cultural rules and frameworks that guide understanding of the nature of 
reality and the frames through which that meaning is developed (Hoffman, 1999). Geertz (1973) also 
concluded that culture is most effectively treated as a symbolic system. Symbols are the surface 
expression of the underlying cultural structure (Oltedal, 2011). According to Scott (1998), the term 
culture describes an attribute or quality internal to a group, and we can refer to an organizational 
culture or subculture. In this sense, culture is a fairly stable set of taken-for-granted assumptions, 
shared beliefs, meanings, and values that form a kind of backdrop for action (p. 132). 
     Employees’ perceptions of organizational support, particularly management’s commitment to 
safety in the organization, are often claimed to be a measure of an organization’s safety climate. The 
terms safety culture and safety climate have often been used interchangeably, although safety 
culture is considered to be a more complex concept than safety climate, reflecting fundamental 
values, norms, assumptions, and expectations (Mearns and Flin, 2009, referred to in Skogdalen and 
Tveiten, 2011). Over time, consensus among industrial psychologists has emerged to differentiate 
safety climate as the surface features of an organization’s safety culture, as discerned from the 
workforce’s comprehension and perceptions at a given point in time. Subcultures possess cultural 
elements and influence the culture emerging from the interactions of the subcultures within an 
organization. Different employee groups can exhibit different safety attitudes/climate structures 
(Skogdalen and Tveiten, 2011). 
 
     The concept of safety culture was first used by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) 
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), following the Chernobyl accident that occurred 
in 1986. More recently, several definitions of the safety culture concept have abounded in safety 
research and organizational literature. There are many different conceptual definitions, but they can, 
in general, be placed into two broad categories: the socio-anthropological perspective and the 
organizational psychology perspective. The socio-anthropological perspective suggests that a 
superficial research model of culture should be avoided so as to build cultural research on a deeper, 
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more complex anthropological model. From an anthropological perspective, appropriate research 
methods include ethnography and field work, as well as qualitative in-depth studies based on 
interviews, observations, and/or participation. Within this perspective, culture is described with an 
emphasis on the organizational member’s subjective interpretation and sensemaking (Oltedal, 2011).  
     From the organizational psychology perspective, one can argue that culture can be described with 
a limited number of dimensions, usually through large questionnaire surveys. From this perspective, 
the culture concept is assumed to express itself through an organizational climate, a set of 
perceptually based psychological attributes. The organizational psychology perspective provides a 
conceptual bridge among safety culture, safety behavior, and organizational safety management 
systems, with the aim of controlling, guiding, or directing first-line operators’ attitude and behavior 
toward safe operations (Oltedal, 2011). 
     From a cultural perspective, safety policies are not important in themselves; the importance stems 
from how such policies, as symbols, make sense for the organizational members. This understanding 
of culture establishes a relationship between culture and climate; cultural beliefs and meaning given 
to organizational factors are reflected in actual behavior (Oltedal, 2011). Contrary to this, Antonsen 
(2009) questioned the degree to which some of this research fits into the term culture because it has 
been conceptualized within organizational theory, sociology, and anthropology. Antonsen concluded 
that the term safety culture should be used only as a conceptual label to denote the relationship 
between organizational culture and safety. The emphasis should be on organizational culture instead 
of safety culture, and this would give such studies a firmer theoretical foundation and richer 
empirical findings. 
     Guldenmund (2000), on the other hand, pointed out that most characteristics given to culture 
equally apply to climate, and in recent research it is becoming accepted to view climate as a 
reflection of an underlying culture. According to Oltedal (2011), organizational culture/climate is an 
integrated concept subject to change by organizational management practices and structures. One 
can assume that both organizational cultural and managerial features influence safety, which is 
defined as safety culture. Organizational safety culture is perceived as a concept with integrated 
parts from organizational management system practices and organizational culture/climate. The 
organizational safety culture is assumed to reflect the status of safety in the organization. 
Organizational safety, or safety culture, can be assessed by using two measurement outcome 
variables: risk perception and the state of the safety management system. 
5.5.4 Management commitment and awareness 
ICT safety and security is not purely a technical matter; it is highly dependent on the people and the 
organization surrounding the ICT system (Line and Tøndel, 2012). According to Reason (1997), 
commitment is a vital ingredient for managing the safety of an organization. Commitment has two 
main components: motivation and resources. The motivational issue is related to whether an 
organization seeks to be the domain model for good safety practices or whether it is simply content 
to keep one step ahead of the regulators. Top management can come and go, but a good safety 
culture endures beyond the top management. The second issue concerns the resources allocated to 
the achievement of safety goals. However, commitment will not suffice unless the organization has a 
correct awareness – or cognizance – of the dangers that threaten its operations. For cognizant 
organizations, a lengthy period without a bad accident does not signal the coming of peace. Rather, 
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they see it as a period of heightened danger and so reform and strengthen their defenses accordingly 
(a common feature of a high reliability organization). 
     ICT safety and security awareness can be seen as the extent to which organizational members 
understand the importance of information safety and security, the level of safety and security 
required by the organization, and their individual safety and security responsibilities and act 
accordingly (ISF, 2005, referred to in Albrechtsen, 2007). Members of an organization may have 
inadequate ICT safety and security awareness if they are unfamiliar with possible threats to the 
systems and how to mitigate them, if they are unaware of the possible consequences of safety and 
security breaches, or if they see their own work in isolation and are unaware of the implications of 
their use of ICT systems (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). 
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6. Research design, research methodology, and methods for data 
collection  
This chapter describes the research design, research methodology, and research methods employed 
in the thesis. According to Yin (1994), a research design is the logic that links the data to be collected 
(and the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of a study. The research design guides the 
researcher in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data. A methodology is a general 
approach to studying a research topic; it establishes how one will go about studying any 
phenomenon (Silverman, 1993). A methodology involves philosophical (i.e., worldview) assumptions 
that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data (Creswell, 2011). A method focuses on 
the collecting and analyzing of data (Silverman, 1993). 
    According to Creswell (2003), three questions are central to the design of research: 
1. What knowledge claims are being made by the researcher (including a theoretical 
perspective)? 
2. What strategies of inquiry will inform the procedures? 
3. What methods of data collection and analysis will be used? 
These three elements of inquiry combine to form different approaches to research. These 
approaches are, in turn, translated into processes in the design of research, and using these three 
elements the researcher can identify a quantitative, qualitative, or mixed-methods approach to 
inquiry. 
     Stating a knowledge claim means that researchers start a project with certain assumptions about 
how they will learn and what they will learn during their inquiry. According to Creswell (2003), these 
claims are called paradigms, philosophical assumptions, epistemologies and ontologies, and broadly 
conceived research methodologies. Philosophically, researchers make claims about what knowledge 
is (ontology), how they know it (epistemology), what values go into it (axiology), how they write 
about it (rhetoric), and the process for studying it (methodology). 
     In this research project, the theoretical perspective I have chosen to apply has implications for the 
research design and methodology. The sociotechnical perspective on risk management, institutional 
organizational theory, and the chosen definition of institution (Scott’s omnibus conception of 
institutions) functioned as contextualization for the phenomena studied and as a structure for the 
thesis. As previously mentioned, modern societies contain many complexes of institutionalized rules 
and patterns (e.g., products of professional groups, the state, public opinion) and, according to Scott 
(1998), these are socially constructed realities which provide frameworks for the creation and 
elaboration of formal organizations. Furthermore, according to the theoretical approach employed in 
this thesis, technology’s effects on organizations are also socially constructed. These knowledge 
claims adhere to the perspective of social constructivism. Assumptions made by social constructivism 
are that meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are 
interpreting. Humans engage with their world and make sense of it based on their historical and 
social perspective (Creswell, 2003). 
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     However, another position about claims on knowledge is pragmatism. Instead of methods being 
important, pragmatists view the research problem as being most important, and researchers use all 
approaches to understand the problem. Pragmatism is not committed to any one system of 
philosophy and reality. Individual researchers are free to choose the methods, techniques, and 
procedures of research that best meet their needs and purposes (Creswell, 2003).  As mentioned 
earlier, the use of institutionalism with other theories and topics rather than in isolation is, according 
to Greenwood et al. (2008), a conspicuous and significant strength. Institutional theory has an 
important capacity to stimulate contextualization. Institutional theory aids us in contextualizing the 
phenomena we study, whether that context encompasses regulatory, historical, political, cognitively 
tacit, or socially embedded settings. Such contextualization (which includes the understanding that 
knowledge is socially constructed within a broader context) is a distinguishing feature of institutional 
theory and research. As emphasized in Chapter 5, organizations are penetrated by environments and 
deeply embedded in institutional contexts. A given organization is supported and constrained by 
institutional forces. Moreover, a given organization incorporates a multitude of institutionalized 
features in the form of symbolic systems, relational systems, routines, and artifacts (e.g., technology) 
within their own boundaries.  
     I have chosen to use a mixed-methods research approach to achieve a deeper understanding of 
the organizational environment and all the different factors that may affect the safety and security 
management of network organizations. Pragmatism opens the door to multiple methods, different 
worldviews, and different assumptions, as well as different forms of data collection and analysis in 
the mixed-methods study (Creswell, 2003). Research on risk, safety, and security is in itself 
multidisciplinary, and multiple methodologies are applied within this research field. According to 
Mayring et al. (2007, referred to in Creswell, 2011), interdisciplinary research problems call for 
addressing complex issues using methodologies from both quantitative and qualitative research to 
bring diverse approaches to studies. 
     Simply put, quantitative methods are designed to collect numbers and qualitative methods are 
designed to collect words. In social science, the so-called positivist research methodology uses a set 
of procedures to define, count, and analyze its variables (quantitative hypothesis testing), and an 
interpretivist research methodology describes and illuminates the meaningful social world (studying 
social construction and meanings through qualitative hypothesis generation) (Silverman, 1993). The 
use of the term qualitative versus quantitative is sometimes discouraged because it creates a binary 
distinction that does not hold in practice (Creswell, 2011). Many methods can be used in either 
quantitative or qualitative research studies, including interviews (quantitative surveys to random 
samples or open-ended questions to small samples) and textual/document analysis (counting in 
terms of categories or understanding participants’ categories). According to Silverman (1993), 
methods are specific research techniques which take on a specific meaning according to the 
methodology in which they are used. Writers in the mixed-methods field have tended to dismiss the 
dichotomy in favor of a continuum for presenting qualitative and quantitative differences (Creswell, 
2011). 
     An enormous array of names and ways exist for conducting mixed-methods research. Some call it 
multi-methods, but writers in mixed methods are careful to distinguish “multi-method studies” in 
which multiple types of qualitative or quantitative data are collected from “mixed-methods studies” 
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that incorporate collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) 
suggested a parsimonious set of designs: 
x Triangulation (or convergent) designs, which involve one phase of qualitative and 
quantitative data collection gathered concurrently. 
x Explanatory or exploratory designs, which require two phases of data collection – 
quantitative data collection followed sequentially by qualitative data collection (or vice 
versa). 
x Embedded designs, in which one form of data is embedded within another (may be either a 
single- or a double-phase design with concurrent or sequential approaches). 
However, they now acknowledge that these designs are not sufficiently complex to mirror actual 
practice (Creswell, 2011).  
     According to Silverman (2006), triangulation involves using data produced by different methods to 
validate the data. Silverman also used the term combined approach (combining qualitative and 
quantitative approaches). Combined approaches can strengthen the validity of the study, as some of 
the findings complement and validate each other. Moreover, a combined approach can also reveal 
discrepancies between analysis results of data collected using different methods and thus may open 
new possibilities of interpretation. 
     Yin (1994) described three types of research design: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. The 
research design for this research project was explorative at the start of the study, and then became 
more descriptive. The data collection methods applied in this project (i.e., questionnaire survey, 
interviews, observation studies, document studies) were used for both explorative and descriptive 
purposes. In addition, the findings were discussed and tentatively explained by use of earlier 
research studies and theory. 
     The research design employed in this thesis was partly explorative and involved qualitative data 
collection followed by quantitative data collection. According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2007), the 
mixed method’s central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches, in 
combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach alone. 
According to Greene (2007), mixed methods is an orientation toward looking at the social world that 
actively invites us to participate in dialogue about multiple ways of seeing and hearing, multiple ways 
of making sense of the social world, and multiple standpoints on what is important and to be valued 
and cherished (referred to in Creswell, 2011). This way of looking at the social world corresponds 
well with the institutional organizational perspective. 
     A quantitative research approach is one in which the investigator primarily uses positivist claims 
for developing knowledge (e.g., cause and effect thinking, reduction to specific variables and 
hypotheses and questions, use of measurement and observation), employs strategies of inquiry such 
as surveys, and collects data on predetermined instruments that yield statistical data. However, 
when conducting mixed-methods research, one can apply both predetermined and emerging 
methods, both open- and closed-ended questions, multiple forms of data drawing on all possibilities, 
and both statistical and text analysis (Creswell, 2003). Qualitative methods can provide a deeper 
understanding of the studied phenomenon, while quantitative methods simultaneously can show 
statistical associations and say something about how widespread certain patterns of behavior, 
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attitudes, and perceptions are (Oltedal, 2011). Surveys are a practical way to gather large amounts of 
information, and they can be useful measurement tools within the field of social science for 
collecting data on human characteristics, perceptions, attitudes, thoughts, and behavior (Hagen, 
2009). In studies of safety culture, risk perception, and attitudes, questionnaire surveys have often 
been used (see section 5.5.3). 
     Through the use of the questionnaire survey, I could obtain answers from as many of the chosen 
types of managers (ICT safety managers/coordinators and contingency planning managers) and 
employees (ICT staff and process control system operators) as possible. However, I chose to use 
mixed methods because I also wanted to study other, and perhaps different, views of the challenges 
for safety and security management of network companies due to increased use of ICT. The 
regulatory authorities, NVE (which is also responsible for supervision and performing regular 
inspections to ensure compliance with regulations), might have a different view of the challenges 
than managers and employees within the network organizations. In addition, documents and 
personal observations might also tell a different story than responses to survey questions. 
     Table 1 summarizes the titles of the four articles included in the thesis, the specific challenges for 
safety and security management of network companies and the research question(s) discussed in 
each article, the institutional aspect/element that mainly influences the challenges discussed in the 
articles, and the methods used to collect data for each of the four studies. The data collection 
methods were used to collect data for the whole research project, and subsequently the data 
material that gave the best basis for answering each research question was chosen by use of 
different approaches (e.g., factor analysis, study of previous research literature, qualitative 
interpretation) to be the data material for the respective study/article. Two of the articles in the 
thesis discuss challenges that can be influenced by cultural-cognitive elements/aspects of 
institutions, and emphasis is thus placed on the cultural-cognitive institutional pillar. This is 
consistent with the previously mentioned acknowledgment that the cultural-cognitive pillar provides 
the deeper foundations of institutional forms (i.e., the infrastructure on which not only beliefs, but 
also norms and rules rest). However, it is important to emphasize that the institutional aspects are in 
fact analytical and are intertwined and overlapping in real life.  
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Table 1. Article titles, challenges studied, research questions, institutional aspects/elements, and 
data collection methods. 
Article title Challenge for 
safety 
management due 
to increased use 
of ICT 
Research question(s) Institutional aspect Data collection 
method 
Article 1:  
Attitudes toward 
risk regulation – 
prescriptive or 
functional 
regulation? 
Attitudes toward 
risk regulation 
What can explain 
varying attitudes 
toward the use of 
functional internal 
control regulations as 
the principle for 
regulating risks? 
Regulative aspects Interviews 
 
Observation studies 
 
Document studies 
 
Questionnaire survey 
Article 2: Strengths 
and weaknesses of 
technical standards 
for management of 
ICT safety and 
security in electric 
power supply 
network companies 
Use of technical 
standards for ICT 
safety and 
security 
What are strengths 
and weaknesses of 
technical standards 
for management of 
ICT safety and 
security? 
Normative aspects Questionnaire survey 
 
Interviews 
 
Document studies 
Article 3: Risk 
perception 
regarding the 
safety and security 
of ICT systems in 
electric power 
supply network 
companies 
Managers’ and 
employees’ risk 
perception 
regarding the 
safety and 
security of ICT 
systems in 
electric power 
supply network 
companies 
What factors can 
influence the risk 
perception of users 
(managers and 
employees) within 
electric power supply 
network companies 
regarding the risk of 
malfunctions in or 
attacks on their ICT 
systems? 
Cultural-cognitive 
aspects 
Interviews 
 
Document studies 
 
Questionnaire 
survey 
Article 4: 
Management 
commitment and 
awareness creation 
- ICT safety and 
security in electric 
power supply 
network companies 
The degree of 
management 
commitment to 
ICT safety and 
security within 
network 
companies in the 
electric power 
supply sector and 
implementation 
of awareness 
creation and 
training measures  
for ICT safety and 
security within 
these companies 
To what degree is the 
management of 
network companies 
in the electric power 
supply sector 
committed to the 
safety and security of 
their organizations’ 
ICT systems? 
To what extent are 
awareness creation 
and training 
measures for ICT 
safety and security 
implemented within 
network companies 
in the electric power 
supply sector and 
what type of 
measures are 
implemented? 
Cultural-cognitive 
aspects 
Questionnaire survey 
 
Interviews 
 
Observation studies 
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6.1 Qualitative research methods 
As mentioned, the research design employed in this thesis involved qualitative data collection 
followed by quantitative data collection. The qualitative research methods employed in this thesis 
were (1) interviews, (2) document studies, and (3) observation studies. 
6.1.1 Interviews 
To explore my research theme and produce research questions that could be tested by the 
quantitative questionnaire survey, qualitative data were gathered through two group interviews with 
representatives from NVE. Furthermore, some results from the interviews were later used to 
complement the data gathered through the survey. 
     For this part of the data collection, semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were 
used. A semi-structured interview is a verbal interchange where the interviewer attempts to elicit 
information from another person (or several persons) by asking questions. Although the interviewer 
prepares a list of predetermined questions (interview guide), the interviews unfold in a 
conversational manner that offers participants the chance to explore issues they feel are important 
(Longhurst, 2010). The interviews were performed in collaboration with two master students who 
were writing their thesis in connection with this research project. 
     The interviewees were representatives from the contingency planning department in NVE who are 
responsible for safety, contingency planning, and supervision in the Norwegian electric power supply 
sector. The first group interview was conducted with three interviewees, and the questions mainly 
focused on the interviewees’ opinion of the Norwegian network companies’ risk perception and 
awareness regarding the risk of electric network failure caused by malfunctions in or attacks on their 
ICT systems. The second group interview was conducted with two interviewees, and the questions 
mainly focused on the interviewees’ opinion regarding the use of functional internal control 
regulations for ICT safety and security and their impression of the network companies’ attitude 
toward these regulations. 
     In addition, a master’s thesis was written in connection with this research project, which provided 
qualitative data from six interviews with representatives from a sample of Norwegian network 
companies and NVE (Røyksund, 2011). This interview study included questions about risk perception 
concerning attacks on the network companies’ ICT systems (cyber crime) and which ICT safety and 
security measures were implemented in the organizations. The data results from these interviews 
were used to supplement the results from my study. 
6.1.2 Document studies 
Document studies can provide valuable insights into understanding a studied social phenomenon. 
Document study is an indirect method of data collection that does not require participation of the 
subjects involved, and by documents I mean any written materials that contain information about 
the phenomenon I wish to study (Bailey, 1994). I did not perform a document analysis where the 
content of the document was coded into themes and analyzed, but rather a document study where I 
thoroughly read through all the documents and made notes of content that was important in relation 
to my study. 
     The documents studied in my research project gave me valuable insight into electric power supply 
systems and the ICT systems (process control systems/SCADA systems) that run and control them, 
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threats toward these systems, and risk regulations for these systems. Data were collected from a 
wide array of written documents: 
x Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI): "Protection of the Society 3/Measures to 
Reduce Vulnerabilities in the Electric Power Supply," Final Report BAS3 [“En sårbar 
kraftforsyning”, Sluttrapport etter BAS3] 
• Norwegian Defense Research Establishment (FFI): “Protection of the Society 5/Vulnerability 
in Critical ICT Systems,” Final Report BAS 5 [“Sårbarhet i kritiske IKT-systemer”, Sluttrapport 
etter BAS5] 
• Report – “Society’s vulnerability,” Vulnerability Commission (NOU 2000:24) [NOU 2000:24 – 
Sårbarhetsutvalget] 
• Report – “Protection of critical infrastructures and critical societal functions in Norway,” 
Infrastructure Commission (NOU 2006: 6) [NOU 2006:6 – Infrastrukturutvalget] 
• White Paper 17 (2001-2002) - Societal Security (Safety). The Road to a Less Vulnerable 
Society. [St.meld. nr. 17 (2001–2002) - Samfunnssikkerhet. Veien til et mindre sårbart 
samfunn] 
• White Paper 22 (2007-2008) – Societal Security (Safety) [St.meld. nr. 22 (2007–2008) - 
Samfunnssikkerhet, samvirke og samordning] 
• White Paper 29 (2011-2012) – Societal Security (Safety) [St.meld. 29 (2011-2012) – 
Samfunnssikkerhet] 
• Regulations relating to contingency planning in the Norwegian electric power supply system 
(The contingency planning regulations), 2002 and 2013 [Forskrift om forebyggende sikkerhet 
og beredskap i energiforsyningen (Beredskapsforskriften), 2002 og 2013] 
• “Guidelines for the contingency planning regulations in the Norwegian electric power supply 
system,” NVE, 2003, 2011 and 2013 [“Veiledning til forskrift om beredskap i 
kraftforsyningen”, NVE , 2003, 2011, 2013] 
• “Guideline for risk and vulnerability analysis in the electric power supply system,”  NVE and 
Proactima, 2010 [Veiledning til ROS-analyser for kraftforsyningen, NVE og Proactima , 2010] 
• “The Norwegian energy regulator - Annual report,” NVE , 2011 [Årsrapport, NVE, 2011] 
• Annual supervision reports, NVE, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 [Årsrapporter for tilsyn, NVE, 
2010, 2011, 2012 og 2013] 
• Presentations by representatives from NVE at various conferences on ICT safety and security 
for companies in the Norwegian electric power supply sector 
(http://www.norsis.no/vedlegg/KraftIS/ and http://www.nve.no/no/Om-
NVE/Presentasjoner-fra-NVE-arrangement/) 
• “Cyber Security Strategy for Norway”, 2012 [Nasjonal strategi for informasjonssikkerhet, 
2012] 
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• “Action plan for the Cyber Security Strategy,” Norway, 2012 [Handlingsplan for Nasjonal 
strategi for informasjonssikkerhet,  2012] 
• “Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey,” NSR, 2006, 2010, 2012 
[Mørketallsundersøkelsen, 2006, 2010, 2012] 
• OECD – “Emerging Systemic Risks” (2003), “OECD Studies in Risk Management, Norway – 
Information Security” (2006), “Innovation in Country Risk Management” (2009), “Future 
Global Shocks” (2011a), “Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk” (2011b) 
• EU – The GRID Consortium, “ICT Vulnerabilities of Power Systems: A Roadmap for Future 
Research”, 2007 
• National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), “Guide to Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) Security,” U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011 
• FOCUS 2012 and 2013, Annual Assessment by the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), 
[FOKUS 2012 og 2013, Etterretningstjenestens åpne vurdering] 
• Annual Threat Assessment, The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), 2012 [PSTs årlige 
trusselvurdering, 2012] 
• Newspaper articles – Dagbladet ”No CTRL” [”Null CTRL”], Teknisk Ukeblad, etc. 
 
6.1.3 Observation studies 
Observational techniques are methods of collecting data by observing people, most typically in their 
natural setting. Participant observation is performed by observers who take part in the activities of 
the people they are studying, and nonparticipant observation is conducted by those who remain as 
aloof as possible. Observation can be useful when you don’t know that much about the subject you 
are investigating and may also make sense when one wants to understand experience from the point 
of view of those who are living it or from the context in which it is lived. One of the defining 
characteristics of observational techniques is their relative unobtrusiveness. However, this 
unobtrusiveness varies with the role played by the observers and with the degree to which they are 
open about their research purposes (Adler and Clark, 2014). 
     Gold’s (1958) typology of researcher roles suggests a continuum of possible roles: the complete 
participant, the participant-as-observer, the observer-as-participant, and the complete observer. 
Gold’s typology also suggests a continuum in the degree to which the researcher is open about his or 
her research purpose. A complete participant is, or is pretending to be, a genuine participant in the 
situation he or she observes. A participant-as-observer is primarily a participant, but at the same 
time admits to an observer status. An observer-as-participant is primarily a self-professed observer, 
but occasionally participates in the situation. A complete observer is an observer who does not 
become a part of the situation (Adler and Clark, 2014). 
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     During my research project, observation studies were carried out at two conferences on ICT safety 
and security for companies within the electric power supply sector, held in Norway in 2011.17 The 
participants at both conferences were mainly managers and employees working with ICT safety and 
security within network companies in Norway, in addition to vendors of process control systems 
(e.g., SCADA systems) and ICT safety and security solutions for these systems (e.g., ABB and 
Siemens). The speakers at the conferences included representatives from NVE, NorCERT, Mnemonic 
AS (one of the largest providers of IT information security services in the Nordic region), Norwegian 
Centre for Information Security (NorSIS), and ICT safety and security researchers from universities 
and research institutes. During the observation studies, I observed the types of ICT safety and 
security issues raised at the conferences, the types of issues on which participants focused, and the 
types of questions and discussions that came up during the conferences. 
     In my observation studies, I took on an observer-as-participant role. I listened to the presentations 
and discussions at the conference and made notes of important issues that were discussed, 
comments that were made, and arguments that were used, but I did not participate in the 
discussions. However, during the conferences, I also talked to conference participants and organizers 
during breaks, during lunches, and during the conference dinners. I discussed the studies I was doing 
in my PhD project and different issues related to my research purpose and research questions. 
6.2 Quantitative research methods 
The main data collection method in the thesis was a questionnaire survey which was sent to 
managers and employees in network companies within the Norwegian electric power supply sector. 
6.2.1 Questionnaire development 
Abstract constructs cannot be directly observed but are measured through the use of attributes or 
indicators derived from construct clarification and definition. To operationalize a construct is to 
define a construct in such a way that it can be measured or identified. Empirical indicators become 
the items or categories of items on the instrument (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). The starting 
point when developing a questionnaire and scales is a conceptual definition, which specifies the 
theoretical basis. When generating the item pool, each item making up a construct should reflect the 
latent variables underlying the theme (Oltedal, 2011). 
     I designed the questionnaire for this research project based on a review of previous research 
literature, document studies of the contingency planning regulations for the Norwegian electric 
power supply system, and an evaluation of five preexisting questionnaires. The preexisting 
questionnaires were previously used in studies of offshore (petroleum) safety and ICT safety.18 As 
previously mentioned, the questionnaire was designed to be both explorative and descriptive with 
                                                          
17 Kraft IS (2011) and Forum for informasjonssikkerhet i kraftforsyningen (2011). 
18 The five previously used questionnaires were the “Offshore Safety Questionnaire” (Robert Gordon 
University, Aberdeen, 1997), Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authorities’ survey “Trends in risk level – Norwegian 
Shelf” (2007-2008), “Accident prevention – survey for offshore employees” (survey used in PhD project, Centre 
of Maritime Health and Safety, Syddansk Universitet, Hanna B. Rasmussen, 2008-2012),“The Norwegian 
Computer Crime and Security Survey” (2010), and questions used in Janne M. Hagen’s study "How do 
employees comply with security policy? A comparative case study of four organizations under the Norwegian 
Security Act" in The Human Factor behind the Security Perimeter. Evaluating the Effectiveness of Organizational 
Information Security Measures and Employees' Contributions to Security, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural 
Sciences, University of Oslo, Oslo, doctoral dissertation, 2009. 
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regard to possible challenges for safety and security management due to increased use of ICT and, 
hence, it contained a large number of items. 
     The questionnaire contained 97 items, divided into 10 sections: background information, 
knowledge of safety and security, perception of compliance, attitude toward safety, attitude toward 
regulation, experience of incidents, risk perception, safety and security management, awareness 
creation and training, and an overall rating of the safety and security level of the organizations’ ICT 
systems. Most of the constructs were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Risk perception was measured on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(very low risk) to 6 (very high risk), and the overall rating of the safety level of the organizations’ ICT 
systems was measured on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good). 
     Likert scales are summated rating scales that can be used to measure opinions, beliefs, and 
attitudes. The scales consist of a set of items that purports to measure a specific construct and are 
typically summed across items to obtain a single score. An odd number of items allows for the middle 
scale step to be the neutral, or indifferent, point. Even numbered scale steps force the subject to 
either agree or disagree to some extent (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). A 6-point scale was chosen 
for the risk perception scale and the overall rating of the safety level of the organizations’ ICT 
systems to remove the possibility of crossing out the “neutral” middle point. Most of the other scales 
also included the response alternatives “Don’t know” and/or “Not relevant.” 
     The background information section included questions about sex, age, job category (contingency 
planning manager, ICT safety manager, operator in system control center, employee in ICT staff, 
“Other”), length of employment (under 1 year, 1-3 years, 3-5 years, 5-10 years, and more than 10 
years), company size (more than 100 employees and fewer than 100 employees19), company type 
(corporation, cooperative, partnership, company owned by local authorities, “Other”), type of 
business activity (transmission/distribution, transmission/distribution and generation/production, 
transmission/distribution and supply, and transmission/distribution, generation/production, and 
supply), and classification of process control system/SCADA system (class 1, class 2, class 3, or a 
combination). 
     The knowledge of safety and security scale contained five items regarding the respondents’ 
knowledge of ICT safety and security. Examples of items in this scale include “I am familiar with the 
content of Chapter 6 regarding ICT safety and security in the guidelines for the regulations relating to 
contingency planning in the Norwegian power supply system,” “I am familiar with the content of my 
organization’s information security policy,” and “I have access to the information necessary to make 
decisions regarding ICT safety.” 
     The perception of compliance scale contained 25 items measuring the respondents’ perception of 
compliance with ICT regulations and rules in their organization (not only their own compliance). The 
scale included items about risk and vulnerability analysis, use of checklists, guidelines, and ICT safety 
                                                          
19 In this study, I chose to measure the difference between large and small organizations by “more than 100 
employees” versus “fewer than 100 employees.” Organizational size could also have been measured in 
different ways (e.g., by the number of customers, by income). This might have affected the results of the 
statistical analysis.  
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and security standards, contingency plans, system descriptions, emergency drills, reporting of 
incidents, antivirus software, and physical safety and security measures for system control centers 
and servers, among others. 
     The attitude toward safety and security scale contained nine items measuring the respondents’ 
attitude toward safety and security. Examples of items in this scale include “I think it is important to 
read the organization’s contingency plan, ICT safety policy, and ICT safety instructions to achieve 
updated knowledge of ICT safety and security,” “I can do my job faster if I ignore some of the ICT 
safety and security rules,” and “There is a good attitude toward ICT safety and security in this 
organization.” 
     The attitude toward regulation scale contained four items regarding the respondents’ attitude 
toward the obligations regarding ICT safety and security within the contingency planning regulations 
for the Norwegian electric power supply sector. Examples of items in this scale include “I think it’s ok 
that the authorities prescribe the overall safety goals and obligations regarding ICT safety and 
security and permit the organizations to find and develop their own means to achieve these goals” 
and “In connection with the introduction of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) in the 
Norwegian electric power supply system, I wish that the network companies could receive more 
detailed guidelines from the authorities.”  
     The experience of incidents section included 13 different incidents to which an organization can 
be exposed, and the respondents were asked to report the incidents that their organization had 
experienced. The list of incidents was created on the basis of the contingency planning regulations 
for the Norwegian electric power supply sector and on questions and results from the Norwegian 
Computer Crime and Security Survey (2010). The incidents included hacking, information theft, DoS 
attacks, malware, theft of ICT equipment, blackmail, unauthorized change/deletion of data, pirate 
copying, loss of personal information, abuse of ICT resources, and ICT system malfunctions caused by 
technical failure, natural hazards, or human error. The response alternatives for this section were 
“Yes,” “No,” and “Don’t know.” 
     The risk perception scale contained 21 items addressing the respondent’s perception of the risk 
posed by different threats and vulnerabilities. The set of threats and vulnerabilities was created on 
the basis of the contingency planning regulations for the Norwegian electric power supply sector and 
on questions and results from the Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey (2010). The listed 
threats and vulnerabilities included malicious attacks from outside the organization, such as hacking, 
DoS attacks, malware, information theft, unauthorized change/deletion of data, pirate copying, 
blackmail, and ICT attacks from terrorists or foreign states, users as a vulnerability due to their lack of 
skills and knowledge (human error), theft of personal information (phishing), theft of ICT equipment, 
abuse of ICT resources, ICT malfunctions caused by technical failure or natural hazards, sabotage 
against power lines or power stations, and ICT attacks from insiders/disgruntled employees.  
     The safety and security management scale contained five items measuring the management’s 
commitment to ICT safety and security in the network organizations. Examples of items in this scale 
are “My immediate manager intervenes immediately if the ICT safety and security rules are not 
followed,” “My immediate manager appreciates my pointing out matters of importance to ICT safety 
and security,” and “I would rather not discuss ICT safety and security with my immediate manager.”  
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     The section about ICT safety and security awareness and training contained six items regarding the 
use of different awareness-creating activities in the network organizations. Examples of items include 
“New employees get thorough training in the organization’s ICT safety and security rules (included in 
the organization’s ICT safety and security policy and safety/security instructions),” “ICT safety and 
security training for managers and employees is implemented when the ICT systems are updated or 
altered,” “In my organization, awareness campaigns about ICT safety and security are held regularly,” 
and “In my organization, e-mails containing information about ICT safety and security are sent out on 
a regular basis to raise awareness about this issue.” 
 
     The overall rating of the safety and security level of the organizations’ ICT systems contained the 
question: “All in all, how would you assess the safety and security of the ICT systems used in your 
organization?” A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1. 
6.2.2 Web-based questionnaire 
The questionnaire survey was developed as a web-based questionnaire using QuestBack Survey (an 
online survey and feedback platform) and distributed to the respondents by e-mail. The Internet is 
increasingly seen as offering many advantages over more traditional paper and pencil administration 
of questionnaires (e.g., reduced cost, ease and speed of administration). Responsibility can be passed 
to the platform to save the data in a format that may then be imported directly into the software 
package that is to be used for data analysis (in this case SPSS). Time is saved by not having to split the 
data manually and the possibility of errors when splitting the data is practically eradicated. A major 
benefit of web-based questionnaires and surveys is that they do not require the administration of 
materials in person; thus, the questionnaire administration and recording of responses are self-
running. When questionnaires are not administered in person, it is important that the respondents 
interpret the questions in the manner in which the researcher intended. Respondents to web-based 
questionnaires do not have someone at hand to check the exact meaning of a sentence (Fox, Murray, 
and Warm, 2003). I therefore performed a pilot test of the questionnaire before the questionnaire 
was completed to make sure that the instructions and scale items were clear. The pilot was sent to 
three respondents: one contingency planning manager, one ICT safety manager, and one system 
control center operator. 
 
     A few minor revisions were made to the questionnaire based on the feedback from the pilot test. 
The revisions included adding my chosen definition of risk in this research project to the instructions. 
Risk is a contested term with many different definitions, and clearly stating how I defined the 
concept of risk made it easier for the respondents to answer the questionnaire. In addition, I added 
an open-ended question at the end of the questionnaire, where the respondents were given the 
opportunity to make any comments they might have concerning the issues raised in the 
questionnaire or about the questionnaire itself. Furthermore, I defined all other relevant concepts in 
the questionnaire guidelines and explained the purpose of the study. I also added an informative text 
for each of the scales in the questionnaire. The survey was distributed to respondents in June 2012 
and was closed in September 2012. Questionnaire guidelines and information about the aims of the 
study were included in the e-mail containing the survey, and two e-mail reminders were sent to the 
respondents before access to the questionnaire was closed. 
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6.2.3 Survey sample and respondents’ demographics 
Methods of sampling a population to gain data that are representative of the target population are 
always a consideration in a research project (Fox, Murray, and Warm, 2003). With the help of 
sampling, a target population is selected and a target group is invited to answer carefully structured 
questions (Hagen, 2009). The chosen target population for this research project was managers and 
employees in Norwegian electric power supply network companies, mainly contingency planning 
managers, ICT safety and security managers, operators in system control centers, and employees in 
ICT staff. 
     The survey was sent to managers in all the 137 network companies that were part of the PSPO. 
Names and e-mail addresses for ICT safety and security managers and contingency planning 
managers in all the network companies were provided by NVE. In addition to answering the 
questionnaire, the managers were asked to provide names and e-mail addresses for employees in 
their organization’s system control centers and ICT staff, as well as any other managers or employees 
who could be relevant as respondents for this survey. The web-based questionnaire was distributed 
by e-mail to 334 individuals. 
     One hundred and three respondents returned the survey questionnaire, for a response rate of 
31%. Demographic profiles of the respondents in this research project are shown in Tables 2 through 
6. 
Table 2. Demographic profiles of the respondents divided by job category. 
Job category Percentage N 
1 Contingency planning 
manager 
23.3% 24 
2 ICT safety and security 
manager 
23.3% 24 
3 Operator in system control 
center 
15.5% 16 
4 ICT staff 7.8% 8 
5 Other 30.1% 31 
Total  103 

Table 3. Demographic profiles of the respondents divided by company size. 
 
Company size Percentage N 
1 More than 100 employees 37.0% 37 
2 Less than 100 employees 63.0% 63 
-1 Don’t know 0.0% 0 
Total  100 
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Table 4. Demographic profiles of the respondents divided by company type. 
Company type Percentage N 
1 Corporation (AS-ASA) 80.4% 82 
2 Cooperative (Andelslag) 2.9% 3 
3 Partnership (Ansvarlig 
selskap) 
2.0% 2 
4 Company owned by local 
authorities (Kommunal, 
fylkeskommunal eller 
interkommunal bedrift) 
6.9% 7 
5 Other 7.8% 8 
-1 Don’t know 0.0% 0 
Total  102 
 
Table 5. Demographic profiles of the respondents divided by classification of process control 
system (SCADA system). 
Classification of process 
control system 
Percentage N 
1 Class 1 40.8% 42 
2 Class 2 28.2% 29 
3 Class 3 30.1% 31 
-1 Don’t know 12.6% 13 
Total  103 
 
Table 6. Demographic profiles of respondents divided by job category, company size, and gender. 
 
Job category3 
 
Company size 
Total 
More than 100 
employees 
Fewer than 100
employees 
Manager Gender Male 19 44 63 
Female 1 1 2 
Total 20 45 651 
Employee Gender Male 14 15 29 
Female 1 0 1 
Total 15 15 301 
Other Gender Male 2 3 5 
Total 2 3 5 
Total Gender Male 35 62 97 
Female2 2 1 3 
Total 37 63 100 
1Three respondents (one manager and two employees) did not answer the item regarding company size.  
2Only three of the respondents were female and the rest male; however, this corresponds well with the gender distribution of 
employees in Norwegian network companies. 
3The categorical variable “Job category” was collapsed into two categories representing managers and employees. 
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6.2.4 Statistical analysis 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) v. 18 was used to perform the statistical analysis 
in the research project. Negatively worded items were reversed, and total scale scores were 
calculated to provide overall scores for the scales used in the survey. Since it is quite rare to obtain 
complete data from every case when we do research with human beings, it is important to consider 
how to deal with missing values in the statistical analyses. In my analyses, I chose to use the “Exclude 
cases pairwise” option in SPSS, which excludes the cases (respondents) only if they are missing the 
data required for the specific analysis. These cases were still included in any analyses for which they 
had the necessary information (Pallant, 2010). 
6.2.5 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis can be used for assessing construct validity of an instrument for data collection. This 
type of analysis represents a complex array of structure-analyzing procedures used to identify the 
interrelationships among a large set of observed variables (items) and, through data reduction, group 
a smaller set of these variables into dimensions or factors that have common characteristics. A factor 
is a linear combination or cluster of related observed variables that represents a specific underlying 
dimension of a construct, which is as distinct as possible from the other factors included in the 
solution. The factor analysis process generally involves two stages: defining the number of initial 
factors and rotating the factors to improve interpretation. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was 
chosen to explore the underlying dimensions of the constructs of interest in this research project, 
and principal component analysis (PCA) was chosen as the factor extraction method (Pett, Lackey, 
and Sullivan, 2003). 
     PCA with direct oblimin rotation finally resulted in a two-factor solution, where Factor 1 was 
named “Risk perception” and Factor 2 was named “Safety and security management, awareness 
creation, and training.” After further analysis, Factor 2 was divided into two smaller factors named 
“Safety and security management” (Factor A) and “Awareness creation and training” (Factor B). The 
risk perception scale (Factor 1) was analyzed as data material for article 3, and the safety and security 
management scale and the awareness creation and training scale (Factor 2) were analyzed as data 
material for article 4. The four items on the attitude toward regulation scale were also retained as 
data material for the research project, and descriptive statistics for each item were used for article 1. 
In addition, the three aforementioned items from the perception of compliance scale were retained 
(items 3, 7, and 8). Descriptive statistics for each of these three items were used as data material for 
article 2. Finally, I also decided to keep the data from the knowledge of safety and security scale, 
which is discussed in article 3. A more thorough description of the factor analysis is provided in 
Appendix 2. 
6.2.6 Correlation 
Correlation analysis is used to explore the association between pairs of variables. Correlation 
provides an indication that there is a relationship between two variables; however, it does not 
indicate that one variable causes the other. In this research project, correlation analysis (bivariate) 
was performed to explore the relationships between some of the continuous variables in the studies, 
i.e., between risk perception and safety and security knowledge (article 3) and between safety and 
security management (management commitment) and awareness creation and training (article 4). 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (r) were obtained and interpreted to describe the 
strength and direction of the linear relationships between the two variables. Pearson correlation 
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coefficients take on values from -1 to +1. A positive correlation indicates that as one variable 
increases, so does the other, and a negative correlation indicates that as one variable increases, the 
other decreases (Pallant, 2010). 
     Finally, the size of the absolute value (r) provides an indication of the strength of the relationship. 
Various authors have suggested different interpretations of the values between 0 and 1; however, in 
this research project, I chose to interpret the strength of the correlation according to Cohen’s 
guidelines from 1988: small correlation – r=.10 to .29, medium correlation – r=.30 to .49, and large 
correlation – r=.50 to 1.0 (Pallant, 2010, p. 134).  
6.2.7 Statistical techniques to compare groups 
A lot of techniques can be used to test for differences between groups. Parametric techniques make 
a number of assumptions about the population from which the sample has been drawn and the 
nature of the data. Non-parametric techniques, on the other hand, do not make the same 
assumptions and are often seen as more suitable techniques for smaller samples or when the 
collected data are measured at the ordinal (ranked) level. In this thesis, I chose to use analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) and t-tests, which are parametric techniques.20 These techniques indicate whether 
the difference between the groups is “statistically significant” (i.e., not likely to have occurred by 
chance) (Pallant, 2010). 
     Some general assumptions apply to parametric techniques. These techniques assume that the 
dependent variable is measured at the interval or ratio level (i.e., using a continuous scale) (Pallant, 
2010). In this thesis, the dependent variables I tested using these statistical techniques were all 
continuous variables (i.e., attitude toward regulations, risk perception, safety and security 
management, awareness creation and training, items regarding the use of standards, guidelines, and 
checklists for ICT safety and security). These techniques also assume that the scores are obtained 
using a random sample from the population. However, this is often not the case in real-life research 
(Pallant, 2010). How the sample for my survey was chosen is described in section 6.2.3. 
     Another assumption is that the observations that make up the data must be independent from 
one another (i.e., no observation or measurement is influenced by any other observation or 
measurement). The respondents in my survey were spread out in many different organizations, and 
thus I do not think this will be an issue in this research project. For parametric techniques, it is also 
assumed that the populations from which the samples are taken are normally distributed.21 In a lot of 
research (particularly social science research as in this thesis), scores on the dependent variables are 
not normally distributed. However, according to Pallant (2010), most of the techniques are 
reasonably “robust” or tolerant of violations of this assumption, and with large enough sample sizes 
(e.g., 30+), the violation should not cause any major problems. The size of the sample in this survey 
was 103, and thus I assume that violation of this assumption does not cause a problem for the 
analysis of my data. 
     The parametric techniques I have applied in this research project also assume that samples are 
obtained from populations of equal variances (i.e., the variability of scores for each of the groups is 
                                                          
20 Non-parametric techniques were tried as well; however, the results of the analysis with both parametric and 
non-parametric techniques showed similar results. 
21 Normal is used to describe a symmetrical, bell-shaped curve, which has the greatest frequency of scores in 
the middle with smaller frequencies toward the extremes (Pallant, 2010). 
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similar). As part of the t-test and ANOVA analyses, SPSS performs Levene’s test for equality of 
variances. If the significance value obtained is less than .05, it suggests that variances for the two 
groups are not equal and that the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated. However, 
according to Pallant (2010), analysis of variance is reasonably robust to violations of this assumption, 
provided the size of the groups is reasonably similar. In addition, when you perform t-tests in SPSS, 
you are provided with two sets of results, for situations where the assumption is not violated and for 
when it is violated. In this case, one can consult whichever set of results is appropriate for the data. 
     The purpose of t-tests and ANOVA procedures is to test hypotheses, and in this type of analysis 
two different errors are possible. It is possible to reject the null hypothesis (the null hypothesis is a 
hypothesis which the researcher tries to disprove, reject, or nullify) when it is, in fact, true (type 1 
error). This occurs when we think there is a difference between our groups, but there actually is not. 
This possibility can be minimized by selecting an appropriate alpha level (two levels often used are 
.05 and .01). The second type of error is failing to reject a null hypothesis when it is, in fact, false. This 
happens when we believe that the groups do not differ when they do. Several factors can influence 
the power of a test (if the test can correctly identify whether there is a difference between groups) in 
a given situation, including the alpha level set by the researcher (as mentioned above), sample size, 
and effect size (Pallant, 2010). 
     The power of a test depends on the sample size; however, according to Stevens (1996, referred to 
in Pallant, 2010) “power is not an issue” when the sample size is large (e.g., 100 or more 
respondents). As mentioned, the sample size of my survey was 103 respondents. Post-hoc 
comparisons are designed to guard against the possibility of an increased type 1 error. Post-hoc 
comparisons can be used when conducting a whole set of comparisons, exploring the differences 
between each of the groups in the study. Analysis of variance does not tell us which group differs 
from which other group, and one way to find out is to conduct post-hoc tests. An overall F ratio is 
calculated in SPSS that indicates whether there are any significant differences among the groups in 
the design. If the overall F is significant, researchers can then go on and perform additional tests to 
identify where these differences occur. Post-hoc comparisons guard against type 1 errors due to the 
large number of different comparisons being made. This is done by setting more stringent criteria for 
significance and, therefore, it is often more difficult to achieve significance. Several post-hoc tests 
can be used. In this research project, I have chosen to use the post-hoc test Tukey, which is available 
in SPSS (Pallant, 2010). 
     Probability values do not indicate the degree to which the variables are associated with one 
another. Very small differences between groups may become statistically significant (especially in 
large samples); however, this does not mean that the difference has any practical or theoretical 
significance. One way to assess the importance of findings is to calculate the “effect size” (strength of 
association). This is a set of statistics that indicates the relative magnitude of the differences 
between means, or the amount of the total variance in the dependent variable that is predictable 
from knowledge of the levels of the independent variable (not just whether the difference could 
have occurred by chance). Several different effect size statistics exist, and in this research project I 
have chosen to use partial eta squared effect size statistics (eta squared). Eta squared indicates the 
proportion of variance of the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable 
(values can range from 0 to 1). To interpret the strength of the different effect size statistics, I used 
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the guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988): .01=small effect, .06=moderate effect, .14= large effect 
(Pallant, 2010). 
6.2.7.1 ANOVA 
One-way between-groups ANOVA is used to compare the mean scores of several groups (more than 
two groups). One-way between groups ANOVA is used when you have one independent (grouping 
variable) with three or more groups and one dependent continuous variable. “One-way” indicates 
only one independent variable, and “between groups” means that different participants are in each 
of the groups. An F ratio is calculated, which represents the variance between the groups divided by 
the variance within the groups. If the F ratio is large, it indicates more variability between the groups 
(caused by the independent variable) than there is within each group (referred to as the error term). 
A significant F test will indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis, which states that the 
population means are equal. If the Sig. value (p value) is less than or equal to .05 (e.g., .03, .001), 
there is a significant difference somewhere among the mean scores on the dependent variable for 
the different groups (Pallant, 2010). 
     One-way between-groups ANOVA with post-hoc tests (i.e., Tukey) were carried out to explore any 
differences between the mean scores on the main variables in my survey (attitude toward regulation, 
risk perception, safety and security management (management commitment), and awareness 
creation and training) for the different company types in the data material (i.e., corporations, 
cooperatives, partnerships, companies owned by local authorities, and other). The same techniques 
were used to explore any differences between the different job categories, i.e., contingency planning 
manager, ICT safety and security manager, operator in system control center, employee in ICT staff, 
and other. 
6.2.7.2 T-tests 
After the ANOVA, the categorical variable “job category” was collapsed into two categories 
representing managers and employees. The category “managers” consisted of contingency planning 
manager, ICT safety and security manager, and “other leader” and the category “employees” 
consisted of operator in system control center, employee in ICT staff, and “other employee.” 
     Independent-samples t-tests were then performed to determine whether there were significant 
differences between the mean scores of managers versus employees and big companies versus small 
companies on the main variables in this study (i.e., attitude toward regulation, risk perception, safety 
and security management (management commitment), and awareness creation and training). T-tests 
were used to compare the scores of managers versus employees, and big companies versus small 
companies, on the different variables. To find out whether there was a significant difference 
between my two groups, I referred to the column labeled Sig. (2-tailed), which appears under the 
section labeled t-test for “Equality of Means” in SPSS. If the value in the column was equal to or less 
than .05, there was a significant difference in the mean scores on my dependent variable for each of 
the two groups. If the value was above .05, there was no significant difference between the two 
groups. SPSS does not provide eta squared values for t-tests; however, effect size was calculated 
using the information provided in the output (Pallant, 2010). 
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6.3 Reliability, validity, trustworthiness, and ethical considerations 
Reliability, validity, and trustworthiness are important issues related to research findings. Reliability 
is the extent to which another researcher would find the same answer and describes the consistency 
or repeatability of the research that has been performed. Validity is based on the positivist paradigm 
and says something about the confidence or strength of results. Trustworthiness is based on the 
constructivist paradigm, and important trustworthiness criteria are credibility and transferability 
(Johnsen, 2012). 
6.3.1 Reliability and validity - quantitative research studies 
In quantitative studies, researchers advance the relationships among variables and pose this in terms 
of questions or hypotheses. Being objective is an essential aspect of competent inquiry, and for this 
reason researchers must examine methods and conclusions for bias. Standards of reliability and 
validity are important in quantitative research (Creswell, 2003). 
     According to Yin (1994), reliability means demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as 
the data collection procedures, can be repeated with the same results. A major benefit of using web-
based questionnaires is the reliability of data input. The platform records the data directly, thereby 
eradicating transcription errors. The cost benefits of this are apparent in terms of the time it takes to 
input data (Fox, Murray, and Warm, 2003). For my survey, Questback produced an SPSS data sheet 
that could be imported directly into SPSS for further analysis. Nevertheless, to make sure that there 
were no mistakes, I thoroughly checked my data set for errors, following the advice of Pallant (2010, 
pp. 43-49). 
     Content validity is the degree to which elements of the measurement are relevant to and 
representative of the underlying concept. Determining whether the scale or item set has good 
content validity can be accomplished using a number of sources of relevant theory, empirical 
literature, and expert judgment. As mentioned in section 6.2.1, I designed the questionnaire for this 
research project based on a theoretical review, document studies of the contingency planning 
regulations for the Norwegian electric power supply system, and an evaluation of five preexisting 
questionnaires. 
     The validity of a scale refers to the degree to which it measures what it is supposed to measure 
(Pallant, 2010). Construct validity concerns the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made 
from the operationalized constructs in the questionnaire to the theoretical concepts on which those 
operationalizations were based (Oltedal, 2011). As previously described in section 6.2.5, factor 
analysis was used for assessing construct validity of the instrument for data collection (questionnaire 
survey). The extracted factors are assumed to have good discriminant validity (i.e., the degree to 
which the items in different subscales measure different rather than the same construct) and 
convergent validity (i.e., the degree to which the items within a particular subscale measure the 
same unidimensional construct). 
     The reliability of a scale indicates how free it is from random error. A frequently used indicator of 
a scale’s reliability is internal consistency (or convergent validity). As mentioned, internal consistency 
is the degree to which the items that make up the scale are all measuring the same underlying 
attribute (i.e., the extent to which the items “hang together”). The most commonly used statistic for 
measuring internal consistency is Cronbach’s coefficient alpha. This statistic provides an indication of 
the average correlation among all the items that make up the scale. Values range from 0 to 1, with 
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higher values indicating greater reliability. Nunnally (1978) recommended a minimum level of .7 
(referred to in Pallant, 2010). Reliability tests of the scales and factors in my survey indicate that they 
have good internal consistency. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .95 for Factor 1 (risk perception) 
and .90 for Factor 2 (safety and security management, awareness creation, and training). For the two 
smaller factors, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was .85 for Factor A (safety and security 
management) and .84 for Factor B (awareness creation and training). For the knowledge of safety 
and security scale, Cronbach’s alpha was .83. 
     External validity documents whether the results can be generalized from the research context to a 
more general setting (i.e., the domain of applicability of the research results) (Johnsen, 2012). My 
survey sample of 103 respondents can be considered a relatively small sample and may limit the 
potential for generalizing. Nevertheless, according to Pallant (2010, p. 207), a sample of 100+ 
respondents can be regarded as a large sample, and the sample size can be seen as adequate for the 
types of data analyses done in my study (i.e., factor analysis, correlation, t-tests, ANOVA, and 
descriptive statistics). According to Fricker and Schonlau (2002), response rates for web surveys 
where no other survey mode is given have tended to range from moderate to poor. Other 
researchers have also experienced the same response rate problem in studies of information security 
management. Kotulic and Clark (2004) followed up their small response rate with a study suggesting 
that the main reasons for non-responses were related to a policy of not sharing information 
regarding their information security performance, the volume of survey requests received by the 
organizations, and a desire not to spend valuable time on the particular research project (referred to 
in Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). According to feedback to NVE from some of the network 
companies, the same seems to apply for the present survey. Managers and employees in the 
network companies are reluctant to answer questions about ICT safety and security in their 
organizations. Another factor that may have affected the response rate for my survey was that the 
questionnaire was sent out during the summer (from June to September) when many of the 
potential respondents were on vacation. However, due to time pressure, the survey had to be 
conducted at this time. 
     In an attempt to raise the response rate, hidden identity for respondents was activated in my 
electronic survey, and all e-mail addresses were deleted after the survey was closed. When hidden 
identity is used in surveys, no identifiable information (e.g., browser type and version, Internet IP 
address, operating system, e-mail address) will be stored with the answer. Because of the policy of 
not sharing information regarding information security performance, hidden identity was activated 
to assure the respondents that the information they provided could not in any way be traced back to 
a specific company or person. In addition, I signed a confidentiality agreement with NVE before I 
received e-mail addresses for ICT safety and security managers and contingency planning managers 
in the network companies. In the confidentiality agreement, I agreed not to publish any information 
or results that could in any way be linked to a specific company or person. The respondents were 
also given information regarding this confidentiality agreement in the survey invitation e-mail and 
were informed that they could contact me if they needed a copy of the confidentiality agreement 
before they agreed to answer the survey. Last, qualitative research data were gathered to support 
the quantitative results from the survey, which might increase the potential for generalizing. 
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6.3.2 Trustworthiness - qualitative research methods 
As mentioned, trustworthiness is based on the constructivist paradigm, and important 
trustworthiness criteria are credibility and transferability. Credibility as defined in the constructivist 
paradigm can be compared to internal validity in the positivist paradigm. When the objective of a 
study is to establish a causal relationship, internal validity is of particular interest, referring to the 
confidence placed on the assessed cause-effect relationship. The internal validity of the conclusions 
reached depends on the reliability and validity of the questionnaire or scales used (Oltedal, 2011). In 
this research project, I did not use statistical analysis to establish a causal relationship between my 
variables; however, the reliability and validity of the questionnaire and scales used are discussed in 
the previous section. 
     Credibility, on the other hand, demonstrates the match between the constructed realities of 
stakeholders and the reconstructions as being attributed to the stakeholders (affected actors). 
Several techniques exist for verifying the credibility of a research study, including member checks 
(testing hypotheses and interpretations with the stakeholders), prolonged engagement, and peer 
debriefing with a disinterested peer (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, referred to in Johnsen, 2012). Member 
checks are based on involvement with key stakeholders in reflections and interpretations. I discussed 
my research questions and findings with my contact person in NVE several times, and at the end of 
my research project I presented my findings to the contingency planning department in NVE. I 
received positive feedback from NVE after my presentation – the representatives from the 
contingency planning department found my results interesting, and my findings corresponded well 
with their own impressions and what many of them experienced during inspections at the network 
companies and at different gatherings with representatives from the network companies. 
     Prolonged engagement means to participate with the stakeholders over a sufficient period of time 
to understand the research issues and the industry (sector) setting in depth (Johnsen, 2012). I have 
worked on this research project for four years and discussed important issues with key stakeholders 
in different settings during my interviews and observation studies and through my contact with NVE. 
My document studies also helped me develop a deeper understanding of the research issues and the 
industry setting. Peer debriefing with a disinterested peer has been done as a natural part of 
presenting my research results during several national and international research conferences. 
     Transferability as defined in the constructivist paradigm can be compared to external validity in 
the positivist paradigm. The generalization of the findings is related to whether the findings can be 
used in other contexts, that is, whether the findings may be generalized to other people, other 
places, or other times (Johnsen, 2012). Through my document studies, I found that the challenges 
and issues discussed in this thesis also exist in other industries and other countries, and a review of 
previous research literature also showed similar findings from other industrial sectors, such as the oil 
and gas (petroleum) sector (this is further elaborated in Chapter 8). 
6.3.3 Ethical considerations 
In some surveys, an important ethical consideration is to maintain the anonymity of respondents. 
Personal anonymity may be central to gaining reliable information (Fox, Murray, and Warm, 2003). 
As previously stated, hidden identity for respondents was activated in my electronic survey, all e-mail 
addresses were deleted after the survey was closed, and I signed a confidentiality agreement with 
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NVE where I agreed not to publish any information/results that could in any way be linked to a 
specific company or person. 
 
     As mentioned in section 6.1.3., I took on an observer-as-participant role in my observation studies. 
Many ethical issues are associated with observation, especially related to whether or not the 
researcher withholds his or her research purpose from those being observed (Adler and Clark, 2014). 
One conference I observed was open to the public. I talked to the organizers of the conference 
(representatives from NorSiS) and informed them that I was conducting research at the conference 
and about the purpose of my research. I also talked to other conference participants about my 
research study during coffee breaks and dinner. The other conference I observed was not open to 
the public, but had one day that was open to vendors (suppliers), regulatory authorities, and other 
relevant actors within the electric power supply sector. I was invited to come this day by the 
organizers of the conference, Forum for Information Security in the Electric Power Supply, and the 
conference audience was informed that I was there, that I was a researcher, and what my research 
project was about. 
6.4 Methodological limitations 
This section discusses limitations for the thesis with regard to methods and measurements. In 
statistical analysis, measurement errors threaten the validity of the conclusions about the 
relationships between the constructs. Method bias has both a systematic and a random component, 
but the systematic error is in particular considered a major problem. Potential sources of common 
method biases are produced by a common source or evaluator (e.g., social desirability). For example, 
respondents might provide socially desirable answers instead of answering truthfully (Oltedal, 2011).  
 
     Social desirability occurs when survey respondents seek to present themselves in a positive light 
and therefore respond to an item according to what they think is the socially correct answer rather 
than their true answer. Furthermore, on subjective assessments regarding their own company’s 
performance, respondents are often inclined to assess themselves positively. Sometimes, it may also 
be difficult to answer negatively on questions concerning one’s immediate manager (Hagen, 
Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008). A possible remedy for this problem is to use a mixed-methods 
approach so that results do not rely exclusively on the results of one questionnaire (Spector, 2006, 
referred to in Oltedal, 2011), which is done in this research project. 
    Method effects can be caused by an item’s characteristics, including complexity, ambiguity, scale 
format, and negatively worded items (Oltedal, 2011). In this research project, the issue of the 
accuracy of the gathered data was considered, and attempts were made to gather as truthful 
responses as possible. When using forced-choice questions, it is inevitable that at least some 
respondents will not be completely satisfied with the options available. Fox, Murray, and Warm 
(2003) recommended that researchers consider including a “decline” and “don’t know” option in the 
questionnaire. It can be important to provide the respondents with the option to select a “decline” 
option, rather than forcing them into responding to all questions. This also allows the distinction to 
be made between questions where no selection has been made (missing) and those that 
respondents have read but to which they chose not respond. For this reason, I included a “don’t 
know” and a “not relevant” option in my survey. 
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     Included in the previous guidelines (2003 and 2011) for the contingency planning regulations for 
the electric power supply sector was also a classified section relating to regulations for ICT safety and 
security. I did not have access to this classified section for this research project; however, the 
respondents may have included the requirements in this classified section when they answered some 
of the questions regarding the use of functional regulations for ICT safety and security. Nevertheless, 
I do not think that this seriously affected the results of the survey – I still obtained information 
regarding the respondents’ attitude toward the current regulation guidelines, even if I did not have 
access to the entire content of the guidelines.
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7. Research results 
This chapter summarizes each of the four articles, including the aim/purpose, applied method, main 
results, and conclusions. All articles are related to the main research aim in this thesis, which is 
described in the introduction. 
7.1 Summary and results of article 1 
Skotnes, R. Ø. and Engen, O. A. (2015), Attitudes toward risk regulation – Prescriptive or functional 
regulation?, Safety Science, Vol. 77, pp. 10–18. 
     The aim of this article was to address attitudes toward the use of functional versus prescriptive 
risk regulations. The context for the study was the use of functional internal control regulations for 
ICT safety and security in network companies within the Norwegian electric power supply sector. As 
previously mentioned, former research has shown that ambiguity in results of internal control 
regulations may be explained by organizational size, where large companies may be better suited to 
implement internal control than smaller companies (Hovden, 1998; Lindøe, 2001). However, the 
results of my survey suggested that managers and employees in both large and small network 
companies had diverging views on and varying attitudes toward internal control regulations, 
depending on the specific question asked. 
Hence, the following research question was discussed in the article: 
 What can explain varying attitudes toward the use of functional internal control regulations 
as the principle for regulating risks? 
     The research question was answered by presenting results from the interviews, observation 
studies, document studies, and the questionnaire survey. The focus in this article was on the results 
from the four items regarding attitude toward regulations in the survey. Independent samples t-tests 
were performed to identify significant differences in the mean values for the respondents. I found no 
statistically significant differences in the mean scores between managers and employees on the four 
items. However, I found a statistically significant difference in the mean scores between large and 
small network companies on item 3; however, the magnitude of the differences in the means was 
small.22 Thus, the article focused on descriptive statistics of the whole survey sample. Table 7 shows 
the distribution of scores on items 1-4 in the survey.  
                                                          
22 Results of independent samples t-tests - Item 1: Managers (N=66, M=3.89, SD=1.07) and employees (N=31, 
M=3.74, SD=1.06); t (95) = .65, p = .52, 2-tailed). Large companies (N=37, M=3.89, SD=1.05) and small 
companies (N=62, M=3.94, SD=1.02; t (97) = -.20, p = .84, 2-tailed). Item 2: Managers (N=66, M=3.06, SD=1.07) 
and employees (N=31, M=3.39, SD=1.02; t (95) = -1.43, p =.16, 2-tailed). Large companies (N=36, M=3.22, 
SD=1.10) and small companies (N=63, M=3.08, SD=1.05; t (97) = .64, p = .52, 2-tailed). Item 3: Managers (N=64, 
M=2.81, SD=.83) and employees (N=27, M=2.74, SD=.86; t (89) = .37, p = .71, 2-tailed). Large companies (N=34, 
M=2.59, SD=.78) and small companies (N=59, M=2.98, SD=.80; t (91) = -2.31, p = .02, 2-tailed). The magnitude 
of the differences in the means was small (eta squared = .055). Item 4: Managers (N=62, M=3.76, SD=1.06) and 
employees (N=29, M=3.86, SD= 1.06; t (89) = -.43, p = .67, 2-tailed). Large companies (N=32, M=3.75, SD=.95) 
and small companies (N=61, M=3.80, SD=1.12; t (91) = -.23, p = .82, 2-tailed). 
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Table 7. Distribution of scores on item 1-4. 
 Distribution of scores on items (in percentage) 
 Item 1: ‘I think it’s 
ok that the 
authorities prescribe 
the overall safety 
goals and 
requirements for ICT 
safety and security 
and permit the 
organizations to find 
and develop their 
own means to 
achieve these goals’ 
Item 2: ‘I wish that 
the authorities 
would provide us 
with more detailed 
guidelines for how 
we can achieve the 
goals and 
requirements for 
ICT safety and 
security in the 
contingency 
planning 
regulations’ 
 
Item 3: ‘The 
requirements and 
guidelines for ICT 
safety and security 
in Chapter 6 of the 
“Guidelines for the 
contingency 
planning 
regulations for the 
Norwegian electric 
power supply” are 
too detailed’ 
 
Item 4: ‘In 
connection with the 
introduction of 
Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) 
in the Norwegian 
electric power supply 
system, I wish that 
the network 
companies could 
receive more detailed 
guidelines from the 
authorities’ 
Strongly 
disagree 
2,9 % (N=3) 2,9 % (N=3) 2,9 % (N=3) 1,0 % (N=1) 
Disagree 8,7 % (N=9) 27,2 % (N=28) 29,1 % (N=30) 11,7 % (N=12) 
Neither 
disagree 
nor 
agree 
17,5 % (N=18) 35,0 % (N=36) 47,6 % (N=49) 23,3 % (N=24) 
Agree 37,9 % (N=39) 20,4 % (N=21) 9,7 % (N=10) 28,2 % (N=29) 
Strongly 
agree 
32,0 % (N=33) 13,6 % (N=14) 3,9 % (N=4) 29,1 % (N=30) 
Not 
relevant 
0,0 % (N=0) 0,0 % (N=0) 1,0 % (N=1) 1,9 % (N=2) 
Don’t 
know 
1,0 % (N=1) 1,0 % (N=1) 5,8 % (N=6) 4,9 % (N=5) 
Total N=103 N=103 N=103 N=103 
 
     The survey suggested that a majority of the respondents had a positive attitude toward functional 
regulations. At the same time, the respondents had divergent opinions about the need for more 
detailed guidelines for how to comply with the ICT safety and security goals and requirements in the 
contingency planning regulations, but very few respondents felt that the requirements and 
guidelines for ICT safety and security were too detailed. On the other hand, a majority of the 
respondents also answered that they wanted more detailed guidelines concerning the 
implementation of a new technology (AMI). This confirmed the existence of varying attitudes toward 
the functional internal control regulations for ICT safety and security in network companies within 
the Norwegian electric power supply sector. The observation studies showed that some of the 
network company representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the requirements for 
how to implement AMI safely and securely were functional, and they wanted NVE to take more 
control of the implementation process, instead of just setting the goals and leaving the actual 
implementation to the companies. 
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     According to my interviews with NVE, there is also a clear need to introduce internal control 
principles in other areas under its jurisdiction. However, there seems to be a reorientation toward a 
combination of functional and prescriptive regulations within this sector. The Norwegian Energy Act’s 
rules for contingency planning in the electric power supply sector were changed in 2012. In addition, 
on behalf of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, NVE has revised the regulations for contingency 
planning in the Norwegian electric power supply sector, and new contingency planning regulations 
and guidelines for these regulations took effect in 2013. Increased vulnerability and threats due to 
increased use of ICT to monitor, control, and operate power generation plants and power 
distribution were some of the main reasons for the revisions. In many areas of the regulations, 
former practice is still followed, but with a clearer specification of the requirements. In some areas, 
the regulations are tightened through new requirements or a stricter use of existing practice. NVE 
has tried to make the requirements in the contingency planning regulations clearer and more 
concrete based on requests from the electric power supply companies. 
     The article concluded that varying attitudes and conflicting opinions at different times regarding 
functional regulations can be explained by the complexity and uncertainty of the specific risk 
problem to be handled, in addition to the size of the company.  The more loosely coupled the system 
to be managed is, and the more controllable and predictable the risk problem is, the greater the 
request for functional regulations for safety and security will be. Correspondingly, the more tightly 
coupled the system to be managed is, and the more complex, unpredictable, and uncertain the risk 
problem is, the greater the request for prescriptive, detailed regulations will be – regardless of 
whether the company in question is large or small. 
7.2 Summary and results of article 2 
Skotnes, R. Ø. (2012), Strengths and weaknesses of technical standards for management of ICT safety 
and security in electric power supply network companies, Journal of Risk and Governance, Vol. 3, Iss 
2, pp. 119-134. 
     The aim of this article was to study the use of technical standards for management of ICT safety 
and security in electric power supply network companies, in addition to discussing the following 
research question: 
 What are strengths and weaknesses of technical standards for management of ICT safety and 
security? 
     As mentioned earlier, the consistent application of functional regulations requires a 
comprehensive and systematic guide (regulatory guidelines) on how the various provisions are to be 
understood and the appropriate standards that can or should be used to meet the requirements 
(Lindøe and Engen, 2013). As a means to protect ICT systems from malfunctions and attacks, national 
and international technical (industrial) standards and public guidelines for ICT safety and security 
management have been developed to provide a wide array of safety and security measures and 
activities. 
     The research question was answered by presenting results from the questionnaire survey, 
interviews, and document studies. In this article, I chose to focus on the results of three items from 
the perception of compliance scale: item 8 regarding the use of technical standards, item 7 regarding 
the use of a guideline for risk and vulnerability analyses, and item 3 regarding the use of checklists. 
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Standards, guidelines, and checklists are typical tools to use in managing the safety and security in 
organizations, and it makes sense to compare the use of these different tools. Information about the 
use of technical standards for ICT safety and security in Norwegian network companies was collected 
from written documents, including regulations relating to contingency planning in the Norwegian 
power supply system, guidelines for the contingency planning regulations (NVE, 2013), guidelines for 
risk and vulnerability analysis (NVE and Proactima, 2010), and presentations by representatives from 
NVE at different conferences on ICT safety and security for companies in the Norwegian electric 
power supply sector.23 
     Independent samples t-tests were performed to identify significant differences in the mean values 
for the respondents. The t-tests found no statistically significant differences in the mean scores 
between managers and employees or between large companies and small companies on the three 
items used in the article.24  Hence, the focus of the article was on descriptive statistics of the whole 
survey sample. Results from the survey confirmed that very few of the respondents used technical 
standards when they conducted risk and vulnerability analysis of their ICT systems and developed 
and implemented their internal ICT safety and security management systems, at least not 
consistently. Only 17.7% of the respondents answered that they strongly agreed or agreed with item 
8 regarding the use of technical standards. A large percentage of the respondents also answered 
“Neither disagree nor agree” on this item, and many answered “Don’t know.”  
     At the same time, the majority of the respondents used NVE’s “Guideline for risk and vulnerability 
analysis in the electric power supply sector”; 68.9% of the respondents answered that they strongly 
agreed or agreed with this item (item 7), and only 4.9% of the respondents answered that they 
strongly disagreed or disagreed. However, NVE’s guideline for risk and vulnerability analysis does not 
go specifically into ICT safety and security, even though the methods presented can also be used for 
ICT systems. Many of the respondents also used checklists when they developed risk and 
vulnerability analyses for their ICT systems; 45.5% answered that they strongly agreed or agreed with 
item 3 regarding the use of checklists. However, 33.7% of the respondents also answered “Neither 
disagree nor agree” on this item, which suggests that they use checklists on some occasions but not 
on a regular basis. Table 8 presents the distribution of the respondents’ scores on the three items 
used in this article. 
  
                                                          
23 Presentations found at http://www.norsis.no/vedlegg/KraftIS/ and http://www.nve.no/no/Om-
NVE/Presentasjoner-fra-NVE-arrangement/ (accessed 20 November, 2012). 
24 Results of independent samples t-tests – Item 8: Managers (N=51, M=2.92, SD=.94) and employees (N=15, 
M=3.07, SD=.70); t (64) = -.56, p = .58, 2-tailed). Large companies (N=23, M=3.04, SD=.64) and small companies 
(N=45, M=2.96, SD=1.0); t (66) = .38, p = .70, 2-tailed). Item 7: Managers (N=64, M=3.98, SD=.92) and 
employees (N=24, M=4.04, SD=.81); t (86) = -.27, p = .79, 2-tailed). Large companies (N=30, M=3.80, SD=.89) 
and small companies (N=59, M=4.10, SD=.87); t (87) = -1.54, p = .13, 2-tailed). Item 3: Managers (N=62, 
M=3.56, SD=.92) and employees (N=23, M=3.39, SD=.78); t (83) = .80, p = .42, 2-tailed). Large companies (N=31, 
M=3.39, SD=.76) and small companies (N=56, M=3.55, SD=.93); t (85) = -.85, p = .40, 2-tailed).  
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Table 8. Distribution of scores on items 3, 7, and 8. 
Distribution of scores (in percentage) 
 Item 3: “In my 
organization, 
checklists are always 
used in the 
development of risk 
and vulnerability 
analyses” 
Item 7: “In my organization, 
NVE’s ‘Guideline for risk and 
vulnerability analysis in the 
electric power supply sector’ 
is always used in the 
development of risk and 
vulnerability analyses” 
 
Item 8: “In my organization, 
standards (e.g., ISO/IEC 
27001/ISO/IEC 27002/NS-ISO/IEC 
17799) are always used in the 
development of risk and 
vulnerability analyses, 
information security policy, and 
safety/security instructions” 
Strongly 
disagree 
1,0 % (N=1) 1,0 % (N=1) 4,9 % (N=5) 
Disagree 8,9 % (N=9) 3,9 % (N=4) 13,7 % (N=14) 
Neither 
disagree 
nor agree 
33,7 % (N=34) 15,5 % (N=16) 32,4 % (N=33) 
Agree 35,6 % (N=36) 41,7 % (N=43) 15,7 % (N=16) 
Strongly 
agree 
9,9 % (N=10) 27,2 % (N=28) 2,0 % (N=2) 
Not 
relevant 
1,0 % (N=1) 1,9 % (N=2) 2,9 % (N=3) 
Don’t 
know 
9,9 % (N=10) 8,7 % (N=9) 28,4 % (N=29) 
Total N=101 N=103 N=102 
 
     A qualitative interview study from 2011 that was conducted in connection with my present study 
also found that technical standards were rarely used during the development of the electric power 
supply network companies’ ICT risk and vulnerability analysis. Only one of the seven informants in 
the interview study answered that the company used technical standards as a starting point for 
development of a risk and vulnerability analysis of its ICT system. Furthermore, the interview study 
found that most of the companies used checklists to identify objects to be analyzed in the risk and 
vulnerability analysis (Røyksund, 2011). Last, according to my interviews with NVE, the Directorate’s 
experience is that standards are rarely used by the companies in the Norwegian electric power 
supply sector. 
     The article concluded that weaknesses of technical standards for the management of ICT safety 
and security, because of the complexity of the ICT systems used in the electric power supply sector 
(process control systems, e.g., SCADA systems), include that they are perceived as too complicated 
and difficult to follow. Standards are often general and abstract and it can be difficult to do exactly 
what a standard says. Considerable knowledge and technical skill is often required to use the 
technical standards. In addition, different technical standards are divergent when it comes to their 
methodology and approach to safety and security for SCADA systems, and this may make it difficult 
for network companies to choose the right standard. Furthermore, there may be substantial 
differences between presentation and practice, between formal structure and actual operations, and 
between what people say and what they do. Standardization might also lead to a loss of local 
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knowledge and system-specific competence, which can be important when facing safety-critical 
decisions. 
     Strengths of technical standards for the management of ICT safety and security include that they 
give updated, international recommendations and advice and provide increased communication, 
contact, and cooperation between the companies following the standards. SCADA systems are highly 
complex critical infrastructures that have a direct effect on the physical world and can pose a 
significant risk to the health and safety of human lives and serious damage to the environment. The 
complexity of these ICT systems increases the uncertainty, and it is difficult to predict the occurrence 
of events and their consequences. The use of guidelines and checklists may not be adequate 
(comprehensive and updated) for developing and implementing safety and security management 
systems to deal with the fast-paced technological changes and increased connectivity, automation, 
complexity, and vulnerability of these ICT systems. 
7.3 Summary and results of article 3 
Skotnes, R. Ø. (2015), Risk perception regarding the safety and security of ICT systems in electric 
power supply network companies, Safety Science Monitor, Vol. 19, Iss 1, article 4. 
     The purpose of this article was to provide insight into risk perception among users (both managers 
and employees) of ICT systems within electric power supply network companies and to discuss 
factors that can influence users’ risk perception. The following research question was examined in 
the article: 
 What factors can influence the risk perception of users (managers and employees) within 
electric power supply network companies regarding the risk of malfunctions in or attacks on 
their ICT systems? 
The research question was answered by presenting results from the questionnaire survey, 
interviews, previous research literature, and document studies. In this article, I chose to focus on the 
results of the survey items in the risk perception scale, in addition to items regarding knowledge of 
safety and security, experience of incidents, and overall rating of the safety levels of the 
organizations’ ICT systems. 
 
     As described in earlier chapters, the electric power supply system is often seen as the most critical 
infrastructure in modern society, and a breakdown in the ICT systems used within this industry 
(process control systems) can seriously compromise the physical grid, which can result in major 
financial disasters and damage to public safety and health. Hence, ICT safety and security is especially 
important within this sector, and the vulnerability of these ICT systems is also expected to increase 
during the next few years due to the implementation of AMI. Therefore, users of ICT systems within 
electric power supply network companies could be expected to perceive the risk of attacks on or 
malfunctions in these ICT systems as high. On the contrary, descriptive statistics and a histogram 
showed that the respondents perceived the risk of a breakdown in their organization’s ICT systems 
caused by malfunctions or attacks as relatively low. The mean value on the total scale score was 
53.39, the minimum possible value was 19, and the maximum possible value was 114. The results are 
shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of scores on the total risk perception scale. 
           
In addition, the qualitative interview study conducted by Røyksund (2011) showed that, despite an 
increased focus on ICT safety and security within the sector in recent years,25 representatives from 
Norwegian electric power supply companies still perceived the risk of an attack on their ICT systems 
as relatively low. 
 
     Furthermore, the survey respondents perceived the overall safety level of the organizations’ ICT 
systems as good, as shown in Table 9.  
  
                                                          
25 NVE increased its focus on ICT safety and security after 2006 and has (especially since 2009) been putting 
more pressure on the electric power supply organizations through heightened regulations and supervision. In 
addition, in 2009, some of the bigger network companies formed their own Forum for ICT safety in the electric 
power supply sector (Røyksund, 2011). 
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Table 9. Distribution of respondents’ scores on the question: “All in all, how would you assess the 
safety of the ICT systems used in your organization?” 
 Percentage N 
1 Very poor (1) 0.0% 0 
2 (2) 0.0% 0 
3 (3) 6.9% 7 
4 (4) 29.7% 30 
5 (5) 56.4% 57 
6 Very good (6) 6.9% 7 
Total  101 
 
     As mentioned, the respondents in my survey were ICT safety and security managers/coordinators, 
contingency planning managers, operators of process control systems, and ICT personnel. These 
users work directly with process control systems, ICT issues, and/or safety and security issues within 
the network companies and can be expected to have more knowledge about ICT systems and/or 
safety and security than average end-users of traditional computer systems. The respondents 
generally scored high on items concerning their familiarity with the contingency planning regulations 
and with the internal safety and security policy and contingency plan in their companies (the 
knowledge of safety and security scale). However, the interviewees from NVE said they often find 
during inspections that a number of employees (and possibly also managers) in the network 
companies have not read the contingency planning regulations and guidelines. The relationship 
between risk perception and safety and security knowledge was investigated using the Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient, but the analysis showed no statistically significant 
correlation between the total risk perception scale and the total knowledge of safety and security 
scale, r = .02, n = 86, p = .83 (two-tailed).  
     A one-way between-groups ANOVA was conducted to explore differences in risk perception within 
the network companies (i.e., between the mean scores on the risk perception variable for the 
different job categories in the data material). The results showed no statistically significant difference 
at the p < .05 level for the different job categories in the mean scores on the risk perception scale: F 
(7, 87) = 1.3, p = .26 (N = 95). 
     Next, independent-samples t-tests were performed to determine whether significant differences 
existed among the mean scores of managers versus employees, and of small companies versus large 
companies, on the risk perception scale. There was no statistically significant difference in scores for 
managers (M = 53.10, SD = 16.41) and employees (M = 53.17, SD = 18.52; t (88) = -.019, p = .99 (two-
tailed), N = 61 for managers, N = 29 for employees). The magnitude of the differences in the means 
was very small (eta squared = -.0004). Earlier research has shown some differences in risk perception 
between ICT safety and security managers and other users (Goodhue and Straub, 1991; Albrechtsen, 
2007; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). However, because tests did not show any statistically 
significant difference between managers and employees in their scores on the risk perception scale 
in my survey, this article examined possible factors that might explain why the majority of 
respondents perceived the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in the network organizations’ ICT 
systems as low. 
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     I did, however, find a statistically significant difference in the mean risk perception scores between 
managers and employees in small companies (M = 48.16, SD = 15.61) versus managers and 
employees in large companies (M = 61.85, SD = 15.95; t (90) = 4.03, p = .00 (two-tailed), N = 58 for 
small companies, and N = 34 for large companies). Managers and employees in large companies 
perceived the risk of a breakdown in the organization’s ICT systems caused by malfunctions or 
attacks as higher than the managers and employees in the smaller organizations. The magnitude of 
the differences in the means was large (eta squared = .15). 
   The respondents in my survey were also asked if their organizations had experienced different 
safety and security incidents. On some of the incidents (e.g., malware attacks, malfunctioning in the 
ICT systems caused by human error), a majority of the respondents answered that their organizations 
had experienced such incidents, but many of the respondents still rated these types of incidents at 
the low end of the risk perception scale. Interviews with representatives from NVE revealed that the 
regulatory authorities consider most of the network companies to have adequate day-to-day 
operational safety and security, but think they should perform better when it comes to planning for 
extraordinary incidents with potentially large consequences.   
     According to results from my interviews and observation studies, in addition to the qualitative 
interview study by Røyksund (2011), two different subcultures can be said to exist in the network 
companies, depending on whether the people operating the SCADA systems have an education in ICT 
or a background from the electricity industry. According to NVE, the network companies focus on the 
possibilities that the SCADA systems provide (i.e., access to more information and the possibilities of 
operating more electrical plants in a simpler way), but there is not as much focus on, or awareness 
of, the risk of “unwanted” access to these systems, protection against malicious software, and similar 
concerns. During inspections, NVE often discovers access points in the SCADA systems that the 
companies haven’t considered, especially concerning remote access, supplier access, external DVDs, 
and USB sticks. 
     The article concluded that company size, awareness regarding ICT safety and security, and earlier 
experience of danger are factors that can influence the risk perception of ICT system users within 
companies. The article also concluded that knowledge of safety and security may affect risk 
perception, even though I did not find any statistical correlation between these two dimensions in 
the analysis of my survey results. System complexities, which can be seen as a natural source of 
threats against process control systems, can also affect the risk perception of the companies’ 
managers and employees. Process control networks are often more complex than traditional ICT 
networks and require a different level of expertise.  Increased cognitive demands, increased 
electronic complexity, and dense organizational interdependence over large areas often lead to an 
increase in incidences of unexpected outcomes that produce unexpected ramifications. Furthermore, 
a lack of communication between subcultures with different focus points and mindsets within the 
companies was found to influence the risk perception of users of ICT systems, in addition to a certain 
“taken for grantedness” regarding many issues surrounding ICT safety and security. Too much trust in 
the expertise of system vendors can also lead to a lack of focus on the safety and security of network 
companies’ ICT systems and thus influence users’ risk perception.  
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7.4 Summary and results of article 4 
Skotnes, R. Ø., (2015), Management commitment and awareness creation – ICT safety and security in 
electric power supply network companies, Information & Computer Security, Vol. 23, Iss 3, pp. 302 – 
316. 
 
     The aim of this article was to study the degree of management commitment to ICT safety and 
security within network companies in the electric power supply sector, implementation of awareness 
creation and training measures for ICT safety and security within these companies, and the 
relationship between these two variables. 
     The article follows up on previous research which has shown a positive relationship between 
management commitment to ICT safety and security and implementation of awareness creation and 
training measures. The following research questions were addressed: 
 To what degree is the management of network companies in the electric power supply 
sector committed to the safety and security of their organizations’ ICT systems? 
 To what extent are awareness creation and training measures for ICT safety and security 
implemented within network companies in the electric power supply sector, and what type 
of measures are implemented? 
     The research questions were answered by presenting results from the questionnaire survey, 
interviews, and observation studies. In this article, I chose to focus on the survey results of the items 
in the safety and security management scale (management commitment) and the awareness 
creation and training scale. 
    The mean value on the total scale score for the safety and security management scale was 18.83, 
the minimum possible value was 5, and the maximum possible value was 25. This means that the 
respondents agreed with most statements. The results are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Total scores on the safety and security management scale (calculated by adding the 
scores from the 5 items that make up the scale). 
 
Table 10 presents the distribution of the respondents’ scores on the individual items of the 
awareness creation and training scale. 
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Table 10. Distribution of scores on items 1-6 within the awareness creation and training scale. 
 Distribution of scores on items (in percentage) 
 Item 1: “New 
employees 
receive 
thorough 
training in the 
organization’s 
ICT safety and 
security rules 
(included in 
the 
organization’s 
ICT safety and 
security policy 
and safety 
and security 
instructions)” 
Item 2: 
“Training 
sessions in 
ICT safety 
and 
security 
for 
managers 
and 
employees 
are 
conducted 
whenever 
the ICT 
systems 
are 
updated 
or 
altered” 
Item 3: 
“Awareness 
campaigns 
about ICT 
safety and 
security are 
often1 held in 
my 
organization” 
Item 4: “In 
my 
organization 
e-mails 
containing 
information 
about ICT 
safety and 
security are 
often 
distributed 
to raise 
employee 
awareness” 
Item 5: “In 
my 
organization 
formal face-
to-face 
presentations 
of 
information 
about ICT 
safety and 
security are 
often held to 
raise 
employee 
awareness” 
Item 6: “In 
my 
organization 
informational 
videos on ICT 
safety and 
security are 
often shown 
to raise 
employee 
awareness” 
Strongly 
disagree 
3,9 %  (N=4) 4,9 % 
(N=5) 
4,9 % (N=5) 7,8 % (N=8) 12,7 % 
(N=13) 
23,3 % 
(N=24) 
Dis-
agree 
9,7% (N=10) 16,7% 
(N=17) 
27,2 % 
(N=28) 
23,5 % (=24) 42,2 % 
(N=43) 
53,4 % 
(N=55) 
Neither 
disagree 
nor 
agree 
26,2 % (N=27) 43,1 % 
(N=44) 
35,0 % 
(N=36) 
35,3 % 
(N=36) 
33,3 % 
(N=34) 
18,4 % 
(N=19) 
Agree 46,6 % (N=48) 28,4 % 
(N=29) 
27,2 % 
(N=28) 
25,5 % 
(N=26) 
9,8 % (N=10) 3,9 % (N=4) 
Strongly 
agree 
10,7 % (N=11) 3,9 % 
(N=4) 
4,9 % (N=5) 6,9 % (N=7) 1,0 % (N=1) 0,0 % (N=0) 
Not 
relevant 
0 % (N=0) 1,0 % 
(N=1) 
0,0 % (N=0) 1,0% (N=1) 1,0% (N=1) 1,0 % (N=1) 
Don’t 
know 
2,9 % (N=3) 2,0 % 
(N=2) 
1,0 % (N=1) 0,0 % (N=0) 0,0 % (N=0) 0,0 % (N=0) 
Total 103 102 103 102 102 103 
1 In the awareness creation and training scale, the word “often” was defined as “at least once a year.” The 
respondents were informed of this in the scale’s text information. 
 
     The distribution of the respondents’ scores on the individual items of the awareness creation and 
training scale suggested that the majority of the network companies had implemented training in ICT 
safety and security for new employees. Some network companies had implemented training sessions 
in ICT safety and security whenever their ICT systems were updated and altered; however, a large 
percentage of the respondents answered “Neither disagree nor agree” (43.1%) on this item. The use 
of awareness campaigns and distribution of e-mails containing information about ICT safety and 
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security seemed to vary considerably between the companies; 54.9% answered negatively26 on the 
item regarding use of face-to-face presentations of information about ICT safety and security and 
76.7% answered negatively on the item regarding use of informational videos on ICT safety and 
security.

     The relationship between management commitment to ICT safety and security (as measured by 
the total safety and security management scale) and implementation of awareness creation and 
training measures (as measured by the total awareness creation and training scale) in the network 
companies was investigated using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. The 
correlation analysis revealed a large positive correlation between the two variables “management 
commitment” and “awareness creation and training,” r = .641, n = 81.27 There was a strong, positive 
relationship28 between the variables, and high levels of management commitment were associated 
with high levels of awareness creation and training.

    The article concluded that results from the survey showed a strong relationship between 
management commitment to ICT safety and security, and the implementation of awareness creation 
and training measures for ICT safety and security in the network companies. These findings 
corresponded well with results from former studies (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, Albrechtsen, and 
Hovden, 2008; Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a). The survey data also showed that the majority of 
respondents viewed management commitment to ICT safety and security in their organization as 
high. However, contrary to this, results from the interviews and observation studies indicated that it 
is easier to get the network companies to implement technological and technical-administrative 
measures than to achieve management commitment to and create awareness of ICT safety and 
security within the companies.  
 
     Furthermore, the results from the survey suggested that the majority of the network companies 
had implemented training in ICT safety and security for new employees. Some network companies 
had also implemented training sessions whenever their ICT systems were updated and altered; 
however, my results indicated that these types of training sessions were not conducted on a regular 
basis. The use of awareness campaigns and distribution of e-mails containing information about ICT 
safety and security seemed to vary a lot between the companies. Interactive face-to-face 
presentations of information about ICT safety and security and informational videos on ICT safety 
and security did not seem to be used as measures to raise employee awareness within most of the 
network companies. 
  
                                                          
26 “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree.” 
27 Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
28 The strength of the correlation is interpreted according to Cohen’s guidelines from 1988: small correlation – 
r=.10 to .29, medium correlation – r=.30 to .49, large correlation – r=.50 to 1.0 (Pallant, 2010, p. 134). 
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7.5 Summary of research results 
The main conclusions drawn from the research indicate that: 
1) Varying attitudes and conflicting opinions at different times regarding functional risk 
regulations can be explained by the complexity and uncertainty of the specific risk problem 
to be handled, as well as the size of the company. 
2) Weaknesses in technical standards include that they can be perceived as too general, 
complicated, and difficult to follow. Different technical standards also have varying 
methodologies and approaches when it comes to the complex ICT systems used in the 
electric power supply sector, which can make it difficult to choose between them. In 
addition, many Norwegian network companies have not seen the benefits of being certified 
for compliance with technical standards because the national regulations specify the 
requirements with which they must comply to protect their ICT systems. Strengths of 
technical standards for management of ICT safety and security are that they give updated, 
international recommendations and advice and are said to provide increased 
communication, contact, and cooperation between companies following the standards. 
Furthermore, the use of guidelines and checklists may not be adequate to deal with these 
highly complex ICT systems and fast-paced technological changes. 
3) Company size, knowledge and awareness regarding ICT safety and security, and earlier 
experience of danger are factors that can influence the risk perception of ICT system users 
within companies. System complexities can also affect the risk perception of the companies’ 
managers and employees. Furthermore, a lack of communication between subcultures with 
different focus points and mindsets within the companies was found to influence the risk 
perception of users of ICT systems, in addition to a certain “taken for grantedness” regarding 
many issues surrounding ICT safety and security. Too much trust in the expertise of their 
system vendors (suppliers) can also lead to a lack of focus on the safety and security of 
network companies’ ICT systems and thus influence users’ risk perception.  
4) Consistent with previous research, a statistically significant correlation between 
management commitment to ICT safety and security and implementation of awareness 
creation and training measures was found. The majority of survey respondents viewed the 
degree of management commitment to ICT safety and security within their own organization 
as high, even though qualitative studies showed contradictory results. The network 
companies had implemented awareness creation and training measures to a varying degree. 
However, interactive awareness measures were used to a lesser extent than formal one-way 
communication methods. 
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8. Discussion – challenges for safety and security management 
This chapter presents a discussion of the research results from the articles included in the thesis. The 
discussion is related to the thesis’ main research aim and the research questions, which were 
presented in the introduction and in descriptions of the four articles. 
8.1 Regulative aspects – prescriptive or functional regulations? 
According to Scheytt et al. (2006), regulation is central to any discussion of the relationship between 
organizations and the management of risk. Risk regulation has a constitutive role in shaping internal 
organizational practices, a process in which management and self-regulation are difficult to 
distinguish. A well-known challenge, which appears to be distinct with regard to the regulations for 
ICT safety and security in the Norwegian electric power supply system, is finding the right balance 
between command and control risk regulations with detailed and prescriptive rules versus 
performance- and risk-based regulation with functional rules (self-regulation).  
     The rapid development in ICT has made traditional methods of command and control regulation 
by government less than adequate in coping with modern risks, and the introduction of internal 
control has been an attempt to develop new approaches and means to cope with new challenges of 
misfits between technology and regulation (Hovden, 1998). In the Norwegian electric power supply 
sector, principles of internal control were introduced in the area of contingency planning in 2002. 
The internal control system can be a demanding and comprehensive system for the authorities to 
keep up-to-date. They need a lot of knowledge and expertise to monitor whether companies comply 
with the functional regulations and must keep pace with technological developments and new 
knowledge. However, the advantage of using the principles of internal control is that the scope and 
form of the internal control system can vary with a company’s size, complexity, domain, and risk 
scenario, and this allows each company to adjust the system to its own needs, routines, organization, 
and culture. The function-based character of the regulatory regime creates a large degree of 
autonomy in how employers and companies design the safety practices they think are appropriate. 
Such autonomy can be advantageous for employers in several ways, including financially. It has an 
intrinsic value for the employer side because employers can determine the means by themselves and 
not be overruled by the authorities (Bang and Thuestad, 2014). 
     Detailed and prescriptive rules, on the other hand, provide no incentives for companies to engage 
in innovative practices and bind them to the established technology and organizational solutions. The 
more prescriptive rules and technical standards the regulator takes as legally binding, the more 
responsibility and the greater “burden of proof” they impose on themselves. Explicit and detailed 
requirements are certainly highly predictable and easily interpreted, but they may soon stiffen in 
technologies from the past. It is difficult to see how safety-critical issues related to management, 
organization, and technology can be improved by the authorities’ use of additional or more detailed 
rules (Bieder and Bourier, 2013). 
     My study on attitudes toward risk regulations in the Norwegian electric power supply network 
companies found that generally the companies wanted functional internal control risk regulations 
with more freedom of choice, but in specific situations involving specific risk problems (e.g., the 
implementation of AMI) they asked for more detailed rules and wanted NVE to tell them exactly 
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what to do. According to the interviewees from NVE, attitudes toward functional internal control 
regulations in the network companies also vary depending on with whom one speaks. Top 
management may be interested in having functional regulations, but middle management and the 
employees working with the actual implementation of the internal control system might want more 
concrete and detailed regulations. The findings in this thesis correspond well with results from the 
previously mentioned interview study in the Norwegian petroleum industry (Engen et al., 2013). 
     According to my interviewees from NVE, the introduction of internal control regulations has 
actually led to a lesser focus on contingency planning in the network companies. Many of the 
companies feel pressured from all sides and have not established enough internal resources to keep 
the focus on contingency planning. Nevertheless, because of the large differences among the 
network companies, NVE still sees a clear need to introduce internal control principles also in other 
areas under its jurisdiction. However, as shown in Chapter 7, a reorientation toward a combination of 
functional and prescriptive regulations within this sector is occurring. 
     Even if the ICT safety and security requirements are the most detailed of the internal control 
regulations for contingency planning in the Norwegian electric power supply sector, many network 
companies still wanted more detailed rules and guidance from the authorities in this area. Functional 
internal control regulations for ICT safety and security can pose a specific challenge for the safety and 
security managers in electric power supply network companies because of the complexity of the ICT 
systems. It is difficult to establish a complete system description of these complex systems (Rundmo, 
1996), which can make it difficult to identify successful attacks and their consequences and develop 
comprehensive defenses for all the relevant threats. The scale and complexity of the AMI and smart 
grid, along with the increased connectivity and automation, make risk regulation of this area 
particularly challenging. These high complexity systems have tight coupling of their components and 
processes. The fast-paced technological changes, the invisibility of the material processes, the lack of 
oversight, and the problems in sensemaking contribute to a feeling of uncertainty, uncontrollability, 
and unpredictability regarding the risk problems connected to these ICT systems. Most of the 
network companies lack expert knowledge in this area, which increases the need for more detailed 
prescriptive regulations.   
     The pros and cons of rule compliance versus risk management is continuously debated (Hopkins, 
2011) and, according to Lindøe and Engen (2013), defining how the roles in safety and security 
management should be distributed between the state and industry is among the most complex 
questions regarding risk regulation. The complexity of the ICT systems (process control systems), the 
complexity of the interdependencies between critical infrastructure, and the complexity of the risk 
problems add to this question. 
8.2 Normative aspects – strengths and weaknesses of technical standards 
for IT safety and security 
Risk regulation regimes contain many more organizational actors than dedicated regulatory agencies. 
As previously mentioned, some researchers within organizational institutionalism have focused on 
the emergence of “soft” regulations, and the institutional change of interest is the displacement of 
coercive, state-level regulations by more voluntary regulations such as standards, rankings, and 
accreditations. These softer regulatory structures are developed and applied by non-governmental 
agencies and elicit compliance because they provide legitimacy (Greenwood et al., 2008). Emphasis 
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within the normative pillar is on normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and 
obligatory dimension into social life. Normative systems include both values and norms. Values are 
conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to which 
existing structures or behaviors can be compared and assessed. Norms specify how things should be 
done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends (Scott, 2008). 
     A multiplicity of organizations has been created at “the world level” to provide coordination and 
direction for risk management (Scheytt et al., 2006), including international standards organizations 
such as ISO, IEC, and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Committee 
(COSO). Variants of generic risk management create isomorphic pressures on organizations to 
conform to these models and to apply them. Risk management knowledge is formed and 
disseminated through the interplay among various types of “carriers,” (e.g., business schools, 
management scholars, practicing organizations, media, consultants), through the interaction of these 
groups, risk management has become an established body of knowledge and a formalized 
organizational and management practice. The carriers all add to an amplified supply of models for 
organizations, and they all establish a conceptual framework to which organizations need to relate to 
be legitimate. A “good” organization is now one which manages risk in accordance with established 
frameworks; organizations that value their reputation must adopt legitimate practices (Scheytt et al., 
2006). 
     Organizations are often advised to use international standard ISO/IEC27001:2005 (formal 
requirements for information security management systems) when they develop and implement 
their ICT safety and security management system, with the support of ISO 27002 (code of practice for 
information security management). The ISO / IEC 27000 family is a series of information security 
standards developed and published by the ISO and the IEC. These standards provide a globally 
recognized framework for best practice information security management. For example, the 
Norwegian public sector is required to have an internal control system for ICT safety and security 
based on recognized technical standards for ICT safety and security management systems. The 
Agency for Public Management and eGovernment (Difi) recommends that governmental bodies use 
ISO/IEC 27001.  In 2013, Difi, on behalf of the public sector, signed a framework agreement on the 
accessibility of these technical standards for management of ICT safety and security. 
     Results from my survey confirmed that very few of the respondents used technical standards for 
ICT safety and security, and my interviews with NVE also showed that the Directorate’s experience is 
that standards are rarely used by the companies in the Norwegian electric power supply sector.  
According to a representative from NVE, this does not necessarily imply that the companies within 
the sector do not have a methodical approach to ICT safety and security, only that the companies 
have not seen the benefits of being certified for compliance with technical standards because it is the 
contingency planning regulations that specify the requirements with which they must comply to 
protect their SCADA systems. 
     Several different technical standards for ICT safety and security were previously mentioned in 
NVE’s guidelines for the contingency planning regulations, including ISO 27001, ISO 27002, Standard 
of Good Practice from Information Security Forum (ISF), and Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology (COBIT). These standards were mentioned in the guidelines as possible 
tools/methods that organizations can use to develop and establish a safety and security 
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management system and as a starting point for their risk and vulnerability analysis process.29 In 
presentations30 held at conferences on ICT safety and security for companies within the electric 
power supply sector, representatives from NVE also advised the network companies to use 
international and national technical standards for ICT safety and security. 
     However, both the contingency planning regulations and the regulatory guidelines have recently 
been revised, and in the new guidelines from 2013 the technical standards for ICT safety and security 
are no longer mentioned. Instead, the regulatory guidelines are now extended from 168 to 310 
pages, and the guidelines for ICT safety and security are extended from one to two chapters (one 
regarding information safety and security (§6) and one regarding safety and security for process 
control systems (§7)) containing more detailed process descriptions.  
     A follow-up question regarding the missing references to technical standards in the new guidelines 
was posed to one of our former interviewees from the contingency planning department in NVE. The 
answer was that the references to technical standards for ICT safety and security did not become a 
part of the new guidelines for the contingency planning regulations because of an error, but the 
references are planned to be reintroduced in the next version of the guidelines. Nevertheless, several 
of the requirements in NVE’s guidelines are similar to the requirements in ISO 27001, and NVE has 
also included parts of NIST 800-82, “Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security,” in the 
guidelines.  
     Because of the complexity of ICT systems, the technical standards for ICT safety and security may 
also be perceived as too complicated and difficult to follow; it is easier just to cross off items on a 
checklist. Standards are often general and abstract and it can be difficult to do exactly what a 
standard says (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000).  On the other hand, the complexity of the ICT systems 
can also be why it is necessary to use the technical standards instead of simple checklists when 
developing a risk and vulnerability analysis and establishing internal safety and security management 
systems. If the technical standards are not implemented, it may be more difficult for the companies 
to try to anticipate and plan for extraordinary incidents with potentially devastating consequences. 
With regard to updating, ISO 27001 has a website called “Wotsnew”31 which is updated frequently, 
often several times a month, reflecting the work going on behind the scenes to develop and maintain 
the ISO27k standards. Users of the standard are encouraged to “revisit periodically or check the 
history of changes below to avoid missing out on anything important.” 
     There are many different types of process control systems with varying levels of potential risk and 
impact, which means that there are also many different methods and techniques for securing these 
systems (Stouffer, Falco, and Scarfone, 2011). The advantage of using functional internal control 
regulations is that the scope and form of the internal control system can vary with a company’s size, 
complexity, domain, and risk scenario, and this allows each company to adjust the system to its own 
needs, routines, organization, and culture (Hovden, 1998). Standardizers (e.g., national standards 
organizations), on the other hand, argue that standards facilitate communication, contact, and 
cooperation over large areas (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). However, according to NVE, different 
                                                          
29 NVE’s guidelines from 2003 and 2011. 
30 One example is a presentation by senior advisor Øystein Korum from the contingency planning department 
in NVE, at Kraft IS, an ICT safety and security conference held by NVE and NorSIS, Nov. 30-Dec. 1, 2010.  
http://www.norsis.no/vedlegg/KraftIS/Beredskapsforskriften_og_IKT-sikkerhet.pdf (accessed 16 May 2013). 
31 http://www.iso27001security.com/html/wotsnew.html. 
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technical standards are divergent when it comes to methodology and approach to safety and security 
for SCADA systems; for example, NIST (guide to process control systems security) and NERC CIP 
(critical infrastructure protection) have a very specific approach, while ISO, the Information 
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), and COBIT have a more general approach because they cover 
a broad spectrum of systems, including SCADA systems. This can make it difficult for the network 
companies to choose the right standard and will necessitate NVE expanding on the different 
approaches in the guidelines to aid companies in choosing the right one. 
      According to Power (2007), institutional capacities to organize in the face of uncertainty have 
been challenged and threatened by failures, scandals, and disasters, and in response visionary 
documents and designs in the form of standards and guidelines for individuals and organizations 
have been produced so as to maintain perceptions of control and manageability. The organization of 
uncertainty in the form of safety and security management designs and standards is related to 
expectations of governance and demands for defendable, auditable processes. However, many laws, 
regulations, and standards are sufficiently controversial or ambiguous that they do not provide clear 
prescriptions for conduct. In such cases, laws, regulations, and standards are better conceived as 
occasions for sensemaking and collective interpretation, relying more on cognitive and normative 
than coercive elements for its effects. Thus, institutions supported by one institutional pillar may, as 
time passes and circumstances change, be sustained by different pillars (Scott, 2008). 
8.3 Cultural-cognitive aspects – risk perception 
Humans are influenced by their surroundings, and the environment affects cognition as well as 
behavior and individual decisions. The perceived risk concerns how an individual understands and 
experiences a phenomenon (Oltedal et al., 2004). The concept of risk perception is connected to 
cognition, mental processes, sensemaking, and culture. Uncertainty is a psychological construct, and 
people's risk judgments are related to cognitive processes, including how one comprehends 
information (Slovic, Fischoff, and Lichtenstein, 1982). Risk related to ICT systems is one of today’s 
produced uncertainties contributing to Beck’s (1992) characteristics of a risk society (referred to in 
Albrechtsen, 2007). 
     As shown in Chapter 7, the results from my survey of managers and employees in Norwegian 
network companies showed that most of the respondents perceived the risk of attacks on or 
malfunctions in the network organizations’ ICT systems as relatively low. The managers and 
employees in the network companies are closest to their ICT systems (including SCADA systems) and 
have system knowledge. Hence, one might ask why their judgment of the risk should be disregarded. 
However, as described in Chapter 2, numerous research reports and newspaper articles have shown 
that this is a real risk, and many examples of incidents exist worldwide. In light of this, I discuss 
factors that might explain the differences in risk perception. 
8.3.1 Factors that can influence risk perceptions 
Previous studies have found that company size can influence risk perception within companies 
(Eakin, 1992; Hasle and Limborg, 2006; Hagen, Sivertsen, and Rong, 2008), and the analysis of my 
survey results also showed a statistically significant difference in the mean risk perception scores 
between managers and employees in small companies versus managers and employees in large 
companies. 
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     An organization’s technology can be used to assess what type of work is performed by the 
organization and organizational size measures how much of that work the organization carries on 
(i.e., the scale on which the work is conducted). Most studies of the relationship between 
organizational size and structure have used the number of participants (usually employees) as an 
indicator of size. This measure can reflect both the capacity of the organization to perform work, as 
well as the current scale of actual performance (Scott, 1998). Most of the network companies in the 
Norwegian electric power supply sector have fewer than 100 employees and can be considered small 
organizations according to the measurement of organizational size chosen in this study. The 
introduction of ICT systems to monitor, control, and operate power generation plants and power 
distribution first led to a downsizing of employees within the electric power supply companies in 
favor of ICT systems. However, at the same time, the deregulation of the electric power supply sector 
and the introduction of market principles have led to a centralization of the sector due to company 
mergers and acquisitions. 
     As previously mentioned, twenty-three of the network companies are organized in large corporate 
groups with several subsidiaries or daughter companies. In these companies, some of the employees 
in the corporate group might perform work for the network companies, even if they are registered as 
employees in other companies within the group. Some of the large companies have even organized 
system control centers in separate companies. In large corporate groups, the basic ICT functions are 
often managed by corporate IT departments, and these departments may be a bit too removed from 
the different problem areas that are regulated in the contingency planning regulations. 
 
     The smallest companies are often dominated by a combined owner-manager, who is very often 
the sole person responsible for all or most activities not directly related to production. The main 
focus for the owner-manager is the survival of the company and for natural reasons safety and 
security will often be a minor focus due to limited resources in terms of money, personnel, and 
knowledge (Eakin, 1992; Hasle and Limborg, 2006). These small organizations may also have only 
limited contact with regulatory authorities, and owner-managers will sometimes accuse the 
regulatory bureaucracy of having a choking effect on small companies (Power, 2007), a notion that 
was confirmed by our survey based on comments from some of the respondents. All network 
companies in Norway are obligated to appoint an ICT safety and security manager/coordinator, but 
in the smaller companies the ICT safety and security managers do not usually work full time in that 
position. Because of limited resources, many of the smaller network companies cannot hire their 
own ICT staff and instead choose to outsource this function to other companies (Hagen, 2009). 
     The big network companies have larger process control systems (SCADA systems) and system 
control centers and distribute electrical power to more customers (e.g., critical infrastructures such 
as transport, finance, and telecommunication, hospitals, and other organizations, as well as 
individual households) than the smaller network companies. Hence, an attack on the large network 
companies’ ICT systems can have more serious consequences for societal safety. Most of the large 
SCADA systems in the big network companies are subject to stricter obligations in the contingency 
planning regulations than the smaller SCADA systems, and large companies often have a separate IT 
department with significant expertise in ICT. Knowledge and expertise in ICT might lead to a more 
accurate perception of the risks from threats to the companies’ ICT systems. However, another 
department may run the SCADA systems on a daily basis and departments may not always 
communicate well on these issues. In addition to having a separate corporate IT department, 
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outsourcing of basic ICT functions to external companies is also increasingly common. Many of the 
local companies in the corporate group may know little about the potential threats to their ICT 
systems, and the IT department might not have a complete overview of what the consequences of a 
security breach may be in the different application areas. Large companies are also often less 
transparent than smaller companies due to larger and more complex systems, and this can make it 
easier for insiders to engage in crime and not be detected (Hagen, Sivertsen, and Rong, 2008). 
     Regulation introduces obligations which can be a financial burden for smaller companies. The 
governmental inspectors can impose sanctions on the organizations if they commit serious 
infringements of the legislation, most often in the form of monetary fines (the sanction of 
withdrawing the license is usually the last resort). The threat of having such costs imposed can be 
considered a potential burden for the organization (Hasle and Limborg, 2006). According to my 
interviews with NVE, inspectors also have the impression that small organizations find it difficult to 
keep up with obligations regarding ICT safety and security. 
 
     Technically, risks are becoming increasingly integrated and interconnected. However, at the 
organizational level, the organizations that are responsible for dealing with these risks are becoming 
increasingly fragmented, which might influence users’ risk perception. Seen from a safety and 
reliability perspective, this paradox involves a major challenge when it comes to identifying and 
mitigating cross-sectorial risks. According to Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad (2012), NPM-inspired 
ways of organizing infrastructure production generate organizational weaknesses that can influence 
the reliability of critical infrastructures. NPM has led to variants of functional splitting along the value 
chain. Consequently, more organizations are involved in the infrastructure production. Several 
Norwegian network companies are split into one network company (the actual concessionaire) and 
internal suppliers. For instance, one internal supplier handles the planning functions and much of the 
follow-up of fitting contractors. Another supplier runs the control central. Though belonging to the 
same corporation, these companies are regarded as suppliers to the network company and sell 
services to the network company and each other according to formalized contracts.  
 
     Thus, one integrated utility is split into a network of cooperating businesses coordinated by 
contracts and business relationships. Though this kind of reorganization can have many advantages, 
including in terms of reliability, it also introduces new organizational complexity. One effect of a 
modularized system is that informal organizational structures are weakened and communication 
patterns and cooperation modes are standardized. The personal networks across functions are also 
weakened as they belong to different organizations. In the older integrated companies, personal 
networks facilitated smooth operations and information flow that fostered many of the typical 
characteristics of a robust organization. In general, modularization and related developments 
increase the organizational distance between personnel with practical knowledge of the system and 
those with a systematic overview (Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). 
 
     A problem related to organizational fragmentation is that several network companies have chosen 
to outsource their operational work. This means that the fitters now belong to other companies 
competing for operation and emergency preparedness for different sectors of the grid and for 
specific “packages” of maintenance work. In cases where operational work is outsourced, it is 
important for competition for contracts to be fair and transparent. In this respect, personnel 
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networks across functions may be problematic and may even be actively discouraged. However, this 
weakens the personal networks across functions, even though good relationships and dialogue 
between planners (with system knowledge) and doers (with practical knowledge) are particularly 
potent sources of robustness and risk sensitivity (Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad, 2012). In Norway, 
NVE has tried to fix the growing problem of lack of competent personnel by introducing a new 
requirement in the contingency planning regulations for the electric power supply sector. Since 2013, 
all network companies have been required to have competent personnel on their permanent staff. 
However, representatives from the industry are skeptical of these requirements and want to have 
them removed. These representatives do not want requirements for how many employees are 
needed to serve different functions or restrictions on the companies’ outsourcing of services, but 
rather they want to replace these requirements with more general quality and safety requirements. 
 
     A common concern when NPM is introduced in critical infrastructure sectors is that the drive for 
effectiveness may lead to cheap solutions and reduce technical and organizational redundancy. 
However, NPM can also introduce issues of coordinating redundancy. According to Almklov, 
Antonsen, and Fenstad (2012), an interesting case observed by NVE was that the overall redundancy 
of fitters to handle emergencies in the industry had been reduced and that several network 
companies had contracts with the same contractors. Thus, while the emergency response capacity 
was very good for typical incidents, and more effective than before, there was less slack in the 
industry as a whole to tackle extraordinary incidents. If several network companies needed 
assistance, the extra personnel could be contractually obliged to be in several places at the same 
time and thus a false redundancy is created. 
 
     Results of the Norwegian Computer Crime Survey (2012) suggested that managers outsource not 
only functions but also the responsibility for ICT safety and security. Only half of the enterprises in 
the computer crime survey answered that they had allocated internal resources with ICT knowledge 
to follow up on the contracts with and deliveries from their vendors and subcontractors. According 
to the interviewees from NVE, representatives from ABB and Siemens (the two main vendors 
(suppliers) of process control systems/SCADA systems in Norway) have claimed that if the network 
companies utilized more of the safety mechanisms that are already available in the systems, the 
overall safety and security would be increased. NVE suggests that this reflects a certain naiveté or 
gullibility about ICT risk, safety, and security in the sector. Many of the network companies have a lot 
of trust in the expertise of their system vendors, believe that the vendors will create safe solutions, 
and take for granted that some type of technical applications can manage all problems, and this 
might also influence their risk perception. The system owners (network companies) are responsible 
for the safety and security of their own ICT systems, and it might be necessary for the network 
companies to tell their vendors to provide more safety and security solutions for these systems. 
 
     Earlier studies have shown that having had an accident or having experienced an attack can 
influence the current perception of risk. As described in Chapters 6 and 7, the respondents in my 
survey were asked if their organizations had experienced different safety and security incidents. For 
some of the incidents (e.g., malware attacks, malfunctioning in the ICT systems caused by human 
error), a majority of the respondents answered that their organizations had experienced such 
incidents, but many still rated these types of incidents at the low end of the risk perception scale. 
Indeed, one respondent wrote on the questionnaire: “We constantly experience attempts to hack 
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into our ICT systems, but I have only answered based on the attempts that succeeded.” This might 
indicate that even though the network companies do experience attempts to break into their ICT 
systems, they do not perceive these attempts as a high risk because so far most attempts have failed. 
According to the interviewees from NVE, managers and employees in many of the network 
companies find it difficult to prepare for something that might happen, but hasn’t happened yet. 
 
     Perceptions can be the result of incomplete or faulty knowledge (Okrent and Pidgeon, 1998). As 
described in Chapter 7, the respondents in my survey generally scored high on items concerning their 
familiarity with the contingency planning regulations and with the internal safety and security policy 
and contingency plan in their companies (the knowledge of safety and security scale). However, I 
found no correlation between knowledge of safety and security and risk perception, and the 
interviewees from NVE said they often find during inspections that a number of employees (and 
possibly also managers) in the network companies have not read the contingency planning 
regulations and guidelines. 
     Another factor that might influence risk perception is that many issues surrounding ICT safety and 
security seem to be taken for granted within Norwegian network companies. The smaller network 
companies often take for granted that they are unimportant and not a target of potential attack and 
that the potential consequences of an attack on small companies’ ICT systems are not as significant 
as on a large organization’s systems. However, with the introduction of AMI and the smart grid, the 
potential consequences are likely to increase in seriousness. My interviewees from NVE said they 
expect several of the smaller network companies to have to team up and join resources to 
implement and manage the AMI, and this might greatly increase the consequences of malfunctions 
in or attacks on their ICT systems. According to Hagen, Sivertsen, and Rong (2008), both small and 
large enterprises may evaluate (or perceive) the risk of malfunctions in or attacks on their ICT 
systems as too low to put much effort into user education. 
 
     Many network companies also seem to take for granted that the system vendors (suppliers) will 
make safe solutions and that some type of technical applications embedded in the systems can 
manage all possible problems. Furthermore, employees can unintentionally misuse software and e-
mail and import infected information, and they can disclose confidential or sensitive information 
unintentionally. Employees can also intentionally misuse ICT resources and disclose information 
(Hagen, 2009). The consequences of insider attacks can be worse than the consequences of external 
attacks (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, 2009). However, according to NVE, a high threshold for 
acknowledging this kind of risk exists in the network companies. It might be taken for granted that 
“this does not happen in our company,” which can affect managers’ and employees’ risk perception.      
 
     As mentioned in Chapter 7, two different subcultures exist in the network companies, depending 
on whether the people operating the SCADA systems have an education in ICT or a background from 
the electricity industry. In addition to these two different subcultures – information technology and 
automation technology – representatives from the contingency planning section in NVE suggested 
that other subcultures also exist (e.g., employees with backgrounds in telemetrics). The different 
group cultures result in different focus points and mindsets; the groups have different ways of 
thinking and draw on different scripts and frames when they make sense of the technology. For 
example, people who have training in electrical engineering generally focus on keeping the systems 
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running without interruption, and they may be less focused on installing security measures and 
spending time to apply software patches. Follow-up on specific tasks, such as network configuration 
and control of firewalls, can often be seen as a “necessary evil” that system users relate to as only an 
annoying delay in their work. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this type of separation of the workforce 
into subcultures has also been reported in studies from the offshore oil and gas industry (Mearns, 
Flin, and O’Connor, 2001). 
 
     A lack of safety and security awareness by users has often been cited as the top obstacle for 
effective ICT safety and security (Goodhue and Straub, 1991; Johnson, 2006; Hagen, 2009; 
Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009), and lack of awareness might also affect users’ risk perception. 
According to the Norwegian National Strategy for Information Security of 2012, the owners of critical 
infrastructure in many cases have limited knowledge and awareness of vulnerabilities, 
interdependencies of critical infrastructures, and what the individual enterprise must do to protect 
the infrastructure. If a low level of risk perception regarding the safety and security of the ICT 
systems in the electric power supply sector can lead to a lack of compliance with the requirements of 
ICT regulations, the network organizations can fail in their attempt to develop broad and 
comprehensive defenses for all the relevant threats and to identify successful attacks and their 
consequences. Thus, risk perception can be a challenge for the safety and security management of 
electric power supply network companies. 
8.4 Cultural-cognitive aspects - management commitment, awareness 
creation, and training 
ICT safety and security law in Norway places responsibility for ICT safety and security on the 
management and boards of directors of companies. The contingency planning regulations for the 
Norwegian electric power supply sector also emphasize that contingency planning (which includes 
ICT safety and security) is the responsibility of the top managers in the organization, and the 
authorities expect the top management to convey the importance of and follow up on safety and 
security within their organization. If the management is engaged, it will be aware of the need for 
information security measures to comply with the laws and assure that security measures are 
implemented (Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a). However, according to the interviewees from NVE, 
the network companies focus on the possibilities that the SCADA systems provide (i.e., access to 
more information and the possibilities of operating more electrical plants in a simpler way), but there 
is not as much focus on, or awareness of, the risk of “unwanted” access to these systems, protection 
against malicious software, and similar issues.  
 
     According to Hagen and Albrechtsen’s (2009a) study, a larger number of electric power supply 
companies reported incidents typically caused by insiders (e.g., abuse of ICT systems, unintentional 
use violating security) than financial companies. As previously said, the interviewees from NVE had 
the impression that there exists a high threshold for acknowledging the risk of insider incidents in the 
network companies. The companies might take for granted that “this does not happen in our 
company,” which can affect their awareness. 
 
     One of the findings in article 4 was that it is easier to get the network companies to implement 
technological and technical-administrative measures than to achieve management commitment to 
and create awareness about ICT safety and security within the companies. As previously mentioned, 
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a possible explanation for this may be that when formal management systems (i.e., policies, 
procedures, and tools) are in place, these measures may be taken for granted and accepted as 
contributors to an adequate security level. However, contrary to the results from my interviews and 
observation studies, the majority of respondents in my survey viewed management commitment to 
ICT safety and security in their organization as high. One possible explanation for this discrepancy 
may be that on subjective assessments regarding their own company’s performance respondents are 
often inclined to assess themselves positively. Sometimes, it may also be difficult to answer 
negatively on questions concerning one’s immediate manager (Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 
2008). 
 
     My survey found results similar to Albrechtsen and Hovden’s (2009) study of measures that were 
used by managers to influence user behavior and awareness; 54.9% of the respondents answered 
negatively (“Strongly disagree” or “Disagree”) on the statement, “In my organization, formal face-to-
face presentations of information about ICT safety and security are often held to raise employee 
awareness,” and only 10.8% of the respondents answered positively (“Strongly agree” or “Agree”), 
while 33.3% answered “Neither disagree nor agree.” According to Albrechtsen and Hovden, the 
problem with formal one-way communication measures for creating safety and security awareness 
was that users often lacked the motivation and awareness to obtain the knowledge in this 
information, in addition to being bombarded with other types of information.   
 
     Previous research has suggested employee participation, practical learning through interaction, 
role-playing exercises, and e-learning as good techniques to achieve information security awareness 
among users of ICT systems (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009; Thomson and von Solms, 1998; Hagen 
and Albrechtsen, 2009b). However, these types of awareness creating and training measures are 
often resource demanding because they must be repeated to be effective. Removing employees 
from their work during presentations, meetings, and training sessions can also reduce the production 
capacity of the company. This may be why these types of measures are used to a lesser extent than 
formal one-way measures, even though studies have shown that they are considered better and 
more effective for raising awareness about ICT safety and security (Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 
2008; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). This type of trade-off is well known in the safety research 
domain. Reason (1997) described how trade-offs are made at an organizational level, and safety 
margins are eroded due to an emphasis on efficiency rather than safety (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 
2009). 
 
     The Norwegian petroleum industry uses process control systems (SCADA systems) which are 
similar to the technology used in the electric power supply industry. According to Johnsen (2012), the 
integration of technologies, distribution of information, and collaboration in teams create new 
vulnerabilities, new complexities, and new uncertainties in the systems used to control operations, 
just as in the electric power supply industry. Johnsen found an absence of systematic awareness 
training related to ICT/SCADA security, which would affect anticipation and attention and might 
reduce the resilience of the system. According to Jaatun et al. (2009), the petroleum industry still 
does not consider information security to be a matter of sufficient importance. One consequence of 
this is that incidents are treated in an ad hoc manner. The results from my survey in the electric 
power supply sector are similar to Johnsen’s and Jaatun et al.’s findings and suggest a lack of 
 Discussion  
110 
 
awareness of ICT safety and security and that use of awareness creation and training measures for 
ICT safety and security varies a lot among the survey respondents’ network companies. 
 
     The Cyber Security Strategy for Norway of 2012 concluded that the lack of awareness concerning 
ICT safety and security constitutes a high and increasing risk. The complexity of the process control 
systems (SCADA systems), together with an increase in the number of attacks on ICT systems, 
demands a large effort to create awareness of the threats, provide information about safety and 
security measures, and influence positive attitudes. Thus, the lack of both management commitment 
and awareness creation and training for ICT safety and security present challenges for the safety and 
security management of electric power supply network companies. 
8.5 Theoretical limitations - rational versus institutional? 
In this thesis, I have chosen to apply a sociotechnical perspective and institutional organizational 
theory (or organizational institutionalism) as a theoretical framework, which emphasizes that 
organizations are open systems, strongly influenced by their environments. Organizations are 
embedded in society and affected by institutions, ideas, rules, and legitimate patterns of action that 
are generally taken for granted. Attention is directed toward forces that lie beyond the 
organizational boundary in the realm of social processes (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983, 1991; Hoffman, 1999). Modern societies contain many complexes of 
institutionalized rules and patterns (e.g., products of professional groups, the state, public opinion), 
and these socially constructed realities provide frameworks for the creation and elaboration of 
formal organizations (Scott, 1998).  
     Furthermore, according to the theoretical approach employed in this thesis, technology’s effects 
on organizations are socially constructed. Artifacts are created by human ingenuity to assist in the 
performance of various tasks. The most important characteristic of artifacts is that they embody both 
technical and symbolic elements (Suchman, 2003, referred to in Scott, 2008), and users draw on 
familiar schemas and frames to make sense of a new technology. The formal organization can also be 
considered an institution with accompanying rules and instructions for its incorporation and 
employment in a social setting. Institutions are taken for granted in that they are both treated as 
relative fixtures in a social environment and accounted for as functional elements of that 
environment (Jepperson, 1991). 
     However, this thesis discusses safety and security management of organizations where 
organizations implement different preventive measures based on the results of risk and vulnerability 
analyses (Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008) and, according to Antonsen et al. (2012), the 
philosophy of safety management represents a highly rationalist account of management and 
organization. Among other things, the philosophy emphasizes the standardization of work methods, 
the separation of planning and execution, and the use of scientific methods and statistics to detect 
flaws in a system. 
     From a rational system perspective, organizations are instruments designed to attain specific 
predetermined goals with maximum efficiency. The organizational structure is viewed as a means, an 
instrument that can be modified as necessary to improve performance. Theorists utilizing this 
perspective focus on the normative structure of organizations, that is, the specificity of goals and the 
formalization of rules and roles (Scott, 1998). One basic assumption of safety management is that 
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safety should be a management responsibility. Management systems are created, aiming to control 
an organization’s operational performance (Antonsen et al., 2012).  Johnson (2006) argued that the 
top management must be committed to ICT safety and security through its activities and through a 
dedicated budget. An organization’s safety and security policy should contain a letter of commitment 
from the top management showing commitment to ICT safety and security within the organization 
and assign the responsibilities of each member of the organization, particularly line management, 
top management, and safety and security professionals. This can again imply an instrumental 
organizational perspective, where actors are rational and have oversight over all alternatives and 
where leaders can plan ahead and influence how the organization works by introducing new 
measures.  
     However, according to Scheytt et al. (2006), it is well known to management scholars that decision 
capacity within organizations is limited, yet managerial legal discourses often ascribe to such 
imperfect management capacity “full” accountability for adverse outcomes. The concept of bounded 
rationality emphasizes that it is impossible for individuals to be informed about all available decision 
alternatives, and individual choice takes place in an environment of “givens” (i.e., premises that are 
accepted by the subject as bases for his or her choice), and behavior is adaptive only within the limits 
set by these givens. By providing integrated subgoals, stable expectations, required information, 
necessary facilities, routine performance programs, and in general a set of constraints within which 
required decisions can be made, organizations supply these givens to individual participants (Simon, 
1976, referred to in Scott, 1998). 
     However, according to cultural-cognitive theorists, underlying all decisions and choices are socially 
constructed models, assumptions, and schemas. All decisions are admixtures of rational calculations 
and non-rational premises. Institutions provide guidelines and resources for taking action, as well as 
prohibitions and constraints on action (Scott, 2008). According to Hagen (2009), an effective security 
culture that includes consistent, appropriate attention to employee security awareness, training, and 
education is essential to effective information security. Documents are often seen as important 
because they form the basis for other measures (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009); however, 
procedures must actually be followed to be effective and can be taken for granted (Hagen, 2009). In 
addition, as previously stated, many laws, regulations, and standards are better conceived as an 
occasion for sensemaking and collective interpretation. 
     As mentioned in Chapter 4, research on safety has evolved from being dominated by a formal 
rational perspective through a bounded rational perspective to a cultural open perspective where 
social and cultural factors are increasingly important for the understanding and analysis of safety. At 
the same time, safety research has evolved from a primary focus on the rational actor model (focus 
on the individual) to a focus on the social and cultural context (focus on the organization) where 
safety culture and safety climate have received more attention (Dyreborg, 2006). 
     According to the subset of theorists endorsing a cultural-cognitive perspective, the very concept of 
an organization as a special-purpose, instrumental entity is a product of institutional processes – 
constitutive processes that define the capacities of collective actors, both generally and as 
specialized subtypes (Scott, 2008). As previously mentioned, proponents of new institutional 
organizational theory also claim that institutions are both antecedent to and emergent from 
sensemaking processes. Institutions enter meaning-making processes in three ways: Institutions 
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serve as the building blocks or substance of sensemaking, institutions dynamically guide and edit 
action formation, and institutions are continually enacted and accomplished in ongoing sensemaking 
processes (Weber and Glynn, 2006). Last, according to Scheytt et al. (2006), scholarly and practical 
reflections on organizations and the management of risk are necessarily multi-disciplinary and need 
to recognize the ongoing social construction of risk knowledge. 
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9. Contributions of the study and concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I start by discussing the contributions of the thesis. Then I provide recommendations 
and suggestions for measures to reduce the complex challenges for safety and security management 
of network companies and improve the safety and security of their ICT systems, based on the 
findings and theoretical discussions in this thesis. Finally, I suggest topics for further research. 
 
     This thesis highlights important challenges for safety and security management of network 
companies that result from the increased use of ICT to monitor, control, and operate electric power 
distribution. The study has elaborated on previous research on the use of functional internal control 
risk regulations and added new knowledge about the challenges for regulating (and managing) risks 
in complex ICT systems operating critical infrastructures. The introduction of new technologies leads 
to complex risks which in turn lead to varying attitudes to regulation of these risks, depending on the 
degree of complexity and uncertainty of the specific risk problem.  Finding the right balance between 
different principles for controlling risks is especially challenging with regard to complex technological 
risk problems.  
 
     Another finding is that very few Norwegian network companies use technical standards for ICT 
safety and security. This result also confirmed assumptions held by representatives from the 
contingency planning department in NVE, as well as results from a previous interview study 
(Røyksund, 2011). The findings from my study indicate that technical standards for managing ICT 
safety and security should be evaluated and further developed if they are to become more applicable 
for process control systems (SCADA systems) running critical infrastructures. An interesting finding in 
this thesis is also that the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in their ICT systems appear to be 
perceived as low among my survey respondents in Norwegian network companies. In addition, I 
found that among my respondents both managers and employees perceive the risk as low, contrary 
to findings in some other studies, including Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009), who found a “digital 
divide” between information security managers and users of ICT systems. 
 
    Furthermore, I have elaborated on previous research on the importance of management 
commitment and awareness creation and training with regard to ICT safety and security. I have 
confirmed results from previous studies in other sectors and found a statistically significant 
correlation between management commitment to ICT safety and security and implementation of 
awareness creation and training measures in the companies. However, regarding the question of 
management commitment, I found a discrepancy between the results of my interviews and 
observation studies and the results from the survey. According to my interviews with NVE and the 
results of my observation studies, it is easier to get the network companies to implement 
technological and technical-administrative measures than to achieve management commitment to 
and create awareness about ICT safety and security within the companies. However, the majority of 
respondents in my survey viewed management commitment to ICT safety and security in their 
organization as high. Another important finding is that the use of awareness creation and training 
measures for ICT safety and security vary a lot between the network companies. 
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     The thesis also highlights that one main factor influences all the different challenges I have 
studied, namely, complexity. The environmental contexts in which organizations exist are constantly 
changing, and at an increasing rate. These changes lead to increasing complexity, especially with the 
impact of fast-paced technological change. According to Scheytt et al. (2006), information overload, 
bounded rationality, and the complex nature of possible threats are aspects that add to the intricacy 
of risk management practices. 
 
     The theoretical framework for the thesis (i.e., the sociotechnical perspective and institutional 
organizational theory) has helped to contextualize the studied phenomena, highlight aspects and 
elements that are important to consider in relation to safety and security (or risk) management, and 
show that many different factors can lead to challenges for safety and security management at every 
level of the sociotechnical system. The thesis illustrates why it is important to consider human, 
technological, and organizational factors, as well as the dynamic interaction between these factors. It 
is especially important to consider cultural-cognitive factors and be aware how these elements affect 
safety and security management. Institutional organizational theory contributes to illustrate that 
there is no clear distinction between organizations and their environments and that many socially 
constructed and institutionalized aspects can influence organizations and create important 
challenges. Regulative (regulations), normative (technical standards), and cultural-cognitive 
(sensemaking, risk perception, commitment, and awareness) processes are connected in complex 
and changing mixtures, and these processes shape organizational structures and activities. The use of 
institutional organizational theory also sheds light on the important fact that many issues related to 
safety and security are taken for granted.      
 
     According to Almklov, Antonsen, and Fenstad (2012), critical infrastructures are systems taken for 
granted. Critical infrastructures are themselves often built on the expectation of the functioning of 
other infrastructures. This goes for the technical infrastructure itself (e.g., water pumps that depend 
on electricity), but equally important is the operational context around it (e.g., ICT-based maps, 
global positioning systems (GPS) and mobile networks in emergency handling, dependence on 
transport to get critical spare components). The tendency to take infrastructures for granted may be 
a problem when analyzing risk because it may challenge the imagination to really understand how 
they are interconnected in different situations. Dependencies do not follow institutional or 
organizational boundaries, so when analyzing and managing risk, several actors should be involved in 
this imaginative work.      
     The results of the current study are especially relevant for regulators, top managers, and safety 
and security managers/coordinators in the Norwegian electric power supply sector. However, the 
challenges discussed in this thesis are likely also relevant for similar electric power supply sectors in 
other countries, as well as other companies that operate critical national infrastructure with similar 
ICT systems (process control systems/SCADA systems). It is important for companies and the 
regulatory authorities to be aware of these challenges, which should be considered when risk 
regulations and safety and security management systems are developed, implemented, and adapted. 
In the next section, I suggest several recommendations for measures that can reduce the challenges 
for safety and security management of network companies and improve the safety and security of 
their ICT systems. 
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9.2 Recommendations and suggestions 
 
• Detailed regulatory requirements may hinder natural development which takes into account 
new technologies and operational patterns; such requirements can be difficult to update fast 
enough. A combination of functional and prescriptive regulations may be more convenient, 
and the new contingency planning regulations for the Norwegian electric power supply 
sector from 2012 (including the new guidelines from 2013) are a step in this direction. 
• However, when implementing new complex technology, more detailed guidelines, in 
addition to more monitoring and support, are necessary. 
• Technical standards for ICT safety and security are often too general and complex, which can 
also lead to unnecessary additional costs and reduced efficiency (a lot of time and expertise 
is needed to use them). It can also be difficult to choose an appropriate standard for process 
control systems (SCADA systems). However, some technical standards provide frequently 
updated international recommendations and advice. Technical standards for managing ICT 
safety and security need to be evaluated and further developed if they are to become more 
applicable for process control systems (SCADA systems) running critical infrastructures. 
According to Nicholson et al. (2012), any upcoming standards should address shortcomings in 
current SCADA system architectures, administrative policies, and platform security 
mechanisms, and it is important for both vendors and end-users to comply with these 
standards. 
• With a poor understanding of risk, the quality of the preventive safety and security work will 
not be satisfactory. Human factors such as a basic understanding of risk, knowledge, 
expertise, determination, and attitudes must be in place for organizational and technical 
aspects of the safety and security work to function as intended. 
• The different subcultures within the network companies should learn to communicate better 
with regard to ICT safety and security. In the oil and gas industry, Johnsen (2012) found that 
key mitigating factors for similar challenges were a focus on common meeting arenas, 
increased training and awareness, cooperation, and the establishment of common goals and 
common risk perceptions (common mental models) among the relevant groups. 
• Instead of trusting in the expertise of their system vendors (suppliers) and counting on the 
vendors to create safe solutions, the SCADA system owners (network companies) need to 
become more vocal in demanding secure products from their vendors. 
 
• There is a general need for increased awareness of the uncertainty and complexity of the ICT 
systems used in the electric power supply, as well as an increased focus on ICT safety and 
security among managers and employees in both large and small network companies. This is 
particularly relevant today because of the implementation of AMI and the smart grid. 
• The top management must demonstrate its commitment to ICT safety and security through 
its activities and through a dedicated budget. 
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• The lack of awareness of a danger might lead to weak vigilance by users and a greater 
potential for abuse. Interactive face-to-face presentations of information about ICT safety 
and security can be a useful measure to raise awareness among managers and employees in 
the network companies, as can involving the employees in the development of ICT safety and 
security measures. 
• Role playing exercises and e-learning can also be useful measures to improve knowledge and 
awareness of how to act safely and securely, which in turn can affect managers’ and 
employees’ risk perception. 
• With infrequent incidents, the risk of inaction may seem small and owners need appropriate 
motivation. Hildick-Smith (2005) suggested that this could come from a government-funded 
awareness blitz. Experts could debunk naive assumptions, instill some fear, and provide 
stepped guidance documents with common language. 
9.3 Future research 
An interesting topic for future research is a closer examination of the internal control systems in the 
network companies. The regulations require the companies to have internal ICT safety and security 
management systems, but it would be interesting to find out more about how the network 
companies actually comply with the regulations. Many of the respondents in my survey answered 
“don’t know” on questions regarding perception of compliance, which made it difficult to perform 
analyses of the data material (e.g., correlation) because there were too many missing values. 
Moreover, the use of hidden identity in the survey made it difficult to conduct a missing data analysis 
to obtain information about the respondents who answered “don’t know” in this survey. However, 
that so many respondents answered “don’t know” on these items can be seen as an interesting 
finding in itself, and it may point to a lack of knowledge and awareness of the ICT safety and security 
requirements in the regulations and thus a lack of compliance with these regulations. 
     Many of the deviations from the contingency planning regulations that NVE noted during 
inspections relate to incomplete or inadequate risk and vulnerability analysis and contingency plans. 
According to NVE’s annual supervision reports in recent years, many companies lack a systematic 
approach to safety, security, and contingency planning. Another interesting path for further research 
is a more thorough study of the network companies’ risk and vulnerability analyses and contingency 
plans related to ICT safety and security in their SCADA systems, including how often they are updated 
and how they are actually used in the safety and security management of the companies. 
     According to discrepancies in the results of my study, further research on management 
commitment to ICT safety and security in the network companies is needed, including examination of 
the role top management plays in the safety and security management of these companies. Further 
exploration of the use of ICT safety and security awareness creation and training measures involving 
employee participation and practical learning through interaction (e.g., e-learning, role-playing 
exercises) might also be an interesting topic for further research. 
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This article addresses attitudes toward the use of functional versus prescriptive risk regulations. The con-
text for the study is the use of functional internal control regulations for information and communication
technology (ICT) safety and security in network companies within the Norwegian electric power supply
sector. The rapid development in ICT has made traditional methods of command and control (prescrip-
tive) regulation by government less adequate in coping with modern risks, and the introduction of inter-
nal control has been an attempt to develop new approaches and means to cope with new challenges of
misﬁts between technology and regulation (Hovden, 1998). The article concludes that the degree of com-
plexity, uncertainty and uncontrollability of a speciﬁc risk problem experienced by different actors, can
explain varying attitudes toward the use of functional regulations for controlling risks.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Information and communication technology (ICT) is increas-
ingly becoming a part of all critical infrastructures (Line and
Tøndel, 2012), and ICT is now used to monitor, control and operate
power generation plants and power distribution within electric
power supply systems (Patel and Sanyal, 2008). The recent trends
are toward more general-purpose solutions, software, and using
the Internet for communication related to operation and manage-
ment of remote processes and production systems. This increases
efﬁciency and cooperation, saves time, and reduces costs.
However, this also makes formerly isolated ICT systems vulnerable
to a set of threats and risks they have not been exposed to before
(Line and Tøndel, 2012). Process control systems, e.g. supervisory
control and data acquisition systems (SCADA systems) , and other
ICT systems used within electric power supply systems, are vul-
nerable to a multitude of physical, electromagnetic, and logical
threats, both natural and man-made (Rodal, 2001).
Vulnerability of ICT systems within electric power supply sys-
tems is also expected to increase during the next few years.
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and, later on the Smart
Grid, are now being introduced in electric power systems in the
Western world. The electric Smart Grid promises increased capac-
ity, reliability, and efﬁciency through the marriage of cyber
technology and the existing electricity network. However, the scale
and complexity of the smart grid, along with its increased connec-
tivity and automation, make the task of cyber protection particu-
larly challenging (Kundur et al., 2010).
During the past decades there has been a marked change in the
way risk, safety, and security legislation is framed in many indus-
trialized countries. The trend has moved toward functional rules
that emphasize the required outcomes of safety and security man-
agement, allowing considerable freedom on the part of the
organizations to identify the means by which these ends will be
achieved (Reason, 1997). The context for this study is regulations
for ICT safety and security in network (transmission and dis-
tribution) companies within the Norwegian electric power supply
sector. The current study is part of a larger research project which
focuses on challenges for safety and security management of net-
work companies due to increased use of ICT in the electric power
supply sector. Based on a literature review, document studies of
the contingency planning regulations for the Norwegian electric
power supply system, and an evaluation of pre-existing question-
naires regarding similar issues, we chose to explore several differ-
ent dimensions in the research project, i.e. knowledge of safety and
security, perception of compliance, attitude toward safety and
security, attitude toward regulation, experience of incidents, risk
perception, safety and security management (management com-
mitment), and awareness creation and training. The aim of the cur-
rent article is to discuss possible explanations for varying attitudes
toward the use of functional internal control regulations as the
principle for regulating risks.
In the Norwegian electric power supply sector principles of
internal control were introduced in the area of contingency
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.03.008
0925-7535/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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planning in 2002, and one of the areas regulated by internal control
is ICT safety and security. Instead of designing detailed rules and
control systems, the authorities prescribe safety and security goals
and permit the companies to develop and enforce their own
detailed rules. This provides more capacity for the authorities to
work on other important tasks, and is at the same time meant to
contribute to a heightening of the individual company’s sense of
responsibility for their own safety and security (Ot.prp. nr. 56
(2000–2001)).
Previous research has shown that ambiguity of results of
internal control regulations may be explained by organizational
size, where large companies have been seen as better suited to
implement internal control than smaller companies (Hovden,
1998; Lindøe, 2001). However, results of a survey we conducted
among managers and employees in Norwegian network compa-
nies in 2012 revealed no statistically signiﬁcant differences
between large and small network companies regarding their atti-
tude toward the internal control regulations for ICT safety and
security. Managers and employees in both large and small net-
work companies had diverging views on and varying attitudes
toward internal control regulations, depending on the speciﬁc
question that was asked.
Hence, the following research question is discussed in the
article:
 What can explain varying attitudes toward the use of functional
internal control regulations as the principle for regulating risks?
The article is organized as follows: First, we give a brief over-
view of the regulatory context for this study and the complexity
of ICT systems. Second, we present our theoretical perspectives
followed by presentations of method and data analysis. In the
theory section we argue for a distinction between safety and
security, introduce the principles of internal control and function
based regulatory systems, and conclude why an analysis of com-
plex technologies and functional risk regulations is required. In
the section concerning material and methods we present the
mixed method applied in this study and give an overview of
the interviews, observation studies, document studies, and ques-
tionnaire survey. The results and discussion are divided in two
sections where the ﬁrst aims to present different viewpoints
concerning function based regulation among the groups of
actors, and the second discusses reasons for these viewpoints
and whether the ﬁndings express challenges for safety and
security management in the electric power supply sector as
such.
1.1. Regulatory context for the study
In Norway, internal control principles for controlling safety were
introduced in the offshore oil industry in the 1980s, and have since
then spread tomany other sectors. In 1992, the principles of internal
control were introduced for all onshore activities, and the internal
control regulation was again revised in 1997. The Norwegian
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) has the legislative
power to issue regulations for companies within the electric power
supply sector, is responsible for supervision, and perform regular
inspections to ensure compliance with regulations. Risk manage-
ment is required by law, in the Internal Control Regulation from
1997.1 For the electric power supply sector the requirement for risk
management is further reinforced through several different reg-
ulations. Contingency planning is regulated by the Energy Act,2 the
Energy Act Regulations,3 and the Contingency Planning
Regulations.4 ICT safety and security is regulated by The Norwegian
Security Act,5 and is further reinforced through Sections 6 and 7 in
the contingency planning regulations. In addition, NVE develop reg-
ulatory guidelines for the contingency planning regulations. The
guidelines are to be continually developed and quality assured based
on feedback from the electric power supply companies.
1.2. Complexities of ICT systems
Technology has an ever-changing nature, and current technolo-
gies (e.g. ICT systems) in many cases strain and stretch old models
of technology and organizations (Roberts and Grabowski, 1996).
The use of computer systems involves the self-contained, invisible
material process that is actually unfolding, as well as the equally
self-contained, equally invisible imagined process that is mentally
unfolding in the mind of an individual or a team. Both managers
and operators (employees) experience increasing cognitive
demands for inference, integration, problem solving, and mental
mapping to understand what is going on out of sight. There is also
continuous intervention improvement and redesign (technological
innovations) in computer technologies, which means that the
implementation state of development never stops, and these tech-
nologies require ongoing structuring and sensemaking if they are
to be managed (Weick, 2001). Increased cognitive demands,
increased electronic complexity, and dense organizational
interdependence over large areas, often lead to an increase in inci-
dences of unexpected outcomes that produce unexpected rami-
ﬁcations (Roberts and Grabowski, 1996).
The main problem is that it will be impossible to predict the
widespread impacts should one system component fail. Systems
can be described by their complexity, and by the tight coupling
of their components and processes. Most societal services and criti-
cal infrastructure will adhere to Perrow’s (1984) description of
complexity and tight couplings, and this is especially true for criti-
cal ICT systems (Hagen et al., 2005). New technologies, such as
complex production systems that use computers, have created
unusual problems in sensemaking for managers and employees
(Weick, 2001). According to Leveson (2004), technology today
(especially digital technology) is changing faster than engineering
techniques to cope with the new technology is being created.
Lessons learned over centuries about designing to prevent acci-
dents may be lost or become ineffective when older technologies
are replaced with new ones. The time to market for new products
has signiﬁcantly decreased, and carefully testing systems and
designs to understand all the potential behaviors and risks before
commercial and scientiﬁc use is often no longer possible.
Interactive complexity is increasing in the systems we are building,
and we are designing systems with potential interactions among
the components that cannot be thoroughly planned, understood,
anticipated, or guarded against. Thus the degree of uncertainty is
also high (Aven and Renn, 2010).
2. Theory
In the area of risk research, it is traditional to distinguish
between the terms safety and security, and the meaning of the
terms can vary considerably from one context to another.
According to Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet (2010), two relevant
and representative distinctions can be identiﬁed (the SEMA
referential framework). The ﬁrst is the system versus environment
1 January 1, 1997: Regulation concerning Systematic Health, Environment and
Safety Activities at Enterprises (Internal Control Regulation).
2 Act No. 50 of 29 June 1990.
3 REG. No. 1990 of 7 December 1990.
4 Reg. No. 1157 of 7 December 2012: Regulations relating to contingency planning
in the power supply system.
5 Act No. 10 of 20 March 1998: Regulations relating to Protective Security Services.
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distinction, where security is concerned with the risks originating
from the environment and potentially affecting the system,
whereas safety deals with the risks arising from the system and
potentially affecting the environment. The second is the malicious
versus accidental distinction, where security typically addresses
malicious (intentional) risks, while safety addresses purely
accidental (unintentional) risks (p. 59). With regards to ICT sys-
tems, both safety and security issues are important. ICT systems
are vulnerable to both attacks and accidents (e.g. technical mal-
functions), and risks that may arise both within the organizations
and in the organizations’ environment.
Modes of risk (or safety and security) regulation can be seen as a
discussion of the pros and cons of rule-compliance versus risk
management (Hopkins, 2011), with a distinction between ‘hard
regulation’ based on ‘command and control’ with prescriptive
rules, and ‘soft regulation’ with concepts coined as ‘self-regulation’
(Sinclair, 1997; Short and Toffel, 2010), ‘meta-regulation’ (Gilad,
2010), etc. An important question is whether these modes of reg-
ulation represent a dichotomy or whether they are complementary
as presented in Fig. 1. Our argument follows Sinclair (1997), stating
that the dichotomy is false. Different countries often have different
regulatory regimes; many factors in each country inﬂuence reg-
ulation itself and what is given attention by the regime (Lindøe
et al., 2013). In practice, risk regulation regimes will combine
responsibilities and roles in a public–private partnership with a
top-down approach with legal binding norms, and a bottom-up
approach with industrial (technical) standards and ‘best practice’.
The use of legal standards becomes a ‘linking pin’ that brings the
two approaches together as indicated in the right part of Fig. 1.
Function based regulation needs some form of discretionary cri-
teria that are considered as legal standards and provide some spe-
cial interpretation challenges. The term ‘legal standard’ refers to
words or phrases in a law claim that stipulates a scale or norm
beyond the law, i.e. a particular practice, widespread attitudes in
the community or other conditions that change with time. While
these phenomena change over time, the contents of the law do
not. The use of legal standards aims to achieve an appropriate reg-
ulation of complex ﬁelds in constant development. It can also be
seen as an expression of respect for the importance of expert
knowledge to ensure the safety and quality in key areas of society.
Legal standards probably safeguard the goal of safety and quality
better than if they had been fully formulated in laws and reg-
ulations. The underlying measure of the legal standards is based
on an understanding of the issues, terminology and solutions that
are understood in the professional and scientiﬁc community.
Through stakeholder involvement in the process of developing
these norms, the use of legal standards may enjoy greater legiti-
macy than rules based on legal terminology and legal text.
A consistent application of a function based regulation requires
a comprehensive and systematic review on how the various provi-
sions are to be understood and how the appropriate standards
should be used to meet the requirements. Procedures must provide
relationships between laws and regulations and technical/profes-
sional standards to comply in accordance with the laws and pre-
dictability in relation to regulators’ evaluations. For the
regulatory authorities and inspectors this can be a demanding
and comprehensive system to keep up to date, and it requires that
the standards keep pace with developments and new knowledge.
Comprehensive guidelines may also be an excuse for companies
for not taking responsibility in monitoring and implementing
new recognized expertise and scientiﬁc knowledge.
2.1. Internal control regulations
When self-regulation is used to assure safety, enterprises are
obliged to identify and assess risks and hazards embedded in their
operations (Lindøe et al., 2006). Internal control gives companies a
personal responsibility to monitor and implement an updated
safety management system. The term ‘safety management system’
(or ‘risk management system’) can be used to describe all measures
that are implemented to achieve, maintain and develop a level of
safety in accordance with deﬁned safety goals.
According to Power (2007), internal control systems embody
both the potential of greater efﬁciency and coordination on the
one hand, and of greater sensitivity to social responsibility issues
on the other. The latter refers to a view of internal control systems
as the basis for more substantive improvement of, for example,
health, safety and environment. Organizations have an incentive
for compliance with principles of internal control, because the reg-
ulatory process can focus on desired outcomes rather than regulat-
ing detailed processes, with regulatory intervention as a last resort.
In cases of breach or dissatisfaction, the regulatory body has
options to escalate its enforcement process with more serious con-
sequences for the regulated organization. Some regulatory systems
are linked to licensing privileges (including the regulatory system
for the Norwegian electric power supply system), where a license
to trade or conduct an activity is conditional on compliance with
formal or procedural norms; such as having ‘effective’ internal con-
trol. The sanction of withdrawing a license is usually a last resort
and an outcome of extensive prior negotiation (Power, 2007).
The rapid development in ICT has made traditional methods of
command and control regulation by government less than ade-
quate in coping with modern risks, and the introduction of internal
control has been an attempt to develop new approaches and means
to cope with new challenges of misﬁts between technology and
regulation (Hovden, 1998). Detailed and prescriptive rules provide
no incentives for enterprises to engage in innovative practice, and
bind them to the established technology and organizational solu-
tions. The more prescriptive rules and technical standards the reg-
ulator takes as legally binding, the more responsibility and greater
‘burden of proof’ are imposed on themselves. Explicit and detailed
requirements are certainly highly predictable and easily inter-
preted, but they soon may stiffen in technologies from the past.
It is difﬁcult to see how safety critical issues related to manage-
ment, organization and technology can be improved by the
authorities using additional or more detailed rules (Bieder and
Bourier, 2013).
The internal control system can be equally demanding and
comprehensive system to keep up to date for the authorities.
They need a lot of knowledge and expertise to monitor that com-
panies comply with the functional regulations, and have to keep
pace with technological developments and new knowledge.
However, the advantage of using principles of internal control is
that the scope and form of the internal control system can vary
with a company’s size, complexity, domain, and risk scenario,
and this allows each company to adjust it to their own needs, rou-
tines, organization, and culture. The function based character of the
regulatory regime creates a large degree of autonomy for how
employers and companies can design the technology and safety
and security practices they think are appropriate. Such autonomy
can be advantageous for employers in several ways, also ﬁnan-
cially. It has not least an intrinsic value for the employer side
because they can decide the choice of means by themselves instead
of being overruled by the authorities (Bang and Thuestad, 2014).
3. Material and methods
As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this study was to
discuss possible explanations for varying attitudes toward the use
of functional internal control regulations as the principle for regu-
lating risks. To fulﬁll this aim a mixed-method approach was used,
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including both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The
research methodology was based on interviews, observation stud-
ies, document studies, and a survey among managers and employ-
ees in network companies within the Norwegian electric power
supply sector. A combined approach can strengthen the validity
of the study, as some of the ﬁndings can complement and validate
each other (Silverman, 2006). Moreover, a combined approach can
also show discrepancies between analysis results of data collected
using different methods, as in the current study, and may thus
open for new possibilities of interpretation.
3.1. Interviews, observation studies, and document studies
Qualitative data was gathered through two group interviews
with representatives from NVE. These interviews were performed
at the beginning of the research project which this study is a part
of, to explore our research theme and produce research questions
that could be tested by the quantitative survey. Furthermore, some
of the results from the interviews are also provided in this article to
complement the data gathered through the survey.
Semi-structured interviews with open ended questions were
used. The interviewees were representatives from the contingency
planning department in NVE, who are responsible for safety, con-
tingency planning, and supervision and inspection in the
Norwegian electric power supply sector. The ﬁrst interview was
done with three interviewees, and the questions mainly focused
on the interviewees’ opinion of the Norwegian network companies’
risk perception and awareness regarding the risk of electric net-
work failure caused by malfunctions in or attacks on their ICT sys-
tems. The second interview was done with two interviewees, and
the questions mainly focused on the interviewees’ opinion regard-
ing the use of functional internal control regulations for ICT safety
and security, and their impression of the network companies’ atti-
tude toward these regulations.
Observation studies were carried out at two conferences on ICT
safety and security for companies within the electric power supply
sector. During the observation studies we observed the types of ICT
safety and security issues raised at the conferences, the type of
issues participants focused on, and the types of questions and dis-
cussions that came up during the conferences. Both the interviews
and observation studies were conducted in 2011. In addition, infor-
mation about the internal control regulations for ICT safety and
security in Norwegian network companies was collected from
written documents, e.g. regulations relating to contingency
planning in the Norwegian power supply system, and guidelines
for the contingency planning regulations.
3.2. Questionnaire development and survey sample
A questionnaire was designed for the research project which
this study is a part of. As previously mentioned, this design was
based on a literature review, document studies of the contingency
planning regulations for the Norwegian electric power supply
system, and an evaluation of 5 pre-existing questionnaires. The
pre-existing questionnaires were used in studies of offshore (pet-
roleum) safety and ICT safety and security, i.e. ‘Offshore Safety
Questionnaire’ (Mearns et al., 1997), Norwegian Petroleum Safety
Authorities’ survey ‘Trends in risk level – Norwegian Shelf ’ from
2007–2008, ‘Accident prevention – survey for offshore employees’
(survey used in PhD project, Centre of Maritime Health and Safety,
University of Southern Denmark, H. B. Rasmussen, 2008–2012),
’The Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey’ from 2010,
and questions used in Janne M. Hagen’s study ‘How do employees
comply with security policy? A comparative case study of four
organizations under the Norwegian Security Act’ (Hagen, 2009).
A web-based questionnaire was developed using QuestBack
Survey, and distributed to the respondents by e-mail. Web-based
surveys can eliminate some of the more labor-intensive ﬁelding
tasks, such as survey package preparation and mailing, and the
subsequent data entry. In web surveys the respondents’ answers
can be directly downloaded into a database, avoiding transcription
errors (Fricker and Schonlau, 2002). Before distributing the survey,
we performed a pilot-test of the questionnaire to ensure that the
instructions and scale items were clear. We sent the pilot to three
respondents; one contingency planning manager, one ICT safety
and security manager, and one system control center operator,
and the questionnaire was adjusted according to feedback. The sur-
vey was distributed to respondents in June 2012, and was closed in
September 2012. We sent two e-mail reminders to each respon-
dent during the time the survey was open.
The survey was sent to managers in all the 137 network compa-
nies that were part of the Power Supply Preparedness Organisation
(PSPO), 334 individuals in total. The PSPO prepares, establishes,
and maintains a structure to efﬁciently handle extraordinary situa-
tions in the power supply system. In 2012, the PSPO included 197
organizations, and 137 of these could be classiﬁed as network com-
panies (numbers were provided by NVE). The questionnaire con-
tained ten sections – background information, knowledge of
safety and security, perception of compliance, attitude toward
Fig. 1. Two modes of risk regulations.
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safety and security, attitude toward regulation, experience of inci-
dents, risk perception, safety and security management, awareness
creation and training, and overall rating of the safety and security
level of the organizations’ ICT systems. The focus in this article is
on results from 4 items regarding attitude toward regulations,
which are shown in Table 3 Items on the scale were measured
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree).
One hundred and three respondents returned the survey ques-
tionnaire, for a response rate of 31%. NVE provided the names and
e-mail addresses of ICT safety and security managers/coordinators
and contingency planning managers in the network companies,
and the managers were asked to provide names and e-mail
addresses for employees in the organizations’ system control cen-
ters and ICT staff. The Statistical Package of the Social Sciences
(SPSS) v. 18 was used to perform all analyses. The categorical vari-
able ‘job category’ was collapsed into two categories representing
managers and employees. The category ‘managers’ consisted of
contingency planning manager, ICT safety and security manager,
and ‘other leader’, and the category ‘employees’ consisted of:
operator in system control center, employee in ICT staff, and ‘other
employee’.
Table 1 shows the demographical distribution of the respon-
dents. 66 respondents were managers, and 32 were employees (5
respondents did not specify their job category). Only 3 of the
respondents were female and the rest male, however this corre-
sponds well with the gender distribution of employees in
Norwegian network companies. 63 respondents worked in small
network companies with less than 100 employees, and 37 respon-
dents worked in large network companies with more than 100
employees (3 respondents did not answer the item regarding com-
pany size). Based on the use of hidden identity in the electronic
survey we lack information regarding how many of the 137 net-
work companies the respondents actually represented. However,
29 respondents were ICT safety and security managers (informa-
tion security managers), 11 from large companies and 18 from
smaller companies. Due to the fact that each company only has
one ICT safety and security manager, at least 29 companies are
represented in the data material and most likely more.
A survey sample of 103 respondents can be considered a rela-
tively small sample, and may limit the potential for generalizing.
Nevertheless, according to Pallant (2010, p. 207) a sample of
100+ respondents can be regarded as a large sample, and the sam-
ple size can be seen as adequate for the types of data analyses done
in our study. According to Fricker and Schonlau (2002), response
rates for web surveys where no other survey mode is given have
tended to range from moderate to poor. Other researchers have
also experienced the same response rate problem in studies of
information security management. Kotulic and Clark (2004,
referred to in Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009)) followed up their
small response rate with a study suggesting that the main reasons
for non-responses were related to a policy of not sharing informa-
tion regarding their information security performance, the volume
of survey requests received by the organizations, and a desire not
to spend valuable time on the particular research project.
In an attempt to raise the response rate, hidden identity for
respondents was activated in our electronic survey, and all e-mail
addresses were deleted after the survey was closed. When hidden
identity is used in surveys, no identiﬁable information (e.g. brow-
ser type and version, Internet IP address, operating system, or
e-mail address) will be stored with the answer. Because of the
policy of not sharing information regarding information security
performance, hidden identity was activated to assure the respon-
dents that the information they provided could not be traced back
to themselves or their company. In addition, we signed a conﬁden-
tiality agreement with NVE before we received e-mail addresses
for ICT safety and security managers and contingency planning
managers in the network companies. In the conﬁdentiality agree-
ment we agreed that we would not publish any information or
results that could in any way be linked to a speciﬁc company or
person. The respondents were also given information of this
conﬁdentiality agreement in the survey invitation e-mail, and were
informed that they could contact us if they needed a copy of the
conﬁdentiality agreement before they agreed to answer the survey.
Lastly, qualitative research data were gathered through interviews,
observation studies and document studies to support the quantita-
tive results from the survey.
4. Results
4.1. Results from interviews, observation studies and document studies
According to our interviewees from NVE, the introduction of
internal control regulation has actually led to a lesser focus on con-
tingency planning in the organizations. Many of the companies feel
pressured from all sides, and have not been able to establish
enough internal resources to keep the focus on contingency plan-
ning. The results from our interviews also suggested that the larger
network companies generally have been most interested in having
functional rather than detailed prescriptive rules. On the other
hand, several small companies are also asking for less detailed
ICT safety and security rules and requirements. These smaller com-
panies may now have acquired more expertise on safety and secur-
ity management since the internal control regulations were
introduced.
According to NVE, the network companies express divergent
views at different times regarding the question about functional
versus prescriptive rules and requirements. On a general basis
the network companies want functional internal control risk reg-
ulations with more freedom of choice, but in speciﬁc situations
involving speciﬁc risk problems (e.g. the implementation of
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)) they ask for more
detailed rules and want NVE to tell them exactly what to do.
According to our interviewees from NVE, the attitudes toward
functional internal control regulations in the network companies
can also vary depending on who you are talking to. The top man-
agement may be interested in having functional regulations, but
the middle-management and employees working with the actual
implementation of the internal control system might want more
concrete and detailed regulations. However, NVE sees a clear need
Table 1
Demographic proﬁles of respondents.
Job
categories
Company size Total
More than 100
employees
Fewer than 100
employees
Manager Gender Male 19 44 63
Female 1 1 2
Total 20 45 65a
Employee Gender Male 14 15 29
Female 1 0 1
Total 15 15 30a
Other Gender Male 2 3 5
Total 2 3 5
Total Gender Male 35 62 97
Female 2 1 3
Total 37 63 100
a Three respondents (1 manager and 2 employees) did not answer the item
regarding company size. Thus, the numbers in this table are not completely con-
sistent with the numbers in Section 4.1.
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for the introduction of internal control principles also in other
areas under their jurisdiction.
During observation studies at ICT safety and security confer-
ences within the electric power supply sector, we observed several
representatives from network companies questioning the authori-
ties regarding the implementation of AMI. The network company
representatives asked whether the authorities would give them
more concrete requirements for how to implement AMI besides
recommendations, e.g. technical demands, demands regarding
choice of suppliers, etc. The answer from NVE’s representative
was that the requirements in the regulations are mainly functional,
and it is up to the individual network companies to identify the
means by which these ends will be achieved. NVE did, however,
strongly recommend that all decisions regarding how to imple-
ment AMI should be based on a thorough risk assessment of all
possible vulnerabilities and threats to the ICT systems’ safety and
security. Some of the network company representatives expressed
dissatisfaction with this answer, and wanted NVE to take more
control of the implementation process, instead of just setting the
goals and leaving the actual implementation to the companies.
4.2. Data analysis and results of survey
Independent samples t-tests were performed in order to iden-
tify signiﬁcant differences in the mean values for the respondents.
We found no statistically signiﬁcant differences in the mean scores
between managers and employees on the 4 items regarding atti-
tude toward functional internal control regulations for ICT safety
and security in the survey. We found a statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference in the mean scores between large and small network com-
panies on item 3, however the magnitude of the differences in the
means were small. Hence, in the present article the focus will be on
descriptive statistics of the whole survey sample. Table 2 shows
the results of the independent samples t-tests.
4.2.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the distribution of scores on items 1–4 in the
survey. The distribution of scores on item 1 regarding the use of
functional regulations shows that around 70% of the respondents
were positive to functional regulations (‘Agree’ and ‘Strongly
agree’). On item 2 regarding the need for more detailed guide-
lines the highest percentage of the respondents answered
‘Neither disagree nor disagree’ (35%), which is the neutral middle
point. 30, 1% answered negatively on this item (‘Strongly dis-
agree’ and ‘Disagree’), and 34% answered positively (‘Strongly
agree’ and ‘Agree’). On item 3 regarding the guidelines being
too detailed, 32% of the respondents did not think that the
requirements and guidelines for ICT safety and security in chap-
ter 6 of the guidelines for the contingency planning regulations
were too detailed (‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Disagree’). Only 13,
6% of the respondents agreed with the item, and found the
requirements and guidelines too detailed. On the other hand,
47, 6% of the respondents answered that they neither disagreed
nor agreed with the item, and 5, 8% answered ‘Don’t know’. On
item 4 regarding the desire for more detailed guidelines in con-
nection to the introduction of AMI, 57% of the respondents were
positive (‘Strongly agree’ and ‘Agree’) to more detailed guidelines
from the authorities for the introduction of AMI, while only 12,
7% were negative (‘Strongly disagree’ and ‘Disagree’). 23, 3% nei-
ther disagreed nor agreed to this item.
The survey among managers and employees in Norwegian
network companies suggested that a majority of the respondents
had a positive attitude toward functional regulations. At the
same time the respondents had divergent opinions about the
need for more detailed guidelines for how to comply with the
ICT safety and security goals and requirements in the Ta
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contingency planning regulations, but very few respondents felt
that the requirements and guidelines for ICT safety and security
were too detailed. On the other hand, a majority of the respon-
dents also answered that they wanted more detailed guidelines
concerning the implementation of a new technology (Advanced
Metering Infrastructure). This conﬁrms the existence of varying
attitudes toward the functional internal control regulations for
ICT safety and security in network companies within the
Norwegian electric power supply sector.
5. Discussion
The pros and cons of rule-compliance versus risk manage-
ment is continuously debated (Hopkins, 2011), and deﬁning
how the roles in safety and security management should be dis-
tributed between the state and the industry is one of the most
complex questions regarding risk regulation (Lindøe and Engen,
2013).
In Norway, internal control principles (enforced self-reg-
ulation and functional requirements) for controlling risk were,
as previously mentioned, introduced in the offshore oil (petro-
leum) industry in the 1980s. The regulatory system for this
industry builds on a diversiﬁed mixture of legal and industrial
norms and standards (Lindøe, 2010). In 2013, an expert group
(appointed by the government) reviewed the regulatory strategy
and the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) regulations for the
Norwegian petroleum sector through an extensive interview-
study with relevant organizations and agencies. According to
the expert group’s report, all the interview-groups were positive
to the regulatory regime; the risk-based regulations with func-
tional requirements were regarded as well-functioning, with an
ability to get a complicated industry to comply with the goal
of safe and efﬁcient operation. Functional regulations are
intended to be ﬂexible in relation to introduction of new tech-
nology, new organizational forms, routines, and practices, and
thus ensuring continuous learning. However, these regulations
leave a lot of room for interpretations, which for some compa-
nies can lead to uncertainty as to what is appropriate and cor-
rect (Engen et al., 2013).
The guidelines to the risk regulations in the Norwegian
Petroleum industry refer to recognized technical (industrial) stan-
dards as a way to fulﬁll the functional requirements. However,
with a steadily growing number of technical standards con-
siderable knowledge and technical skill is required to be able to
use them. Renewing these standards also requires a lot of
resources, and several of the interview-groups in the petroleum
sector study found the regulatory regime to be too complicated,
with overlapping of standards in some areas. Furthermore, the
respondents all agreed that increasing complexity within the sec-
tor had major implications for the risk regulation. Some of the
respondents pointed out that the ﬂexibility of the functional inter-
nal control regulations may be misused to choose only minimum
solutions during less prosperous times, and thus not facilitating
any development. On the other hand, to meet the requirements
in the functional regulations other companies develop rigid inter-
nal systems with routines and procedures which can exceed the
functional requirements and thus lead to reduced ﬂexibility
(Engen et al., 2013).
Results from our interviews suggested that the introduction of
internal control has lead to a lesser focus on safety, security and
contingency planning in the Norwegian network companies.
Earlier research has shown that small companies with limited
resources have often had more problems with their internal con-
trol implementation due to a lack of clear and detailed guidelines
on how to do it, while larger and more proactive companies with
competence and resources have found it easier to tailor an effective
safety and security management system. Large companies with a
bureaucratic form, clear lines of authority, and expertise on safety
and security management, may be better suited for the imple-
mentation of internal control systems. The reason for the revision
of the internal control regulation in Norway in 1997 was to take
into account the special problems of small and medium sized
enterprises by a simpliﬁcation of the requirements (Hovden,
1998; Lindøe, 2001). Even so, the results of our survey did not
show signiﬁcant differences in attitudes toward the functional
internal control regulations for ICT safety and security between
small and large network companies within the Norwegian electric
network sector.
The ﬁndings from our interviews and observation studies corre-
spond well with results from the previously mentioned interview-
study in the Norwegian petroleum industry. The relationship
between functional and prescriptive risk regulations is an area of
conﬂict between the different actors within this industry as well.
The industry in general considers the functional regulations as
well-functioning and wants as few detailed requirements as possi-
ble. However, contrary to this, the labor unions and the govern-
ment want to increase the amount of minimum requirements.
New companies within the industry are also requesting more
guidance and detailed requirements from the authorities (Engen
et al., 2013).
The Norwegian electric power supply sector consists of com-
panies with different organizational forms, functions, tasks, size,
Table 3
Distribution of scores on item 1–4.
Distribution of scores on items (in percentage)
Item 1: ‘‘I think it’s ok that the
authorities prescribe the overall
safety goals and requirements for
ICT safety and security, and permit
the organizations to ﬁnd and
develop their own means to
achieve these goals’’
Item 2: ‘‘I wish that the
authorities would provide us with
more detailed guidelines for how
we can achieve the goals and
requirements for ICT safety and
security in the contingency
planning regulations’’
Item 3: ‘‘The requirements and
guidelines for ICT safety and
security in Chapter 6 of the
‘Guidelines for the contingency
planning regulations for the
Norwegian electric power supply’
are too detailed’’
Item 4: ‘‘In connection to the
introduction of Advanced
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) in
the Norwegian electric power
supply system, I wish that the
network companies could receive
more detailed guidelines from the
authorities’’
Strongly disagree 2.9% (N = 3) 2.9% (N = 3) 2.9% (N = 3) 1.0% (N = 1)
Disagree 8.7% (N = 9) 27.2% (N = 28) 29.1% (N = 30) 11.7% (N = 12)
Neither disagree nor agree 17.5% (N = 18) 35.0% (N = 36) 47.6% (N = 49) 23.3% (N = 24)
Agree 37.9% (N = 39) 20.4% (N = 21) 9.7% (N = 10) 28.2% (N = 29)
Strongly agree 32.0% (N = 33) 13.6% (N = 14) 3.9% (N = 4) 29.1% (N = 30)
Not relevant 0.0% (N = 0) 0.0% (N = 0) 1.0% (N = 1) 1.9% (N = 2)
Don’t know 1.0% (N = 1) 1.0% (N = 1) 5.8% (N = 6) 4.9% (N = 5)
Total N = 103 N = 103 N = 103 N = 103
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and goals, and it can be difﬁcult to issue detailed regulations
that would apply to all companies. The advantage of using prin-
ciples of internal control is that the scope and form of the inter-
nal control system can vary with a company’s size, complexity,
domain, and risk scenario, and this allows each company to
adjust it to their own needs, routines, organization, and culture
(Hovden, 1998).
Even though NVE sees a clear need for the introduction of
internal control principles also in other areas under their juris-
diction, there seem to be a reorientation toward a combination
of functional and prescriptive regulations within this sector.
The Norwegian Energy Act’s rules for contingency planning in
the electric power supply sector were changed in 2012. In addi-
tion, on behalf of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, NVE has
revised the regulations for contingency planning in the
Norwegian electric power supply sector, and new contingency
planning regulations and guidelines for these regulations have
taken effect from 2013. Increased vulnerability and threats due
to increased use of ICT to monitor, control, and operate power
generation plants and power distribution is one of the main rea-
sons for the revisions. In many areas of the regulations former
practice is still followed, but with a clearer speciﬁcation of the
requirements. In some areas the regulations are tightened
through new requirements, or a stricter use of the existing prac-
tice. NVE has tried to make the requirements in the contingency
planning regulations clearer and more concrete based on
requests from the electric power supply companies.
Internal control regulations regarding ICT safety and security can
posea speciﬁcchallenge for the safetyandsecuritymanagers inelec-
tric power supply network companies because of the complexity of
the ICT systems. It is difﬁcult to establish a complete systemdescrip-
tion of these complex systems (Rundmo, 1996), which can make it
hard to identify successful attacks and their consequences and
develop comprehensive defenses for all the relevant threats. The
scale and complexity of the AMI and Smart Grid, along with its
increased connectivity and automation, will make risk regulation
of this area particularly challenging. These high complexity systems
have tight coupling of their components and processes. The fast
paced technological change, the invisibility of the material pro-
cesses, the lack of overview, and the problems in sensemaking, con-
tribute to a sense of uncertainty, uncontrollability, and
unpredictability regarding the risk problems connected to these
ICT systems.Most of the network companies lack expert knowledge
in this area, which increases the need for more detailed prescriptive
regulations.
6. Conclusion
As previously stated, a function based regulatory risk regime
creates a large degree of autonomy for how companies can
design the safety and security practices they think are appropri-
ate, and it is difﬁcult to see how safety critical issues related to
management, organization and technology can be improved by
using additional or more detailed rules by the authorities. Even
so, the results of interviews, observation studies, and a survey
among managers and employees in Norwegian network compa-
nies, conﬁrmed that there exists varying attitudes and divergent
opinions at different times regarding the question about func-
tional versus prescriptive risk regulation. The respondents gener-
ally have a positive attitude toward functional regulations for
ICT safety and security, however, at the same time a majority
of the respondents have also answered that they want more
detailed guidelines for the current implementation of a new
complex technology (Advanced Metering Infrastructure). This
may be caused by the increased electronic complexity, increased
cognitive demands, fast paced technological change, and prob-
lems in sensemaking that these new technologies have created
for both managers and employees.
Thus, varying attitudes and divergent opinions at different
times toward the use of functional risk regulations can be
explained by the degree of complexity and uncertainty of a
speciﬁc risk problem experienced by different actors. The more
loosely coupled the system to be managed is, and the more con-
trollable and predictable the risk problem is perceived to be, the
greater the request for functional risk regulations will be. And
correspondingly, the more tightly coupled the system to be man-
aged is, and the more complex, unpredictable, and uncertain the
risk problem is perceived to be, the greater the request for pre-
scriptive, detailed regulations will be – regardless of whether the
company in question is large or small.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to provide insight into risk perception among users (both managers and 
employees) of information and communication technology (ICT) systems within electric power supply 
network companies, and discuss factors that can influence users’ risk perception. The electric power supply 
system is the most critical infrastructure in modern society, and a breakdown in the ICT systems used within 
this industry (process control systems) can seriously compromise the physical grid which can result in major 
financial disasters and damage to public safety and health. Process control systems are vulnerable to a 
multitude of threats, both natural and man-made, and the vulnerability of these ICT systems is also expected 
to increase during the next few years due to the implementation of new technology. It could therefore be 
expected that users of ICT systems within network companies would perceive the risk of attacks on or 
malfunctions in these ICT systems as high. On the contrary, results from a survey sent to 137 Norwegian 
network companies showed that the respondents perceived this risk as relatively low. Previous research has 
found that company size, knowledge and awareness of ICT safety and security, and earlier experience of 
danger, are factors that can influence risk perception within companies. In this article we also suggest that 
complexities of the ICT systems and a lack of communication between subcultures with different focus 
points and mindsets within the companies, can explain why users perceive the risk of attacks on or 
malfunctions in these ICT systems as low. In addition, many issues surrounding ICT safety and security seem 
to be taken for granted within Norwegian network companies, and many companies trust that the system 
suppliers will make safe technological solutions that can take care of all problems.
Keywords: Risk perception, ICT safety and security, critical infrastructures, electric power supply, network 
companies, ICT systems, users
1. INTRODUCTION
Perceived risk, i.e. subjective risk judgments, can be influenced by several factors, and may deviate from 
"objective" risk. According to Rundmo (1996), biased perception of risk can cause misjudgments of potentially-
hazardous risk sources. In a report from the project “Emerging systemic risks in the 21st Century”, OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-ordination and Development) points to risk perception itself as one factor that can 
delay or exaggerate precautionary measures (OECD, 2003).
The following research question is examined in the article:
What factors can influence the risk perception of users (managers and employees) within electric power 
supply network companies regarding the risk of malfunctions in or attacks on their ICT systems?
The research question is answered by presenting results from previous research literature and document 
studies, results from a survey sent to 137 network companies in Norway, and results from interviews with 
representatives from the contingency planning department of the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate (NVE). 
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2ICT has increasingly become a part of all critical infrastructuresi (Line and Tøndel, 2012), and is used to 
monitor, control and operate power generation plants and power distribution within electric power supply systems. 
The electric power supply can be seen as the most critical infrastructure in modern society (Hagen and 
Albrechtsen, 2009), and a prolonged interruption of the electric power supply may have consequences for many 
critical societal functions caused by interdependencies between infrastructures. A breakdown in the ICT systems 
(i.e. process control systems) used within the electric power supply sector can seriously compromise the physical 
grid, which can result in major financial disasters and damage to public safety and health (Patel and Sanyal, 
2008). It could therefore be expected that users of ICT systems within electric power supply network companies 
would perceive the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in these ICT systems as high.
On the contrary, results from our survey of managers and employees in Norwegian network companies 
showed that most of the respondents perceived the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in the network organizations’ 
ICT systems as relatively low. Interviews with representatives from NVE also revealed that the regulatory 
authorities consider most of the network companies to have adequate day-to-day operational safety and securityii,
but think they should perform better when it comes to planning for extraordinary incidents with potentially large 
consequences. In addition, a qualitative interview study done by Røyksund (2011) showed that, despite an 
increased focus on ICT safety and security within the sector during recent years iii, representatives from Norwegian 
electric power supply companies still perceived the risk of an attack on their ICT systems as relatively low. 
The respondents in our survey were ICT safety and security managers, contingency planning managers, 
operators of process control systems, and ICT personnel. These users work directly with process control systems, 
ICT issues, and/or safety and security issues within the network companies, and can be expected to have more 
knowledge about ICT systems and/or safety and security than average end-users of traditional computer systems.
 The rest of the article is structured in the following way. The article starts with a presentation of some 
results from literature and document studies of threats to and vulnerabilities in the electric power supply’s ICT 
systems, and users’ view on ICT safety and security. In section 2 theoretical foundations for the study are 
presented, section 3 presents the data material and methods used in the study, and data analysis and results of the 
survey are presented in section 4. In section 5 results from the survey, document studies and interviews are 
interwoven in the discussion, and in section 6 our main findings are summarized in the conclusion.
1.1 Threats to and vulnerabilities in the electric power supply’s ICT systems
According to our studies of previous research literature and document studies, process control systems, e.g. 
supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA systems) iv, are vulnerable to a multitude of threats, 
both natural and man-made (Stouffer, Falco and Scarfone, 2011; Rodal, 2001; Hagen, 2009; Line and Tøndel, 
2012). The application of ICT systems contributes to increase power system vulnerabilities, in a worldwide 
scenario where malicious threats against large and complex infrastructures are increasing (The Grid Consortium, 
2007). In the past, process control systems were completely isolated from the outside world, but because of market 
demands there are now logical links between the process control systems and other networks (administrative 
systems and the internet). In addition, reductions in staff and expertise within the network companies as a result of 
restructuring and deregulation of the sector since the 1990s have led to increasing dependence on external 
competence. Work by external suppliers may often be carried out online, and this increases the need to tie all the 
different participants of the electric power supply together in a massive ICT network. Since logical connections 
exist between the different ICT systems, skilled hackers may be able to penetrate defenses (Hagen et al., 2005).
Over the last decades, a shift from proprietary hardware to standardized and less expensive operating 
systems and security products, with commonly known vulnerabilities, has also dramatically increased the number 
of systems subject to attack (OECD, 2006). According to the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), electric power is often thought to be one of the most prevalent sources of disruptions of interdependent 
critical infrastructures. Threats to industrial (process) control systems can come from numerous sources, including 
adversarial sources such as hostile governments, terrorist groups, industrial spies, disgruntled employees, 
malicious intruders, and natural sources such as system complexities, human errors and accidents, equipment 
failures and natural disasters (Stouffer, Falco and Scarfone, 2011). The ICT industry itself has started to address 
many of these security concerns. Soon after a vulnerability is identified, software producers often develop a 
corrective “patch”, that they make available free of charge. However, ICT administrators often find it difficult to 
keep up to date with corrective patches, and the time lag between the moment a vulnerability is announced (and a 
patch made available) and the moment hackers start to exploit it is also shrinking (OECD, 2006).
A report from 2012 on terror towards the U.S. electrical grid, concluded that a few, well-informed persons 
may be able to blackout large areas over a long period of time, with devastating and life-threatening 
3consequences. According to NVE, this threat is just as great for Norway as for the U.S. (Teknisk Ukeblad, 2012). 
Results from the national “Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey” from 2012, showed an increasing 
gap between threats and safety and security measures in Norwegian organizations, at the same time as ICT 
dependence is increasing (Næringslivets sikkerhetsråd, 2012). In December 2012, the Norwegian government also 
launched its “National Strategy for Information Security” (Regjeringen, 2012a). According to the action plan that 
accompanied this national strategy, the Norwegian authorities’ annual threat assessments ascertained that threats 
related to ICT based espionage and sabotage have increased in recent years, and we must now expect 
sophisticated attacks aimed at critical societal information, including ICT systems that operates industrial 
processes and critical infrastructure (Regjeringen, 2012b).
In 2013, the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet published a series of articles called “Null CTRL” [“No 
CTRL”]. The newspaper articles have studied online devices in Norway, and have revealed how a lack of 
computer security can affect us all at home, at work, and in public spaces. The newspaper has so far alerted the 
authorities and network owners and/or providers of over 2500 Norwegian control systems (used in e.g. the armed 
forces, and health, oil, and transport sectors) that are connected to the internet with little or no protection. NVE 
was interviewed in connection to the article series, and warned that the vulnerability of ICT systems used in 
electric power supply systems is expected to increase during the next few years (Dagbladet, 2013). Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and, later on the Smart Grid, are now being introduced in the Norwegian electric 
power system, as in other Western countries. Smart Grids introduce ICT components into the power distribution 
grid (e.g. sensors for monitoring and control, smart meters, and two-way communication). Smart Grids connect 
power plants and system control centers with all households, businesses, and buildings all over the country, as 
well as abroad (Line and Tøndel, 2012). The electric Smart Grid promises increased capacity, reliability and 
efficiency through the marriage of cyber technology and the existing electricity network. On the other hand, the 
scale and complexity of the electric smart grid, along with its increased connectivity and automation, make the 
task of cyber protection particularly challenging (Kundur et al., 2010).
2. THEORY
2.1 Users’ view on ICT safety and security
According to Dhillon and Backhouse (2000), the role, responsibility and integrity of users are important 
principles of information security management. A user can be characterized as a person with legitimate access to 
the organization’s information (and communication) systems (referred to in Albrechtsen, 2007), e.g. end-users, 
security officers, managers, designers (Besnard and Arief, 2004). Users are said to play an important role in the 
information security performance of organizations by their security awareness and cautious behavior
(Albrechtsen, 2007). Goodhue and Straub (1991) studied the level of security concern among ICT system users, 
and focused on user’s perceptions about the security of their systems. Previous studies had found that neither end-
users nor information security staff believed that there were persuasive reasons to be concerned about security. 
This lack of concern was found to be alarming in the face of mounting empirical evidence that a significant 
number of security breaches did occur. A lack of awareness of the danger might lead to weak vigilance by users 
and a greater potential for abuse.
According to Albrechtsen (2007), a user’s view on information security is created by several interlocking 
organizational, technological and individual factors. The context of a user’s work may create information security 
trade-offs, e.g. individuals tend to put emphasis on efficient and least-effort work instead of loss prevention. 
Social norms and interactions at the work place influence individual understanding of information security, and 
the quality of information security management also affects users’ awareness, motivation and behavior in some 
way. Technological information security solutions influence users, and individual factors such as motivation, 
knowledge, attitudes, values and behavior also influence individual views on information security. Last, but not 
least, how people perceive risk is a part of the explanation for users’ view on information security, which is the 
focus of our present study.
2.2 Risk perception
According to Aven and Renn (2010), it is essential to complement data on physical consequences with 
insights into risk perception when one is dealing with complex and uncertain risk problems. Studies of risk 
perception examine the opinions that people express when they are asked to characterize and evaluate hazardous 
activities and technologies. Perceived risk, i.e. subjective risk judgments or a person’s own estimate of risk, may 
deviate from "objective" risk. “Objective” risk is the risk that exists independent of an individual’s knowledge and 
worries of the source of the risk (Ulleberg and Rundmo, 1996, referred to in Oltedal et al., 2004). According to 
Andersson (2011), individuals will be able to make well-informed decisions and expose themselves to an optimal 
risk level if they have accurate perceptions of risk (i.e. knowledge about the true levels of risk they face. To some 
4extent perceived risk can be a reflection of “objective” (real) risk, especially when risks are well-known (Sjöberg, 
2000). Humans are influenced by their surroundings, and the environment affects cognition as well as behavior 
and individual decisions. The perceived risk concerns how an individual understands and experiences the 
phenomenon (Oltedal et al., 2004).
Several factors have been found to influence risk perception. Heuristics, probability judgment biases, and 
frequent media exposure has been said to influence the level of perceived risk (Sjöberg, 2000). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) introduced a program of research on judgment under uncertainty which has come to be known 
as the heuristics and biases approach. They suggested that intuitive predictions and judgments often are mediated 
by a small number of distinctive mental operations, called judgmental heuristics. These heuristics are often useful, 
but they sometimes lead to characteristic errors or biases (referred to in Kahneman and Tversky, 1996). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), criticized expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under 
risk, and developed an alternative model, called prospect theory. When faced with a complex problem, people 
employ a variety of heuristic procedures in order to simplify the representation and the valuation of prospects 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 2000). Examples of perceptual biases can be biases in people’s judgments of time saved 
by increasing the speed of an activity (Svensson, 2008). Time gain is one of the motivators for drivers to speed up, 
and in turn speeding increases the risk of having an accident (Eriksson, Svensson and Eriksson, 2013). According 
to Sjöberg (2000), the risk target is of paramount importance in risk studies; people do not make the same estimate 
when they rate the risk to themselves, to their family, or to people in general. Risk denial is an important feature, 
and this phenomenon has been related to what has been called unrealistic optimism. People tend to estimate the 
general risks to be larger than the personal ones. Familiarity with the source of danger, control over the situation, 
and the dramatic character of the events can also influence risk perception (Oltedal et al., 2004).
Thus, the study of risk perception has a cognitive stance with focus upon perception as mainly a cognitive 
process. People's risk judgments are related to cognitive processes, e.g. how one is able to comprehend the given 
information (Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1982). This approach makes up the foundation of the 
psychometric paradigm in risk perception. According to this paradigm risk can be understood as a function of 
general properties of the hazard (risk object) (Sjöberg, 2000). The psychometric model is based on a number of 
explanatory scales (e.g. new risk versus old risk, involuntary risk versus voluntary risk, dreaded risk, number of 
people exposed, etc.) where the subjects are asked to rate a number of hazards on each of the scales. The cultural 
theory of risk perception launched by Douglas (1966, 1978) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), has also been an 
important theoretical contribution. According to cultural theory risk perception is not governed by personality 
traits, needs, preferences, or properties of the risk objects. It is a socially, or culturally, constructed phenomenon. 
What is perceived as dangerous, and how much risk to accept, is a function of one’s cultural adherence and social 
learning (referred to in Oltedal et al., 2004). Sjöberg (2000) on the other hand, rather sees attitude as a crucial 
factor in risk perception, in addition to risk sensitivity and specific fear.
According to Aven and Renn (2010), intuitive risk perception is based on how information about a risk is 
communicated, the psychological mechanisms for processing uncertainty, and earlier experience of danger. This 
mental process results in perceived risk - a collection of notions that people form regarding risk sources, relative 
to the information available to them and their basic common sense (Jaeger et al., 2001, referred to in Aven and 
Renn, 2010). The present article will focus on risk perception among managers and employees within 
organizations (electric power supply network companies), and in an organization risk perceptions may influence 
risk behavior and hence influence “objective” risk or safety (Rundmo, 1996). Trust is often held to be of crucial 
importance for the understanding of risk perception (Sjöberg, 2001). Trust in an expert, an agency, or a 
corporation has been assumed to be determined by perceptions of a number of attributes, among them competence 
and expertise (Peters, Covello & McCallum, 1997, referred to in Oltedal, 2004). For network companies trust in 
suppliers of ICT systems may be a factor that can influence their risk perception regarding the safety and security 
of these systems.
2.3 Complexities of ICT systems
According to Aven and Renn (2010), the degree of complexity and uncertainty are two of the aspects that 
can be used to distinguish between different types of risk problems (situations). Here complexity refers to the 
difficulty of identifying causal links between a multitude of potential causal agents and specific effects, and 
uncertainty refers to the difficulty of predicting the occurrence of events and their consequences. Large 
interconnected infrastructures are characterized by high complexity, and ICT is both a critical infrastructure in 
itself, and at the same time an important component of other critical infrastructures, which further increases the 
complexity (Line and Tøndel, 2012).
Perrow (1984) claimed that failures may be inevitable as systems grow increasingly complex. The main 
problem is that it will be impossible to predict the widespread impacts should one system component fail. Systems 
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services and critical infrastructure will adhere to Perrow’s description of complexity and tight couplings, and this 
is especially true for critical ICT systems (Hagen et al., 2005). According to Weick (2001) new technologies, such 
as complex production systems that use computers, have created unusual problems in sensemaking for managers 
and operators (employees). The use of computer systems involves the self-contained, invisible material process 
that is actually unfolding, as well as the equally self-contained, equally invisible imagined process that is mentally 
unfolding in the mind of an individual or a team. There is also continuous intervention improvement and redesign 
(technological innovations) in computer technologies, which means that the implementation state of development 
never stops, and these technologies require ongoing structuring and sensemaking if they are to be managed 
(Weick, 2001).
Increased cognitive demands, increased electronic complexity, and dense organizational interdependence 
over large areas, often lead to an increase in incidences of unexpected outcomes that produce unexpected 
ramifications (Roberts and Grabowski, 1996). According to Leveson (2004), technology today (especially digital 
technology) is changing faster than engineering techniques to cope with the new technology is being created. 
Interactive complexity is increasing in the systems we are building, and we are designing systems with potential 
interactions among the components that cannot be thoroughly planned, understood, anticipated, or guarded
against. Thus the degree of uncertainty is also high. Risk related to ICT systems is one of today’s produced 
uncertainties contributing to Beck’s (1992) characteristic of a risk society. This shows that macro-sociological 
factors can be important factors for understanding risk perception and behavior (referred to in Albrechtsen, 2007).
3. MATERIAL AND METHODS
A multi-method approach was used in this study, including both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
Qualitative data were gathered through document studies and interviews. In addition, statistical data were 
collected through a survey among managers and employees in network companies within the Norwegian electric 
power supply sector. The combined approach can strengthen the validity of the study, as some of the findings 
complement and validate each other (Silverman, 2006).
3.1 Document studies
Data regarding vulnerability, safety and security of ICT systems used within the electric power supply 
sector were collected from guidelines for the regulations relating to contingency planning in the Norwegian power 
supply system from 2003, 2011 and 2013, and annual supervision reports from NVE. In addition, other strategies 
and reports regarding ICT safety and security were studied (from the U.S., Europe and Norway), e.g. NIST’s 
“Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security” from 2011, the GRID Consortium’s “ICT Vulnerabilities of 
Power Systems: A Roadmap for Future Research” from 2007, OECD’s (Organization for economic coordination 
and development) study “OECD Studies in Risk Management, Norway – Information Security; 2006”, reports 
from the “Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey” from 2006, 2010 and 2012, the Norwegian “National 
Strategy for Information Security” from 2012 and the action plan that accompanied this national strategy. A 
selection of newspaper articles on the same topic in Norwegian newspapers were studied as well.
3.2 Interviews
To explore our research theme, produce research questions that could be tested by the quantitative survey, 
and to compliment the data gathered through the survey, qualitative data was gathered through two group 
interviews with representatives from NVE.
Semi-structured interviews with open ended questions were used. The interviewees were representatives 
from the contingency planning department in NVE, who are responsible for safety and security, contingency 
planning, and supervision in the Norwegian electric power supply sector. The first interview were done with three 
interviewees, and the questions mainly focused on the interviewees’ opinion of the Norwegian network 
companies’ risk perception and awareness regarding the risk of electric network failure caused by malfunctions in 
or attacks on their ICT systems. The second interview were done with two interviewees, and the questions mainly 
focused on the interviewees’ opinion regarding the use of functional internal control regulations for ICT safety 
and security, and their impression of the network companies’ attitude towards these regulations.
3.3 Survey
A questionnaire was designed for a research project which this study is a part of, based on a theoretical 
review, document studies of the contingency planning regulations for the Norwegian electric power supply 
system, and an evaluation of 5 pre-existing questionnaires. The pre-existing questionnaires were previously used 
in studies of offshore (petroleum) safety and ICT-safetyv. A web-based questionnaire was developed using 
6QuestBack Survey, and distributed to the respondents by e-mailvi.  Web-based surveys can eliminate some of the 
more labor-intensive fielding tasks, such as survey package preparation and mailing, and the subsequent data 
entry. In web surveys the respondents’ answers can be directly downloaded into a database, avoiding transcription 
errors (Fricker and Schonlau, 2002).
The survey was sent to managers and employees in all the 137 network companies that are part of the 
PSPOvii, 334 individuals in totalviii. The questionnaire contained ten sections - background information, knowledge 
of safety and security, perception of compliance, attitude towards safety and security, attitude towards regulation, 
experience of incidents, risk perception, safety and security management, awareness creation and training, and 
overall rating of the safety levels of the organizations’ ICT systems. In this article we have chosen to focus on the 
results of the items in the risk perception scale, in addition to items regarding knowledge of safety and security, 
experience of incidents, and overall rating of the safety levels of the organizations’ ICT systems.
The risk perception scale contained 19 items addressing the respondents’ perception of the risk posed by 
different threats and vulnerabilities. We created the set of threats and vulnerabilities on the basis of the 
contingency planning regulations for the Norwegian electric power supply sector and questions and results from 
the “Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey” (2010). The listed threats and vulnerabilities included 
malicious attacks from outside the organization (e.g. hacking, denial-of-service attacks (DoS attacks), malware, 
ICT attacks from terrorists or foreign states); users as a vulnerability due to their lack of skills and knowledge 
(human error); theft of personal information (phishing); ICT malfunctions caused by technical failure or natural 
hazards; sabotage against power lines or power stations; and ICT attacks from insiders/disgruntled employees. 
Items on the risk perception scale were measured on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very low risk) to 6 
(very high risk).
The knowledge of safety and security scale contained 5 items regarding the respondents’ knowledge of ICT 
safety and security. Examples of items in this scale were: “I am familiar with the content of chapter 6 regarding 
ICT safety and security in the guidelines for the regulations relating to contingency planning in the Norwegian 
power supply system”, “I am familiar with the content of my organization’s information security policy”, and “I 
have access to the information necessary to make decisions regarding ICT safety”. Items on the knowledge of 
safety and security scale were measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The experience of incidents section included 13 different incidents that an organization can be exposed to, 
and the respondents were asked to report the incidents that their organization had experienced. The overall rating 
of the safety and security level of the organizations’ ICT systems contained the question: “All in all, how would 
you assess the safety and security of the ICT systems used in your organization?” (measured on a 6-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (very poor) to 6 (very good)).
One hundred and three respondents returned the survey questionnaire, for a response rate of 31%. NVE 
provided the names and e-mail addresses of ICT safety and security managers/coordinators and contingency 
planning managers in the network companies, and the managers were asked to provide names and e-mail 
addresses for employees in the organizations’ system control centers and ICT staff. A survey sample of 103 
respondents can be considered a relatively small sample, and may limit the potential for generalizing. According 
to Fricker and Schonlau (2002), response rates for web surveys where no other survey mode is given have tended 
to range from moderate to poor. Other researchers have also experienced the same response rate problem in 
studies of information security management. Kotulic and Clark (2004) followed up their small response rate with 
a study suggesting that the main reasons for non-responses were related to a policy of not sharing information 
regarding their information security performance, the volume of survey requests received by the organizations, 
and a desire not to spend valuable time on the particular research project (referred to in Albrechtsen and Hovden, 
2009). In an attempt to raise the response rate, hidden identity for respondents was activated in our electronic 
survey, and all e-mail addresses were deleted after the survey was closed.
On the other hand, according to Pallant (2010) a sample of 100+ respondents can be regarded as a large 
sample (p. 135), and the sample size can be seen as adequate for the types of data analyses done in our study. In 
addition, qualitative research data were gathered through interviews and document studies to support the 
quantitative results from the survey, which might increase the potential for generalizing.
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF SURVEY DATA
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) v. 18 was used to perform the analyses, which 
included descriptive statistics, tests of variance (ANOVA) and t-tests. A total scale score was calculated to give an 
overall score for the scales used in the survey. A reliability test of the total scale scores indicate that the scales 
7used in this study had good internal consistency; Cronbach’s alpha was .95 for the risk perception scale and .83 
for the knowledge of safety and security scale.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the demographical distribution of the respondents. 66 respondents were managers, and 32 
were employees (5 respondents did not specify their job category). Only 3 of the respondents were female, and the 
rest male. 63 respondents worked in small network companies with less than 100 employees, and 37 respondents 
worked in large network companies with more than 100 employees (3 respondents did not answer the item 
regarding company size). Based on the use of hidden identity in the electronic survey we lack information
regarding how many of the 137 network companies the respondents actually represented. However, 29 
respondents were ICT safety and security managers (information security managers), 11 from large companies 
and 18 from smaller companies. Due to the fact that each company only has one ICT safety and security manager, 
at least 29 companies are represented in the data material and most likely more.
Table 1. Demographic profiles of respondents. 
Job categories 
Company size 
Total 
More than 100 
employees 
Fewer than 100 
employees 
Manager Gender Male 19 44 63 
Female 1 1 2 
Total 20 45 651 
Employee Gender Male 14 15 29 
Female 1 0 1 
Total 15 15 301 
Other Gender Male 2 3 5 
Total 2 3 5 
Total Gender Male 35 62 97 
Female 2 1 3 
Total 37 63 100
1 Three respondents (1 manager and 2 employees) did not answer the item regarding company size. Thus, the 
numbers in Table 1 are not completely consistent with the numbers in Section 4.1.
The respondents perceived the overall safety level of the organizations’ ICT systems as good, as shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Distribution of respondents’ scores on the question: “All in all, how would you assess the safety of the 
ICT systems used in your organization?”
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  In addition, descriptive statistics and histogram show that the respondents perceived the risk of a breakdown 
in their organization’s ICT systems caused by malfunctions or attacks as relatively low. The mean value on the 
total scale score was 53.39, the minimum possible value was 19, and the maximum possible value was 114. The 
results are shown in Fig. 1.
8Figure 1 – Distribution of scores on the total risk perception scale.
4.2 Correlation, analysis of variance (ANOVA) and t-tests
The relationship between risk perception and safety and security knowledge was investigated using Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient. The analysis showed no statistically significant correlation between the 
total risk perception scale and the total knowledge of safety and security scale, r = .02, n = 86, p = .83 (two-
tailed).
We conducted a one-way between-groups ANOVA to explore differences in risk perception within the 
network companies (i.e. between the mean scores on the risk perception variable for the different job categories in 
the data material). The results showed no statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level for the different job 
categories in the mean scores on the risk perception scale: F (7, 87) = 1.3, p = .26 (N = 95).
Next, the categorical variable “job category” was collapsed into two categories representing managers and 
employees. The category “managers” consisted of contingency planning manager, ICT safety manager, and “other 
leader”, and the category “employees” consisted of: operator in system control center, employee in ICT staff, and 
“other employee”. Independent-samples t-tests were performed to determine whether significant differences 
existed among the mean scores of different groups on the risk perception scale. There was no statistically 
significant difference in scores for managers (M = 53.10, SD = 16.41) and employees (M = 53.17, SD = 18.52; t
(88) = -.019, p = .99 (two-tailed), N = 61 for managers, N = 29 for employees). The magnitude of the differences 
in the means was very small (eta squared = -.0004).
However, a statistically significant difference was found in the mean risk perception scores between 
managers and employees in small companies (M = 48.16, SD = 15.61) versus managers and employees in large 
companies (M = 61.85, SD = 15.95; t (90) = 4.03, p = .00 (two-tailed), N = 58 for small companies, and N = 34 
for large companies). Managers and employees in large companies perceived the risk of a breakdown in the 
organization’s ICT systems caused by malfunctions or attacks as higher than the managers and employees in the 
smaller organizations. The magnitude of the differences in the means was large (eta squared = .15).
95. DISCUSSION
Results from our studies of previous research literature and documents, suggested that process control 
systems are vulnerable to a multitude of threats, both natural and man-made, and the vulnerability of these ICT 
systems is also expected to increase during the next few years due to the implementation of new technology. 
Contrary to this, the results from our survey among users of ICT systems within Norwegian electric power supply 
network companies showed that both managers and employees perceived the overall safety levels of the network 
companies’ ICT systems as good, and at the same time they also perceived the risk of the threats to ICT systems 
listed in the risk perception scale as relatively low. 
Former research has shown some differences in risk perception between ICT safety and security managers 
and other users. Goodhue and Straub (1991) found that information security managers showed more concern for 
the security of their company’s ICT system than general managers, as might be expected. According to 
Albrechtsen (2007), the individual’s and the security management’s perception of risk can differ, and individuals 
might not see the range of consequences in the same manner as the security management in an organization does. 
A later study done by Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009), found that information security managers evaluated the 
risk level of some threats/vulnerabilities to be lower than did the end-users (e.g. incautious use of the internet, 
spam mail, and hacking). On the other hand, security managers also ranked the risk level of a few threats as 
significantly higher than did end-users (e.g. IT-related human error, and social engineering attempts).
However, tests of variance (ANOVA) showed no statistically significant difference between the mean 
scores on the risk perception scale between the different job categories in our survey, and t-tests did not show any 
statistically significant difference between managers (including ICT safety and security managers) and employees 
in their scores on the risk perception scale. ICT safety managers have a particular responsibility for ICT safety and 
security, and can be considered experts in this field based on their knowledge (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). 
Even so, as previously mentioned, the users studied in our survey work directly with process control systems, ICT 
issues, and/or safety and security issues within the network companies, and can be expected to have more 
knowledge about ICT systems and/or safety and security than average end-users of traditional computer systems. 
Hence, this article examines possible factors that may explain why the majority of respondents in our survey 
perceived the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in the network organizations’ ICT systems as low.
Former research has found that a company’s size is a significant factor for whether or not a company has 
implemented a proper security policy, and the analysis of our survey results also showed a statistically significant 
difference in the mean risk perception scores between managers and employees in small companies versus
managers and employees in large companies. Managers and employees in large companies perceived the risk of a 
breakdown in their organization’s ICT systems caused by malfunctions or attacks as higher than the managers and 
employees in the smaller organizations. Hagen, Sivertsen and Rong, (2008), present a selection of findings from 
the “Norwegian Computer Crime and Security Survey” from 2006. According to their study, smaller businesses 
are less likely to have extensive security arrangements in place. Some of the constraints of small businesses are 
that they generally do not have the diverse ICT staff typical of larger companies, and many managers in small 
businesses also have little understanding of information security threats and risks. Smaller enterprises may, 
however, be exposed to several kinds of computer crime incidents due to weaknesses in access control measures 
and data protection. 
The smallest companies are often dominated by a combined owner-manager, who is very often the sole 
person responsible for all or most activities not directly related to production. The main focus for the owner-
manager is the survival of the company and for natural reasons safety and security will often be a minor focus due 
to limited resources in terms of money, personnel, and knowledge (Eakin, 1992; Hasle and Limborg, 2006). These 
small organizations may also have only limited contact with the regulatory authorities, and owner-managers will 
sometimes accuse the regulatory bureaucracy of having a choking effect on small companies (Power, 2007), a 
notion that was confirmed by our survey based on comments from some of the respondents. All network 
companies in Norway are obligated to appoint an ICT safety and security manager, but in the smaller companies 
the ICT safety and security managers do not usually work full time in that position. Because of limited resources, 
many of the smaller network companies cannot hire their own ICT staff and instead choose to outsource this 
function to other companies (Hagen, 2009).
The big network companies have larger process control systems (SCADA systems) and system control 
centers, and distributes electrical power to more customers (e.g. critical infrastructures such as transport, finance, 
and telecommunication, hospitals, and other organizations, as well as individual households) than the smaller 
network companies. Hence, an attack on the large network companies’ ICT systems can have more serious 
consequences for societal safety. Most of the large SCADA systems in the big network companies are subject to 
stricter obligations in the contingency planning regulations than the smaller SCADA systems, and large 
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companies often have a separate information technology (IT) department with significant expertise in ICT. 
Knowledge and expertise in ICT might lead to a more accurate perception of the risks from threats to the 
companies’ ICT systems. However, another department may run the SCADA systems on a daily basis and 
departments may not always communicate well on these issues. In addition to having a separate corporate IT 
department, outsourcing of basic ICT functions to external companies is also increasingly common. Many of the 
local companies in the corporate group may know little about the potential threats to their ICT systems, and the IT 
department might not have a complete overview of what the consequences of a security breach may be in the 
different application areas. Large companies are also often less transparent than smaller companies, due to larger 
and more complex systems, and this can make it easier for insiders to engage in crime and not be detected (Hagen, 
Sivertsen and Rong, 2008).
How a security incident is handled can depend on how serious the security violation is perceived to be 
(Hagen, 2009). According to Hagen (2009), the way employees interpret (make sense of) a security situation 
depends on the extent of their security knowledge. Perceptions can be the result of incomplete or faulty 
knowledge (Okrent and Pidgeon, 1998). In our survey, the respondents generally scored high on items concerning 
their familiarity with the contingency planning regulations and with the internal safety and security policy and 
contingency plan in their companies (the knowledge of safety and security scale). However, we found no 
correlation between knowledge of safety and security and risk perception in our survey. Furthermore, our 
interviewees from NVE said they often find during inspections that a number of employees (and possibly also 
managers) in the network companies have not read the contingency planning regulations and guidelines. 
According to Besnard and Arief (2004), humans may be biased at perceiving actual levels of risk, and rarely have 
an exhaustive knowledge of the systems they interact with.
A lack of safety and security awareness by users has often been cited as the top obstacle for effective ICT 
safety and security (Goodhue and Straub, 1991; Johnson, 2006; Hagen, 2009; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). 
According to Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009), members of an organization can have inadequate ICT safety and 
security awareness if they are unfamiliar with possible threats to the systems and how to mitigate them, if they are 
unaware of the possible consequences of safety and security breaches, if they see their own work in isolation and 
are unaware of the implications of their use of ICT systems. According to the Norwegian “National Strategy for 
Information Security” of 2012, the owners of critical infrastructure in many cases have limited knowledge and 
awareness about vulnerabilities, the interdependencies of critical infrastructures, and what the individual 
enterprise must do to protect the infrastructure.
No earlier experience of danger can also affect the risk perception of users of ICT systems within 
companies. According to Flin et al. (1996), there is a relationship between risk perception and accident 
involvement, and having had an accident or having experienced an attack can influence the current perception of 
risk. In a study of fishermen’s risk perception (subjective assessments of risks), Brooks (2005) found that they did 
not consider it necessary to conduct emergency procedures (e.g. capsize, abandon ship), and that this may be 
related to the absence of capsizes in recent times.  According to Goodhue and Straub (1991), it often takes a major 
loss from computer abuse to initiate or reinforce security management. The respondents in our survey were asked 
if their organizations had experienced different safety and security incidents. On some of the incidents (e.g. 
malware attacks, and malfunctioning in the ICT systems caused by human error), a majority of the respondents 
answered that their organizations had experienced such incidents, but many of the respondents still rated these 
types of incidents at the low end of the risk perception scale. Indeed, one respondent wrote as a comment on the 
questionnaire: “We constantly experience attempts to hack into our ICT systems, but I have only answered based 
on the attempts that succeeded”. This might indicate that even though the network companies do experience 
attempts to break into their ICT systems, they do not perceive these attempts as a high risk, because so far most of 
the attempts have failed. According to our interviewees from NVE, managers and employees in many of the 
network companies find it difficult to prepare for something that might happen, but hasn’t happened yet.
NIST have developed a guide to process control systems security, and one of the threats to process control 
systems listed in this guide is complexities. Process control networks are often more complex than traditional ICT 
networks, and requires a different level of expertise (e.g. control networks are often managed by control 
engineers, not ICT personnel). Process control systems can have very complex interactions with physical 
processes, and consequences in the process control system domain can manifest in physical events (Stouffer, 
Falco and Scarfone, 2011). It is difficult to establish a complete system description of these complex systems, and 
the lack of understanding might lead to a biased perception of risk and result in misjudgments about potentially-
hazardous risk sources (Rundmo, 1996).
As previously mentioned, another factor that may influence users risk perception is the amount of 
communication between IT departments and system control centers. According to results from our interviews and 
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observation studies, in addition to the qualitative interview study done by Røyksund (2011), two different 
subcultures can be said to exist in the network companies, depending on whether the people operating the SCADA 
systems have an education in ICT or a background from the electricity industry. These two different group 
cultures result in different focus points and mindsets; they have different ways of thinking and draw on different 
scripts and frames when they make sense of the technology. People who have training in electrical engineering 
generally focus on keeping the systems running without interruption, and they may be less focused on installing 
security measures and spending time to apply software patches. Follow-up of specific tasks, such as network 
configuration and control of firewalls, can often be seen as a “necessary evil” that users of the system do not relate 
to as anything but an annoying delay in their work.
Many issues surrounding ICT safety and security also seem to be taken for granted within Norwegian 
network companies. The smaller network companies often take for granted that they are unimportant and not a 
target of potential attack, and that the potential consequences of an attack on small companies’ ICT systems are 
not as significant as on a large organization’s systems. However, with the introduction of AMI and the smart grid, 
the potential consequences are likely to increase in seriousness. Our interviewees from NVE said they expect 
several of the smaller network companies to have to team up and join resources to be able to implement and run 
the AMI, and this can greatly increase the consequences of malfunctions in or attacks on their ICT systems. 
According to Hagen, Sivertsen and Rong (2008), both small and large enterprises may evaluate (or perceive) the 
risk of malfunctions in or attacks on their ICT systems as too small to put much effort into user education.
According to our interviewees from NVE, they find a certain naiveté or gullibility about ICT risk, safety 
and security in the sector; many of the network companies have a lot of trust in the expertise of their system 
suppliers, believe that the suppliers will make safe solutions, and take for granted that some type of technical 
applications can take care of all problems. The system owners (network companies) are responsible for the safety 
and security of their own ICT systems, and it might be necessary for the network companies to tell their suppliers 
to provide more safety and security solutions for these systems. According to NVE, the network companies focus 
on the possibilities that the SCADA systems provide (i.e., access to more information and the possibilities of 
operating more electrical plants in a simpler way), but there is not as much focus on, or awareness of, the risk of 
“unwanted” access to these systems, protection against malicious software, and similar concerns. During 
inspections, NVE often discover access-points in the SCADA systems that the companies haven’t considered, 
especially concerning remote access, supplier access, external DVDs and USB sticks. Furthermore, the 
consequences of insider attacks can be worse than the consequences of external attacks (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, 
2009). However, according to NVE, a high threshold for acknowledging this kind of risk exists in the network 
companies. It might be taken for granted that “this does not happen in our company” which can affect managers’ 
and employees’ risk perception.
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The results from our survey among users of ICT systems (process control systems) within Norwegian 
electric power supply network companies showed that both managers and employees perceived the overall safety 
level of their ICT systems as good, and at the same time perceived the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in their 
ICT systems as relatively low. Our results correspond well with results from a former interview study done by 
Røyksund (2011), as well as with results from our interviews with representatives from the Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). The impression is that the risk of attacks on or malfunctions in their 
ICT systems is not perceived as high within a lot of the Norwegian network companies.
We found, in accordance with previous research, that company size, knowledge and awareness regarding 
ICT safety and security, and earlier experience of danger are factors that can influence the risk perception of ICT 
system users within companies. System complexities, which can be seen as a natural source of threats against 
process control systems, can also affect the risk perception of the companies’ managers and employees. Process 
control networks are often more complex than traditional ICT networks, and requires a different level of expertise.
Increased cognitive demands, increased electronic complexity, and dense organizational interdependence over 
large areas often lead to an increase in incidences of unexpected outcomes that produce unexpected ramifications.
Furthermore, a lack of communication between subcultures with different focus points and mindsets within the 
companies was found to influence the risk perception of users of ICT systems, in addition to a certain “taken for 
grantedness” regarding many issues surrounding ICT safety and security. Too much trust in the expertise of their 
system suppliers can also lead to a lack of focus on the safety and security of network companies’ ICT systems 
and thus influence users risk perception.
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NOTES
i An infrastructure is critical if its failure would lead to unacceptable human or economic consequences, and 
would impact societies’ capabilities of rescue, response and recovery. This links the notion of critical 
infrastructures closely to the concept of societal safety. Societal safety can be defined as “society's ability to 
maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens' basic 
requirements in a variety of stress situations” (Olsen et al. 2007,71)
ii In the area of risk research, it is traditional to distinguish between the terms safety and security, and the meaning 
of the terms can vary considerably from one context to another. According to Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet 
(2010), two relevant and representative distinctions can be identified (the SEMA referential framework). The first 
is the system vs. environment distinction, where security is concerned with the risks originating from the 
environment and potentially affecting the system, whereas safety deals with the risks arising from the system and 
potentially affecting the environment. The second is the malicious vs. accidental distinction, where security 
typically addresses malicious (intentional) risks, while safety addresses purely accidental (unintentional) risks (p. 
59).
iii NVE increased its focus on ICT safety and security after 2006, and has (especially since 2009) been putting 
more pressure on the electric power supply organizations, through heightened regulations and supervision. In 
addition, in 2009, some of the bigger network companies formed their own Forum for ICT-safety in the electric 
power supply sector (Røyksund, 2011).
iv SCADA systems help control and monitor utilities by gathering field data from sensors and instruments located 
at remote sites, transmitting and displaying these data at a central site, and enabling engineers to send control 
commands to the field instruments (Patel and Sanyal, 2008:398). SCADA systems are also called “industrial 
control systems” or “process control systems”. 
v The five previously used questionnaires were: Offshore Safety Questionnaire (The Robert Gordon University, 
Aberdeen, 1997), Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authorities’ survey “Trends in risk level – Norwegian Shelf” 
(2007-2008), “Accident prevention – survey for offshore employees” (survey used in PhD project, Centre of 
Maritime Health and Safety, Syddansk Universitet, Hanna B. Rasmussen, 2008-2012),“The Norwegian Computer 
Crime and Security Survey” (2010), and questions used in Janne M. Hagen’s study "How do employees comply 
with security policy? A comparative case study of four organizations under the Norwegian Security Act" (Hagen 
2009).
vi Before distributing the survey, we performed a pilot-test of the questionnaire to ensure that the instructions and 
scale items were clear. We sent the pilot to three respondents; one contingency planning manager, one ICT safety 
15
and security manager, and one system control center operator, and the questionnaire was adjusted according to 
feedback.
vii The Power Supply Preparedness Organization (PSPO) prepares, establishes, and maintains a structure to 
efficiently handle extraordinary situations in the power supply system. In 2012, the PSPO included 197 
organizations, and 137 of these can be classified as network companies (numbers were provided by NVE).
viii The survey was distributed to respondents in June 2012, and was closed in September 2012.
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Abstract 
Purpose - The aim of this article is to follow up on previous research by studying the degree of 
management commitment to information and communication technology (ICT) safety and security 
within network companies in the electric power supply sector, implementation of awareness 
creation and training measures for ICT safety and security within these companies, and the 
relationship between these two variables. 
Design/methodology/approach – Data were mainly collected through a survey among users of ICT 
systems in network companies within the Norwegian electric power supply sector. In addition, 
qualitative data were gathered through interviews with representatives from the regulatory 
authorities, and observation studies were conducted at ICT safety and security conferences. 
Findings – In accordance with previous research, our survey data showed a statistically significant 
correlation between management commitment to ICT safety and security and implementation of 
awareness creation and training measures. The majority of survey respondents viewed the degree of 
management commitment to ICT safety and security within their own organization as high, even 
though qualitative studies showed contradictory results. The network companies had implemented 
awareness creation and training measures to a varying degree. However, interactive awareness 
measures were used to a lesser extent than formal one-way communication methods. 
Originality/value - The article provides insight into management commitment to and 
implementation of awareness creation and training measures for ICT safety and security within 
network companies. 
Keywords - ICT, safety, security, management commitment, awareness creation, training, electric 
power supply 
Article Classification – Research paper 
1. Introduction
Previous research has advocated the need for more training, awareness creation, and management 
commitment regarding ICT safety and security1 (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden 
2008; Hagen, 2009; Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a). Studies of safety have suggested that 
management involvement is important for the safety work within companies. If the management is 
engaged it will be aware of the need for information security measures to comply with the laws, and 
assure that safety and security measures are implemented. The success of safety and security 
management systems is often said to be dependent on the commitment of all staff, and all members 
must be aware of their responsibility for safety and security. Otherwise, the safety and security 
mechanisms can be bypassed or diminished by employees. 
     This article follows up on previous research which has shown a positive relationship between 
management commitment to ICT safety and security and implementation of awareness creation and 
training measures. The following research questions are addressed: 
 To what degree is the management of network companies in the electric power supply 
sector committed to the safety and security of their organizations’ ICT systems? 
 To what extent are awareness creation and training measures for ICT safety and security 
implemented within network companies in the electric power supply sector, and what type 
of measures are implemented? 
     ICT has increasingly become a part of all critical infrastructures2 (Line and Tøndel, 2012), and is 
used to monitor, control and operate power generation plants and power distribution within electric 
power supply systems. A breakdown in these ICT systems (process control systems) can seriously 
compromise the physical grid, which can result in major financial disasters and damage to public 
safety and health (Patel and Sanyal, 2008). The electric power supply is the most critical 
infrastructure in modern society (Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a), and a prolonged interruption of 
the electric power supply may have consequences for many critical societal functions caused by the 
interdependencies between infrastructures.  
     Process control systems, e.g. supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA systems)3, 
and other ICT systems used within the electric power supply system, are vulnerable to a multitude of 
threats, both natural and man-made (Rodal, 2001). Connecting the ICT systems to the Internet has 
increased the risk for system breakdowns and serious failures (Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a), and 
has made the formerly isolated ICT systems vulnerable to a set of threats and risks they have not 
been exposed to before (Line and Tøndel, 2012). Vulnerability of ICT systems in the electric power 
supply system is also expected to increase during the next years. Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
(AMI) and, later on the Smart Grid, are now being introduced in the electric power systems of the 
Western countries. The electric Smart Grid promises increased capacity, reliability and efficiency 
through the marriage of cyber technology and the existing electricity network. However, the scale 
and complexity of the smart grid, along with its increased connectivity and automation, make the 
task of cyber protection particularly challenging (Kundur et al., 2010). 
     The research questions are answered by presenting results from a survey sent to 137 network 
companies in Norway, supplemented by results from interviews with representatives from the 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) and observation studies. The next section 
introduces the theoretical foundations for the study. Section 3 presents the data material and 
methods used in the study, and data analysis and results of the survey are presented in section 4. In 
section 5 results from the survey, interviews, and observation studies are interwoven in the 
discussion, and finally section 6 contains the conclusion. 
2. Theory 
2.1 ICT safety and security measures 
ICT safety and security measures include both technological and organizational measures. 
Technological measures can consist of personal passwords, redundancy of critical systems, intruder 
detection systems, anti-virus software, and firewalls. Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden (2008) have 
categorized organizational measures into four main groups: security policy, procedures and control, 
administrative tools and methods (e.g. risk analysis, audits, incident reporting systems), and 
organizational and individual awareness creation and maintenance. The first three groups of 
organizational safety and security measures can also be described as technical-administrative 
measures. The forth group of organizational measures consists of training/education, awareness 
campaigns, user participation, top management’s engagement and involvement of all parts of the 
organization in learning processes from incidents. In this study we have chosen to focus on 
management’s engagement/commitment (both top management and middle-management), and 
training/education and awareness campaigns. 
     According to Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden’s (2008) survey among information security 
professionals in Norway, awareness-creation measures were assessed to be very effective compared 
to the basic, formal security systems, however awareness-creation measures were also the least 
implemented. Information security management has traditionally emphasized formal management 
approaches, and formal measures are also less resource demanding than awareness-creation 
measures. When formal management systems (i.e. policies, procedures, and tools) are in place, these 
measures may be taken for granted and accepted as contributors to an adequate security level.  
2.2 Management commitment 
According to Rasmussen (1997), management’s commitment to safety and security has appeared to 
be a major problem, and has lead to the relating efforts of society to control management incentives 
by safety and security regulation. Research on safety climate has also indicated that the safety levels 
of organizations are influenced by managers’ attitudes towards safety, and the perceived priority 
given to safety training (Antonsen, 2009). Hagen (2009) defines information security as essentially a 
management responsibility. Information security should be embedded in all management processes, 
and include incident reporting and organizational learning. According to Johnson (2006), 
organizational policies and user guidelines require the commitment of top level managers, and 
should be directly linked to the company’s business strategies. The top management must be 
committed to ICT safety and security through its activities and through a dedicated budget. In 
addition, an organization’s safety and security policy should contain a letter of commitment from the 
top management showing commitment to ICT safety and security within the organization, and assign 
responsibilities of each member of the organization, particularly line management, top management 
and safety and security professionals. 
2.3 Awareness creation and training 
Formal technical-administrative measures and documented systems, e.g. safety and security policies, 
guidelines and instructions, can be taken for granted, and often few users4 have actually read the 
documents. Nevertheless, documents are often seen as important because they form the basis for 
other measures (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). But when technological and administrative 
measures are in place, “softer” resources can be used to modify performance. Influencing 
individuals’ knowledge, attitudes, and behavior must be regarded as important means that are 
complementary to formal technical-administrative measures (Hagen, 2009). As Siponen (2000) puts 
it: “(…) security people want end-users to internalize and follow given guidelines (…) rather than to 
be aware of them but for some reason or other fail to apply them in reality” (p. 36). 
     ICT safety and security awareness can be seen as the extent to which organizational members 
understand the importance of information safety and security, the level of safety and security 
required by the organization and their individual safety and security responsibilities, and act 
accordingly (ISF, 2005, referred to in Albrechtsen, 2006). Members of an organization can have 
inadequate ICT safety and security awareness if they are unfamiliar with possible threats to the 
systems and how to mitigate them, if they are unaware of the possible consequences of safety and 
security breaches, if they see their own work in isolation and are unaware of the implications of their 
use of ICT systems (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). A lack of safety and security awareness by users 
has been cited as the top obstacle for effective ICT safety and security. If people (management and 
employees) do not handle and protect ICT systems in a safe and secure manner, even the best 
technologies will be ineffective. Previous research has suggested that the impact of ICT safety and 
security breaches coming from people inside an organization is bigger than all other sources 
combined (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, 2009).  
     According to Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009), users often assume that the responsibility for ICT 
safety and security rests with the technology and with the ICT safety and security managers and they 
do not realize the benefits of ICT safety and security measures. In addition, users often trade off ICT 
safety and security against efficiency and functionality, which can be caused by efficiency demands, 
emphasis on minimum-effort work, and poor quality of ICT safety and security training and education 
resulting in insufficient skills and knowledge. For employees, the responsibility for acting in a manner 
that is safe and secure for the organization comes on top of other demands they are faced with in 
their everyday work. 
3. Material and methods 
The research methodology in this study was mainly based on a survey; statistical data were collected 
from users of ICT systems (managers and employees) in network companies within the Norwegian 
electric power supply sector. In addition, qualitative data were gathered through in depth qualitative 
interviews and observation studies. A combined approach can strengthen the validity of the study, as 
some of the findings can complement and validate each other (Silverman, 2006). However, as in this 
study, a combined approach can also show discrepancies between analysis results of data collected 
using different methods, and may thus open for new possibilities of interpretation. 
3.1 Survey 
A web-based questionnaire was developed using QuestBack Survey, and distributed to the 
respondents by e-mail5. The survey was sent to managers and employees in the 137 network 
companies that are part of the PSPO6, 334 individuals in total7. The questionnaire contained ten 
sections - background information, knowledge of safety and security, perception of compliance, 
attitude towards safety and security, attitude towards regulation, experience of incidents, risk 
perception, safety and security management, awareness creation and training, and overall rating of 
the safety and security levels of the organizations’ ICT systems. In this article we have chosen to 
focus on the results of the items in the safety and security management scale (management 
commitment) and the awareness creation and training scale. Items on the scales were measured on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
      The safety and security management scale contained 5 items measuring the management’s 
commitment to ICT safety and security in the network organizations. The items in this scale were: 
“My immediate manager intervenes immediately if the ICT safety and security rules are not 
followed”, “My immediate manager checks from time to time whether we are actually working safely 
and securely”, “My immediate manager is involved in the organization’s ICT safety and security 
work”, “My immediate manager appreciates my pointing out matters of importance to ICT safety and 
security”, and “I would rather not discuss ICT safety and security with my immediate manager”. 
Managers (ICT safety and security managers/coordinators and contingency planning managers) and 
employees (operators in system control centers and ICT staff) responded to the same items, hence 
we received information about the commitment of both top-management and middle-management 
in the network organization. The awareness creation and training scale contained 6 items related to 
the use of different awareness-creating and training measures in the network organizations (the 
individual items are shown in section 4.1). 
     One hundred and three respondents returned the survey questionnaire, for a response rate of 
31%. NVE provided the names and e-mail addresses of ICT safety and security 
managers/coordinators and contingency planning managers in the network companies, and the 
managers were asked to provide names and e-mail addresses for employees in the organizations’ 
system control centers and ICT staff. A survey sample of 103 respondents can be considered a 
relatively small sample, and may limit the potential for generalizing. According to Fricker and Sconlau 
(2002), response rates for web surveys where no other survey mode is given have tended to range 
from moderate to poor. Other researchers have also experienced the same response rate problem in 
studies of information security management. The main reasons for non-responses has been related 
to a policy of not sharing information regarding their information security performance, the volume 
of survey requests received by the organizations, and a desire not to spend valuable time on the 
particular research project (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). In an attempt to raise the response rate, 
hidden identity for respondents was activated in our electronic survey, and all e-mail addresses were 
deleted after the survey was closed. 
On the other hand, according to Pallant (2010) a sample of 100+ respondents can be regarded as a 
large sample (p. 135), and the sample size can be seen as adequate for the types of data analyzes 
done in our study. In addition, qualitative research data were gathered to support the quantitative 
results from the survey, which might increase the potential for generalizing. 
3.2 Interviews and observation studies 
To explore our research theme, produce research questions that could be tested by the quantitative 
survey, and to complement the data gathered through the survey, qualitative data was gathered 
through two group interviews with representatives from NVE. To complement the data from the 
survey and inform our study, observation studies were also carried out at two conferences on ICT 
safety and security within the electric power supply industry.  
     Semi-structured interviews with open ended questions were used. The interviewees were 
representatives from the contingency planning department in NVE, who are responsible for safety, 
contingency planning, and supervision in the Norwegian electric power supply sector. The first 
interview was done with three interviewees, and the questions mainly focused on the interviewees’ 
opinion of the Norwegian network companies’ risk perception and awareness regarding the risk of 
electric network failure caused by malfunctions in or attacks on their ICT systems. The second 
interview was done with two interviewees, and the questions mainly focused on the interviewees’ 
opinion regarding the use of functional internal control regulations for ICT safety and security, and 
their impression of the network companies’ attitudes towards these regulations. 
     The two conferences on ICT safety and security within the electric power supply industry were 
held in Norway in 2011. The participants at both conferences were mainly managers and employees 
working with ICT safety and security within network companies in Norway, in addition to suppliers of 
industrial control systems (e.g. SCADA-systems) and ICT safety and security solutions for these 
systems. The speakers at the conferences included representatives from NVE, NorCERT (the 
Norwegian Computer Emergency Response Team), Mnemonic AS (one of the largest providers of IT 
information security services in the Nordic region), NorSIS (Norwegian Centre for Information 
Security), and ICT safety and security researchers from universities and research institutes. During 
the observation studies we observed the types of ICT safety and security issues raised at the 
conferences, the types of issues participants focused on, and the types of questions and discussions 
that came up during the conferences. 
4.  Data analysis and results of survey 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) v. 18 was used to perform the analyses, which 
included descriptive statistics and correlation. Negatively worded items were reversed, and total 
scale scores were calculated to give an overall score for the two scales used in the survey. A reliability 
test of the total scale scores indicated that the scales used in this study had good internal 
consistency; Cronbach’s alpha was .85 for the safety and security management scale and .84 for the 
awareness creation and training scale. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the demographical distribution of the respondents. 66 respondents were managers, 
and 32 were employees (5 respondents did not specify their job category). Only 3 of the respondents 
were female, and the rest male. 63 respondents worked in small network companies with less than 
100 employees, and 37 respondents worked in large network companies with more than 100 
employees (3 respondents did not answer the item regarding company size). Based on the use of 
hidden identity in the electronic survey we lack information regarding how many of the 137 network 
companies the respondents actually represented. However, 29 respondents were ICT safety and 
security managers (information security managers), 11 from large companies and 18 from smaller 
companies. Due to the fact that each company only has one ICT safety and security manager, at least 
29 companies are represented in the data material and most likely more. 
  
Table 1. Demographic profiles of respondents. 
 
Job categories 
 
Company size 
Total 
More than 100 
employees 
Fewer than 100 
employees 
Manager Gender Male 19 44 63 
Female 1 1 2 
Total 20 45 651 
Employee Gender Male 14 15 29 
Female 1 0 1 
Total 15 15 301 
Other Gender Male 2 3 5 
Total 2 3 5 
Total Gender Male 35 62 97 
Female 2 1 3 
Total 37 63 100 
1 Three respondents (1 manager and 2 employees) did not answer the item regarding company size. Thus, the numbers in Table 1 are 
not completely consistent with the numbers in Section 4.1. 
 
     The mean value on the total scale score for the safety and security management scale was 18.83, 
the minimum possible value was 5, and the maximum possible value was 25. This means that the 
respondents agreed to most statements, and the majority of respondents viewed management 
commitment to ICT safety and security in their organization as high. The results are shown in Fig. 1. 
  
Figure 1. Total scores on the safety and security management scale (calculated by adding up the 
scores from the 5 items that make up the scale). 
           
  
     Table 2 presents the distribution of the respondents’ scores on the individual items of the 
awareness creation and training scale. 
Table 2. Distribution of scores on item 1-6 within the awareness creation and training scale. 
Distribution of scores on items (in percentage) 
Item 1: “New 
employees 
receive 
thorough 
training in 
the 
organization’
s ICT safety 
and security 
rules 
(included in 
the 
organization’
s ICT safety 
and security 
policy and 
safety and 
security 
instructions)” 
Item 2: 
“Training 
sessions in 
ICT safety 
and 
security 
for 
managers 
and 
employee
s are 
conducted 
whenever 
the ICT 
systems 
are 
updated 
or 
altered” 
Item 3: 
“Awareness 
campaigns 
about ICT 
safety and 
security are 
often1 held in 
my 
organization
” 
Item 4: “In 
my 
organizatio
n e-mails 
containing 
information 
about ICT 
safety and 
security are 
often 
distributed 
to raise 
employee 
awareness” 
Item 5: “In 
my 
organization 
formal face-
to-face 
presentation
s of 
information 
about ICT 
safety and 
security are 
often held to 
raise 
employee 
awareness” 
Item 6: “In 
my 
organization 
informationa
l videos on 
ICT safety 
and security 
are often 
showed to 
raise 
employee 
awareness” 
Strongly 
disagre
e 
3.9 %  (N=4) 4.9 % 
(N=5) 
4.9 % (N=5) 7.8 % (N=8) 12.7 % 
(N=13) 
23.3 % 
(N=24) 
Dis-
agree 
9.7% (N=10) 16.7% 
(N=17) 
27.2 % 
(N=28) 
23.5 % (=24) 42.2 % 
(N=43) 
53.4 % 
(N=55) 
Neither 
disagre
e nor 
agree 
26.2 % 
(N=27) 
43.1 % 
(N=44) 
35.0 % 
(N=36) 
35.3 % 
(N=36) 
33.3 % 
(N=34) 
18.4 % 
(N=19) 
Agree 46.6 % 
(N=48) 
28.4 % 
(N=29) 
27.2 % 
(N=28) 
25.5 % 
(N=26) 
9.8 % (N=10) 3.9 % (N=4) 
Strongly 
agree 
10.7 % 
(N=11) 
3.9 % 
(N=4) 
4.9 % (N=5) 6.9 % (N=7) 1.0 % (N=1) 0.0 % (N=0) 
Not 
relevant 
0 % (N=0) 1.0 % 
(N=1) 
0.0 % (N=0) 1.0% (N=1) 1.0% (N=1) 1.0 % (N=1) 
Don’t 
know 
2.9 % (N=3) 2.0 % 
(N=2) 
1.0 % (N=1) 0.0 % (N=0) 0.0 % (N=0) 0.0 % (N=0) 
Total 103 102 103 102 102 103 
1 In the awareness creation and training scale the word “often” was defined as “at least once a year”. The 
respondents were informed of this in the scale’s text information. 
     The distribution of the respondents’ scores on the individual items of the awareness creation and 
training scale suggested that the majority of the network companies had implemented training in ICT 
safety and security for new employees. Some network companies had implemented training sessions 
in ICT safety and security whenever their ICT systems were updated and altered, however a large 
percentage of the respondents answered “Neither disagree nor agree” (43.1 %) on this item. The use 
of awareness campaigns and distribution of e-mails containing information about ICT safety and 
security seemed to vary a lot between the companies. 54.9% answered negatively8 on the item 
regarding use of face-to-face presentations of information about ICT safety and security, and 76.7% 
answered negatively on the item regarding use of informational videos on ICT safety and security. 
4.2 Correlation 
The relationship between management commitment to ICT safety and security (as measured by the 
total safety and security management scale) and implementation of awareness creation and training 
measures (as measured by the total awareness creation and training scale) in the network companies 
was investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Before this statistical 
analysis could be performed on the data set, the total scale scores for the two scales needed to be 
calculated by adding up the scores from the items that made up each scale (Pallant, 2010). The 
correlation analysis revealed a large positive correlation between the two variables “management 
commitment” and “awareness creation and training”, r = .641, n = 819. There was a strong, positive 
relationship10 between the variables, and high levels of management commitment were associated 
with high levels of awareness creation and training. 
5. Discussion 
The “Cyber Security Strategy for Norway” (Regjeringen, 2012) from 2012, concluded that the lack of 
awareness concerning ICT safety and security constitutes a high and increasing risk. In many cases, 
the owners of critical infrastructure have limited knowledge and awareness about vulnerabilities, the 
interdependencies of critical infrastructures, and what the individual enterprise must do to protect 
the infrastructure. The complexity of the process control systems, together with an increase in the 
number of attacks on ICT systems, demands a large effort to create awareness of the threats, to 
provide information about safety and security measures, and to influence positive attitudes. 
 
     Studies of safety have suggested that management involvement is important for the safety work 
within companies. ICT safety and security law in Norway places responsibility for ICT safety and 
security on the management and the boards. The contingency planning regulations for the 
Norwegian electric power supply sector also emphasize that contingency planning (which includes 
ICT safety and security) is the responsibility of the top managers in the organizations, and the 
authorities expect the top management to convey the importance of and follow up on safety and 
security within their organization. If the management is engaged it will be aware of the need for 
information security measures to comply with the laws, and assure that security measures are 
implemented (Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a).  
 
    The results from our survey showed a strong relationship between management commitment to 
ICT safety and security, and the implementation of awareness creation and training measures for ICT 
safety and security in the network companies. High levels of management commitment were 
associated with high levels of awareness creation and training. These findings correspond well with 
results from former studies (Johnson, 2006; Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008; Hagen and 
Albrechtsen, 2009a). 
 
     According to Hagen and Albrechtsen’s (2009a) comparative study of regulation of information 
security and the impact on top management commitment in the electric power supply sector versus 
the finance sector in Norway, a larger number of electric power supply companies reported incidents 
typically caused by insiders (e.g. abuse of ICT systems, unintentional use violating security, etc.) 
compared with financial companies. The researchers found that higher organizational security 
awareness corresponded with less exposure to insider threats. The results of the study also showed 
that high management engagement corresponded with a high degree of adopted security measures 
and a lower degree of insider incidents. According to our interviews with representatives from NVE, a 
high threshold for acknowledging the risk of insider incidents exists in the network companies. The 
companies might take for granted that “this does not happen in our company” which can affect their 
awareness. 
     During our observation studies at an ICT safety and security conference for companies within the 
Norwegian electric power supply sector in 2011, we observed a representative from one of the 
network companies asking the representative from NorCERT if the ICT systems in the Norwegian 
electric power supply sector were considered a high target for cyber attacks. The representative from 
NorCERT answered that the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) did not assign a high threat level 
to the possibility of cyber attacks on Norwegian ICT systems, but they had observed an increasing 
amount of internet espionage. According to several of the participants at the conference it was hard 
to get money for ICT safety and security measures from the top management when the authorities 
did not consider the threat level as high. 
     On the other hand, our observation studies were carried out in 2011, and according to PST’s 
annual threat assessment for 2012, there is a danger that foreign intelligence services' computer and 
internet based intelligence activity could more severely affect Norwegian intelligence targets. A 
report from 2012 on terror towards the U.S. electrical grid, concluded that a few, well-informed 
persons may be able to blackout large areas over a long period of time, with devastating and life-
threatening consequences. According to NVE, this threat is just as great for Norway as for the U.S. 
(Teknisk Ukeblad, 2012). And according to The Norwegian Intelligence Service’s 
(Etterretningstjenesten) open security threat assessment from February 2013 (FOCUS 2013), cyber 
terror is now one of the main threats to national security. As previously mentioned, there are also 
large ICT safety and security challenges related to the implementation of AMI. 
     According to our interviewees from NVE, they had the impression that it was easier to get the 
network companies to implement technological and technical-administrative measures, than to 
achieve management commitment to and create awareness about ICT safety and security within the 
companies. As previously mentioned, a possible explanation for this may be that when formal 
management systems (i.e. policies, procedures, and tools) are in place, these measures may be taken 
for granted and accepted as contributors to an adequate security level. However, contrary to the 
results from our interviews and observation studies, the majority of respondents in our survey 
viewed management commitment to ICT safety and security in their organization as high. One 
possible explanation for this discrepancy may be that on subjective assessments regarding their own 
company’s performance, respondents are often inclined to assess themselves positively. Sometimes 
it may also be difficult to answer negatively on questions concerning one’s immediate manager 
(Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008). 
    Of the awareness creation and training measures listed in our survey, the most implemented was 
training in ICT safety and security for new employees. Some network companies had also 
implemented training sessions in ICT safety and security whenever their ICT systems were updated 
and altered, however a large percentage of the respondents answered “Neither disagree nor agree” 
on this item which might indicate that these types of training sessions were not conducted on a 
regular basis. 
 
     According to Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009), both the ICT safety and security managers and end-
users of ICT systems that were interviewed in their study agreed that end-users often do not have 
the knowledge and skills needed for safe and secure behavior. Both groups believed this shortcoming 
to be the result of insufficient training. Users of ICT systems often do not realize the benefits of 
information security, and consider practicality and efficiency as far more important for their work. 
Both the interviewed managers and end-users also agreed that the best measures to raise awareness 
about ICT safety and security were interactive, face-to-face measures, e.g. personal meetings or 
presentations. However, this type of measure was also among the least frequently used approaches 
by the companies in the study. Formal one-way communication methods, such as information 
material and electronic information (e.g. screen savers, e-mail messages, and leaflets) were 
extensively used because these measures are simple and cheap. The problem with these types of 
measures was that users often lacked the motivation and awareness to obtain the knowledge in this 
information, in addition to being bombarded with other types of information. 
     Similar results were found in our survey. 54.9% of the respondents answered negatively (“Strongly 
disagree” or “Disagree”) on the statement: “In my organization formal face-to-face presentations of 
information about ICT safety and security are often held to raise employee awareness”, only 10.8 % of 
the respondents answered positively (“Strongly agree” or “Agree”), and 33.3 % answered “Neither 
disagree nor agree”11. 
     According to Albrechtsen and Hagen (2009), employee participation is valuable for measures 
influencing user performance as well as for other parts of information security management. 
Practical learning (through interaction), rather than formal education, is likely to be the most 
effective way to improve knowledge on how to act safely and securely. Thomson and von Solms 
(1998) argued that social psychological principles needed to be introduced to improve the 
effectiveness of security awareness programs. The use of role playing exercises and the use of 
examples related to the employee’s own work situation were suggested as good techniques to 
achieve information security awareness among users of ICT systems. Use of e-learning can be 
another way to strengthen individual security awareness and behavior. A study by Hagen and 
Albrechtsen (2009b) discusses the effects of a computer-based security training program (using e-
learning software) which was introduced in a multinational commercial organization in 2008. The 
study documented significant improvements in information security knowledge, awareness and 
behavior of the employees that participated in the training program. 
     However, these types of awareness creating and training measures are often resource demanding 
because they must be repeated to be effective. Removing employees from their work during 
presentations, meetings, and training sessions, can also reduce the production capacity of the 
company. This may be a reason for why these types of measures are used to a lesser extent than 
formal one-way measures, even though studies have shown that they are considered better and 
more effective for raising awareness about ICT safety and security (Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 
2008; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). 
6. Conclusion 
The results from our survey among managers and employees in Norwegian electric power supply 
network companies showed a strong relationship between management commitment to and the 
implementation of awareness creation and training measures for ICT safety and security in the 
companies. High levels of management commitment were associated with high levels of awareness 
creation and training. These findings correspond well with results from former studies (Johnson, 
2006; Hagen, Albrechtsen, and Hovden, 2008; Hagen and Albrechtsen, 2009a).  
     The survey data showed that the majority of respondents viewed management commitment to 
ICT safety and security in their organization as high. However, contrary to this, results from our 
interviews with representatives from the authorities and observation studies at ICT safety and 
security conferences indicated that it is easier to get the network companies to implement 
technological and technical-administrative measures, than to achieve management commitment to 
and create awareness about ICT safety and security within the companies.  
     Furthermore, the results from our survey suggested that the majority of the network companies 
had implemented training in ICT safety and security for new employees. Some network companies 
had also implemented training sessions whenever their ICT systems were updated and altered, 
however our results indicated that these types of training sessions were not conducted on a regular 
basis. The use of awareness campaigns and distribution of e-mails containing information about ICT 
safety and security seemed to vary a lot between the companies. Interactive face-to-face 
presentations of information about ICT safety and security did not seem to be used as a measure to 
raise employee awareness within most of the network companies, even though former research has 
found that interactive measures are often viewed as the best measures to raise awareness about ICT 
safety and security (Hagen, Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2008; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009). Other 
measures involving employee participation and practical learning through interaction, e.g. e-learning 
or role-playing exercises, have also been shown to improve knowledge and awareness about how to 
act safely and securely. Our current survey did not include items regarding the use of these types of 
measures within the Norwegian network companies, however this would be an interesting topic for 
further research.  
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Notes 
1 A number of different terms are commonly used when discussing ICT safety and security and threats to ICT 
systems: information security, IT safety and security, computer safety, computer crime, data safety, cyber 
safety, cyber threats, cyber crime, cyber terror, logical threats, etc. In this article we mainly use the term ICT 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
safety and security, but different terms will be used when referencing to other research studies. In the area of 
risk research, it is traditional to distinguish between the terms safety and security, and the meaning of the 
terms can vary considerably from one context to another. According to Piètre-Cambacédès and Chaudet 
(2010), two relevant and representative distinctions can be identified (the SEMA referential framework). The 
first is the system vs. environment distinction, where security is concerned with the risks originating from the 
environment and potentially affecting the system, whereas safety deals with the risks arising from the system 
and potentially affecting the environment. The second is the malicious vs. accidental distinction, where security 
typically addresses malicious (intentional) risks, while safety addresses purely accidental (unintentional) risks 
(p. 59). 
2 An infrastructure is critical if its failure would lead to unacceptable human or economic consequences, and 
would impact societies’ capabilities of rescue, response and recovery. This links the notion of critical 
infrastructures closely to the concept of societal safety. Societal safety can be defined as “society's ability to 
maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens' basic 
requirements in a variety of stress situations” (Olsen et al. 2007,71) 
3 SCADA systems help control and monitor utilities by gathering field data from sensors and instruments 
located at remote sites, transmitting and displaying these data at a central site, and enabling engineers to send 
control commands to the field instruments (Patel and Sanyal, 2008:398).  
4 A user can be characterized as a person with legitimate access to the organization’s information (and 
communication) systems (Albrechtsen, 2006), e.g. end-users, security officers, managers, designers (Besnard 
and Arief, 2004). 
5 Before distributing the survey, we performed a pilot-test of the questionnaire to ensure that the instructions 
and scale items were clear. We sent the pilot to three respondents; one contingency planning manager, one 
ICT safety and security manager, and one system control centre operator, and the questionnaire was adjusted 
according to feedback. 
6 The Power Supply Preparedness Organisation (PSPO) prepares, establishes, and maintains a structure to 
efficiently handle extraordinary situations in the power supply system. In 2012, the PSPO included 197 
organisations, and 137 of these can be classified as network companies (numbers were provided by NVE). 
7 The survey was distributed to respondents in June 2012, and closed in September 2012. 
8 “Strongly disagree” and “Disagree”. 
9 Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
10 The strength of the correlation is interpreted according to Cohen’s guidelines from 1988: small correlation – 
r=.10 to .29, medium correlation – r=.30 to .49, large correlation – r=.50 to 1.0 (Pallant, 2010:134). 
11 N=102. 
IKT-sikkerhet i norsk kraftforsyning - Survey til ledere og 
ansatte i norske nettselskaper
Kjære ledere og ansatte i norske nettselskaper,
I denne undersøkelsen studeres mulige utfordringer for sikkerhetsstyring i 
norske nettselskaper på bakgrunn av økt bruk av IKT i norsk 
kraftforsyning. Resultatene fra undersøkelsen er ment å gi økt 
kunnskap om sikkerhetsutfordringer i nettselskaper innenfor norsk 
kraftforsyning, som igjen kan være til hjelp for myndighetene og 
sikkerhetsansvarlige i arbeidet med å redusere risiko og sårbarhet.
Kartleggingen utføres i forståelse med NVEs beredskapsseksjon.
Det vil ta ca. 20 min å fylle ut spørreskjemaet. Vi ber deg om å svare basert 
på din oppfattelse av ulike forhold i organisasjonen du arbeider i, selv om 
spørsmålene kan dreie seg om deler av organisasjonen du ikke arbeider 
med til vanlig/ikke har detaljkunnskap om (det er også mulig å benytte 
svaralternativet 'Vet ikke').
Vi setter stor pris på at du tar deg tid til å fylle ut skjemaet!
Begrepsavklaring:
IKT-begrepet brukes synonymt med IT-begrepet i denne 
spørreundersøkelsen.
Med IKT-systemer henvises det til: driftskontrollsystemer 
(SCADA/Industrial Control Systems) og administrative og merkantile 
systemer som har betydning for drift og sikkerhet og/eller inneholder 
sensitiv informasjon.
Denne spørreundersøkelsen bygger på en definisjon av begrepet risiko
som: 'en kombinasjon av mulige konsekvenser (utfall) og tilhørende 
usikkerhet'. Sårbarhet oppfattes som kombinasjonen av mulige 
konsekvenser og usikkerhet, gitt at systemet utsettes for en initierende 
hendelse.
Med 'organisasjonen' henvises det her til nettselskapet respondenten er 
ansatt i. Med 'myndighetene' henvises det til Norges vassdrags- og 
energidirektorat (NVE).
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Risiko- og sårbarhetsanalyser (ROS-analyser): I Beredskapsforskriften 
kreves det at alle organisasjoner som inngår i Kraftforsyningens 
Beredskapsorganisasjon (KBO) skal ha oppdaterte ROS-analyser for å 
identifisere organisasjonens risikopotensiale og de tiltak som effektivt 
oppfyller kravene i forskriften. Det anbefales å gjennomføre ROS-analyser 
for overordnet nivå, detaljerte analyser for avgrensede deler av 
organisasjonen, og mer detaljerte analyser på komponentnivå.
Beredskapsplan: I følge Beredskapsforskriften skal alle organisasjoner som 
inngår i KBO ha en oppdatert og funksjonell beredskapsplan. 
Beredskapsplanen skal blant annet omfatte forberedelser og tiltak det kan 
bli nødvendig å iverksette ved ulykker, skader, rasjonering og andre 
ekstraordinære situasjoner som kan påvirke kraftforsyningens drift og 
sikkerhet.
Informasjonssikkerhetspolicy (sikkerhetspolicy): En
informasjonssikkerhetspolicy skal uttrykke ledelsens intensjoner og mål for 
IKT-sikkerhetsarbeidet. Den skal beskrive mål, hovedprinsipper, ansvar og 
roller i forbindelse med organisasjonens arbeid med IKT-sikkerhet.
Sikkerhetsinstruks: I følge beredskapsforskriften bør organisasjonene 
utarbeide en sikkerhetsinstruks for IKT-sikkerhet. Dette skal være en 
instruks for håndtering og beskyttelse av viktig og sensitiv informasjon, 
samt viktige informasjonssystemer, både teknisk og administrativt. 
Sikkerhetsinstruksen bør være et resultat av tiltak som er identifiserte i den 
løpende helhetlige vurderingen av IKT-sikkerheten i organisasjonen.
2 
Din identitet vil holdes skjult.
Les om retningslinjer for personvern. (Åpnes i nytt vindu)
Bakgrunnsinformasjon og organisatorisk kontekst:
1) Kjønn
Mann Kvinne
2) Alder
3) Stilling
Beredskapsleder
IT-sikkerhetsleder
Operatør ved driftssentral
IKT-medarbeider
Annet
4) Hvor lenge har du arbeidet i det selskapet du er ansatt i nå?
Under 1 år
1-3 år
3-5 år
5-10 år
Mer enn 10 år
5) Størrelse på selskap (velg det alternativet du synes passer best)
Over 100 ansatte
Under 100 ansatte
Vet ikke
6) Hvilken selskapsform har organisasjonen?
AS-ASA
Andelslag
Ansvarlig selskap
Kommunal, fylkeskommunal, eller interkommunal bedrift
Annet
Vet ikke
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7) Hvilken type virksomhet driver organisasjonen?
Kun nettvirksomhet
Nett og produksjon
Nett og omsetning
Nett, produksjon og omsetning
Vet ikke
Det er mulig å velge mer enn ett svaralternativ her:
8) Hvilken klassifisering har driftskontrollsystemet i din organisasjon?
Klasse 1
Klasse 2
Klasse 3
Vet ikke
Denne delen av spørreskjemaet handler om din viten om sikkerhet i organisasjonen. Vennligst 
angi hvor enig eller uenig du er i hvert av de følgende utsagn:
9) Kunnskap/viten om sikkerhet
Meget 
uenig Uenig
Verken 
uenig 
eller 
enig Enig
Meget 
enig
Ikke 
aktuelt
Jeg er godt kjent med innholdet i 
kapittel 6 om 
informasjonssikkerhet i 
'Veiledning til forskrift om 
beredskap i kraftforsyningen'
Jeg er godt kjent med innholdet i 
organisasjonens beredskapsplan
Jeg er godt kjent med innholdet i 
organisasjonens 
informasjonssikkerhetspolicy
Jeg er godt kjent med innholdet i 
organisasjonens 
sikkerhetsinstruks
Jeg har adgang til den 
informasjonen som er nødvendig 
for å kunne ta beslutninger som 
vedrører IKT-sikkerhet
4 
Denne delen av spørreskjemaet handler om din oppfattelse av etterlevelse i din organisasjon, 
når det gjelder krav i Beredskapsforskriften, og organisasjonens interne beredskapsplan, 
informasjonssikkerhetspolicy og sikkerhetsinstruks for IKT-sikkerhet. Vi ber deg her om å 
vennligst angi hvor enig eller uenig du er i hvert av de følgende utsagn (NB! I de fleste 
utsagnene er ordet 'alltid' benyttet for at du skal ta stilling til i hvilken grad dette stemmer i din 
organisasjon. Hvis noe for eksempel gjøres ofte, men ikke alltid, kan man svare 'Enig' i stedet 
for 'Meget enig'):
10) Oppfattelse av etterlevelse
Meget 
uenig Uenig
Verken 
uenig 
eller 
enig Enig
Meget 
enig
Ikke 
aktuelt
Vet 
ikke
I min organisasjon er IKT-
sikkerhet et viktig tema i 
ROS-analysene
I min organisasjon 
utarbeides det alltid ROS-
analyser for alle nivå i 
organisasjonen
I min organisasjon benyttes 
alltid sjekklister ved 
utarbeidelse av ROS-
analysene
I min organisasjon 
oppdateres ROS-analysene 
ved alle endringer 
(systemmessige og 
organisatoriske endringer, 
eksternt og internt)
I min organisasjon 
oppdateres alltid ROS-
analysene ved oppdatering 
av programvare, 
maskinvare og 
arkitekturløsninger
I min organisasjon 
oppdateres alltid ROS-
analysene når 
organisasjonen får 
kjennskap til mulige nye 
trusler mot IKT-sikkerheten
I min organisasjon benyttes 
alltid NVEs 'Veiledning i 
risiko- og 
sårbarhetsanalyser for 
kraftforsyningen' ved 
utarbeidelsen av ROS-
analysene
I min organisasjon benyttes 
alltid standarder (som ISO 
27001/ISO 27002/NS-
ISO/IEC 17799) ved 
utarbeidelse av blant annet 
ROS-analyser, 
informasjonssikkerhetspolicy 
og sikkerhetsinstruks
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I min organisasjon er 
beredskap i forbindelse med 
IKT-sikkerhet en viktig del 
av beredskapsplanen
I min organisasjon har vi 
alltid tilgjengelig en 
oppdatert systembeskrivelse 
av driftskontrollsystemet
I min organisasjon blir det 
sett på som viktig å teste 
IKT-sikkerheten gjennom 
beredskapsøvelser
Når organisasjonens 
beredskapsplan har vært i 
bruk, enten gjennom 
øvelser eller reelle 
hendelser, blir planen alltid 
evaluert
Evalueringer av 
beredskapsplanen blir alltid 
benyttet som utgangspunkt 
for oppdateringer av 
organisasjonens ROS-
analyser
Det er lett å ta kontakt med 
IT-sikkerhetslederen hvis 
man har spørsmål eller 
informasjon vedrørende 
IKT-sikkerheten i 
organisasjonen
I min organisasjon er det 
enkelt å rapportere 
hendelser knyttet til IKT-
sikkerheten, og brudd på 
denne, til overordnede ledd i 
organisasjonen
Rapportering av hendelseer 
knyttet til IKT-sikkerheten, 
og brudd på denne, blir 
alltid fulgt opp av ledelsen i 
organisasjonen
Alle ansatte informeres om 
innholdet i organisasjonens 
informasjonssikkerhetspolicy
I min organisasjon er 
sikkerhetsinstruksen 
tilgjengelig for alle ansatte
I min organisasjon er det 
kun autorisert personell som 
har tilgang til rom som 
inneholder driftssentral med 
tilhørende utrustning
I min organisasjon er det 
alltid oppdaterte 
autorisasjonslister for 
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brukere av organisasjonens 
IKT-systemer
I min organisasjon er 
driftskontrollsystemet totalt 
atskilt fra andre systemer 
(det administrative 
systemet, internett, osv.)
I min organisasjon inngås 
det alltid sikkerhetsavtaler 
med leverandører
I min organisasjon føres det 
alltid logg over eksterne 
forbindelser til 
driftskontrollsystemet, og 
andre relevante aktiviteter
I min organisasjon blir det 
sett på som viktig å alltid ha 
oppdatert anti-virus 
programvare
I min organisasjon blir det 
sett på som viktig å alltid ha 
oppdaterte operativsystem
Denne delen av spørreskjemaet handler om holdning til sikkerhet. Vennligst angi hvor enig 
eller uenig du er i hvert av de følgende utsagn:
11) Holdning til sikkerhet
Meget 
uenig Uenig
Verken 
uenig 
eller 
enig Enig
Meget 
enig
Ikke 
aktuelt
Vet 
ikke
Jeg utfører mitt arbeid 
bedre hvis jeg ignorerer 
noen IKT-sikkerhetsregler (i 
informasjonssikkerhetspolicy 
og sikkerhetsinstruks)
Det er viktig å lese 
organisasjonens 
beredskapsplan, IKT-
sikkerhetspolicy, og 
sikkerhetsinstruks for å ha 
oppdatert kunnskap om IKT-
sikkerhet
Jeg kan utføre arbeidet 
fortere hvis jeg ignorerer 
noen IKT-sikkerhetsregler
Det er en god holdning til 
IKT-sikkerhet i denne 
organisasjonen
I praksis går hensynet til 
produksjon foran hensynet 
til IKT-sikkerhet i denne 
organisasjonen
Jeg har et personlig ansvar 
overfor IKT-sikkerheten i 
organisasjonen
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Jeg synes det er meget 
viktig at organisasjonen har 
strenge regler for 
passordbeskyttelse, av- og 
pålogging, bruk av bærbare 
medier, og ansattes tilgang 
til nettsamfunn (for 
eksempel sosiale medier) i 
arbeidstiden
Jeg synes det er viktig å 
rapportere alle mulige 
sårbarheter jeg oppdager i 
organisasjonens IKT-
systemer
Hvis jeg oppdager at en 
kollega bryter IKT-
sikkerhetsreglene i
organisasjonen vil jeg ta 
dette opp med personen
Denne delen av spørreskjemaet handler om offentlig regulering av sikkerhet og beredskap i 
norsk kraftforsyning. Vennligst angi hvor enig eller uenig du er i hvert av de følgende utsagn:
12) Holdning til regulering
Meget 
uenig Uenig
Verken 
uenig 
eller 
enig Enig
Meget 
enig
Ikke 
aktuelt
Vet 
ikke
Jeg synes det er greit at 
myndighetene kun 
bestemmer overordnede 
mål og krav til IKT-
sikkerheten, og at 
organisasjonen selv får 
beslutte hvordan vi vil gå 
frem for å oppnå disse 
målene
Jeg skulle ønske at 
myndighetene kunne gi oss 
mer detaljerte 
retningslinjer for hvordan vi 
skal gå frem for å oppnå 
IKT-sikkerhetskravene i 
Beredskapsforskriften
Kravene og retningslinjene i 
kap. 6 om IKT-sikkerhet i 
'Veiledning til forskrift om 
beredskap i 
kraftforsyningen' er for 
detaljerte
I forbindelse med 
innføringen av AMS 
(avanserte måle- og 
styringssystemer) skulle 
jeg ønske at 
organisasjonene fikk mer 
detaljerte retningslinjer fra 
myndighetene
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Hvilken type hendelser har organisasjonen vært utsatt for? Sett kryss:
13) Hendelser
Ja Nei
Vet 
ikke
Målrettede datainnbrudd (hacking)
Tyveri av informasjon (industriell spionasje, stjeling av 
passord, osv.)
Uautorisert endring/sletting av data
Misbruk av IKT-ressurser (PC/nett/server)
Spredning av ulovlig/opphavsrettslig beskyttet materiale 
(piratkopiering)
Målrettede aksjoner som har til hensikt å redusere 
tilgjengeligheten (DoS-angrep)
Trusler om å angripe IKT-systemer (utpressing)
Tyveri av IT-utstyr (PC, server, osv.)
Tap av opplysninger underlagt personopplysningsloven
Distribuerte dataangrep med ondsinnet programvare
(Malware), som ormer, virus, trojanere, og bakdører
Svikt i IKT-systemer på bakgrunn av operatørfeil 
(menneskelig feil)
Svikt i IKT-systemer på bakgrunn av miljø-/naturhendelser 
(oversvømmelse, vannskader, brann, lynnedslag, osv.)
Svikt i IKT-systemer på bakgrunn av fysisk svikt 
(kabelbrudd, kontaktfeil, komponentfeil, osv.)
Nedenfor er det angitt noen fare- og ulykkeskategorier som kan oppstå i organisasjonen. 
Markér vennligst hvor stor risiko du mener de forskjellige kategoriene kan utgjøre for 
organisasjonen. Vi er her interessert i din personlige vurdering. Kryss av én boks for hver 
situasjon:
14) Risikooppfattelse/-persepsjon
Meget 
liten 
risiko 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Meget 
stor 
risiko 
(6)
Målrettede datainnbrudd (hacking)
Tyveri av informasjon (industriell 
spionasje, stjeling av passord, osv.)
Uautorisert endring/sletting av data
Misbruk av IKT-ressurser 
(PC/nett/server)
Spredning av ulovlig/opphavsrettslig 
beskyttet materiale piratkopiering)
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Målrettede aksjoner som har til hensikt 
å redusere tilgjengeligheten (DoS-
angrep)
Trusler om å angripe IKT-systemer 
(utpressing)
Tyveri av IT-utstyr (PC, server, osv.)
Tap av opplysninger underlagt 
personopplysningsloven (Phishing)
Distribuerte dataangrep med ondsinnet 
programvare (Malware), som ormer, 
virus, trojanere, og bakdører
Svikt i IKT-systemer på bakgrunn av 
operatørfeil (menneskelig feil)
Svikt i IKT-systemer på bakgrunn av 
miljø-/naturhendelser (oversvømmelse, 
vannskader, brann, lynnedslag, osv.)
Svikt i IKT-systemer på bakgrunn av 
fysisk svikt (kabelbrudd, kontaktfeil, 
komponentfeil, osv.)
Sabotasje mot kraftstasjoner
Sabotasje mot kraftledninger
Sabotasje mot transformatorstasjoner
Brudd i kraftledning
Kraftledning ødelagt pga. uvær
IKT-angrep fra terroristgrupper
IKT-angrep fra fremmede stater
IKT-angrep fra insidere/utro tjenere
15) Alt i alt, hvordan vurderer du sikkerheten i IKT-systemene som 
brukes i din organisasjon?
Veldig dårlig (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Veldig god (6)
Denne delen av spørreskjemaet handler om sikkerhetsledelse. Vennligst angi hvor enig eller 
uenig du er i hvert av de følgende utsagn:
16) Sikkerhetsledelse
Meget 
uenig Uenig
Verken 
uenig 
eller 
enig Enig
Meget 
enig
Ikke 
aktuelt
Vet 
ikke
Min nærmeste leder griper 
straks inn hvis IKT-
sikkerhetsregler ikke 
overholdes
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Min nærmeste leder sjekker 
av og til om vi faktisk 
arbeider sikkert
Jeg diskuterer helst ikke 
IKT-sikkerhetsforhold med 
min nærmeste leder
Min nærmeste leder setter 
pris på at jeg påpeker 
forhold som har betydning 
for IKT-sikkerheten
Min nærmeste leder er 
engasjert i IKT-
sikkerhetsarbeidet i 
organisasjonen
Denne delen av spørreskjemaet handler om bevisstgjøring og opplæring i IKT-sikkerhet. 
Vennligst angi hvor enig eller uenig du er i hver av de følgende utsagn:
17) Bevisstgjøring og opplæring i IKT-sikkerhet
Meget 
uenig Uenig
Verken 
uenig 
eller 
enig Enig
Meget 
enig
Ikke 
aktuelt
Vet 
ikke
Nyansatte får særlig grundig 
opplæring i organisasjonens 
IKT-sikkerhetsregler i 
informasjonssikkerhetspolicy 
og sikkerhetsinstruks)
Det gjennomføres opplæring 
i IKT-sikkerhet for ledere og 
ansatte ettersom IKT-
systemene 
endres/oppdateres
I min organisasjon 
gjennomføres det ofte 
bevisstgjøringskampanjer i 
forbindelse med IKT-
sikkerhet
I min organisasjon sendes 
det ofte ut e-poster med 
informasjon for å 
bevisstgjøre de ansatte i 
forbindelse med IKT-
sikkerhet
I min organisasjon holdes 
det ofte formelle 
presentasjoner med 
informasjon om IKT-
sikkerhet for å bevisstgjøre 
de ansatte
I min organisasjon vises det 
ofte informasjonsfilmer for å 
bevisstgjøre de ansatte om 
IKT-sikkerhet
11 
 
18) Kommentarer til spørreskjemaet:
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Appendix 2: Factor analysis

1 
Factor analysis 
In this appendix, I provide a thorough description of the factor analysis used for assessing the construct 
validity of the questionnaire survey, which guided the selection of the specific challenges that came to 
be the focus of this thesis. 
      As mentioned earlier in the thesis, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was chosen to examine the 
underlying dimensions of the constructs of interest in this research project. EFA is used when the 
researcher does not know how many factors are necessary to explain the interrelationships among a 
set of characteristics, indicators, or items. A basic assumption of EFA is that within a collection of 
observed variables there exists a set of underlying factors, smaller in number than the observed 
variables, that can explain the interrelationships among those variables (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 
2003). 
   Two main issues must be considered in determining whether a particular data set is suitable for factor 
analysis: sample size and the strength of the relationships among the items. There is little agreement 
among authors concerning how large a sample should be; however, the recommendation is generally 
to have a large sample. Some suggest having at least 300 cases for factor analysis (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007), while others say the sample size should be 100 or larger (Hair, 1998; Oltedal, 2011). It is 
also important to determine whether there are sufficient numbers of significant correlations among 
the items in the questionnaire to justify undertaking a factor analysis. If the correlations among the 
items are not significant, it will not be possible to obtain a parsimonious set of factors that represent 
the items in the proposed scale. Several tests can be undertaken by computer to ascertain whether it 
would be judicious to proceed with factor analysis. In this project, I used Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). 
     Principal component analysis (PCA) was chosen as the factor extraction method in this research 
project. PCA is commonly used by researchers interested in scale development and evaluation (Pallant, 
2010). The goal of PCA is to arrive at a succinct set of uncorrelated components that extract variance 
in descending order and summarize the data set. PCA is especially useful when the researcher wants 
to summarize the relationships among a large number of variables with a smaller number of 
components, which is relevant for this project. Rotation was used to improve the meaningfulness and 
interpretation of the generated factors. Factor rotation is the process of turning the reference axes of 
the factors about their own origin to achieve a simple structure and theoretically more meaningful 
factor solution. In this research project, both varimax rotation (orthogonal) and direct oblimin rotation 
(oblique) were used to rotate the factors, and the type of rotation that found the simplest factor 
solution for the items was chosen (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). 
     PCA with both direct oblimin and varimax rotation was carried out to explore the underlying factor 
structure of the scales used in the survey. Factors were extracted based on the following analytical 
criteria: (1) pairwise deletion (excluding cases if they were missing the data required for the specific 
analysis), (2) eigenvalue greater than 1.0, (3) factor loading of more than .4, and (4) inspection of the 
screeplot (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). A scale reliability test was then performed for the chosen 
factors to check the new scale’s internal consistency (i.e., whether all the items measured the same 
underlying construct). Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is one of the most commonly used indicators of 
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internal consistency, and ideally the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of a scale should be above .7 (Pallant, 
2010). 
     PCA typically requires that the variables being examined be based on similar units of measurement. 
In this research project, the variables examined by factor analysis were the items from the knowledge 
of safety and security scale, the perception of compliance scale, the attitude toward safety and security 
scale, the attitude toward regulation scale, the risk perception scale, the safety and security 
management scale, and the awareness creation and training scale. As previously mentioned, all the 
items were measured on similar Likert scales. The items on the risk perception scale were measured 
on a scale from 1 to 6, and the rest of the items were measured on a scale from 1 to 5. This means that 
each item in the scales shares a similar or standardized scale of measurement (Pett, Lackey, and 
Sullivan, 2003). 
     The first attempt to perform PCA with all the chosen items did not show any results because the 
resulting matrix was not a positive definite. This was probably due to pairwise deletion of missing 
values. The perception of compliance scale had a lot of missing data, and many of the respondents 
answered “don’t know” on the questions concerning the organizations’ compliance with ICT safety and 
security regulations and rules. In addition, self-report surveys might not be the best method for 
measuring concepts like compliance with rules and regulations. The respondents might give socially 
desirable answers instead of answering truthfully. Social desirability occurs when survey respondents 
seek to present themselves in a positive light and therefore respond to an item according to what they 
think is the socially correct answer rather than their true answer. This can distort the data and affect 
the validity of the instrument (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). In this research project, the 
respondents were asked to answer according to their perception of compliance in the organization as 
a whole, and not their own compliance with rules and regulations. Nevertheless, the respondents 
might also have given a socially desirable answer on behalf of their organization. 
     Compliance with ICT safety and security rules and regulations may also be measured more 
objectively (e.g., by on-site inspections and revisions). Because the items on the perception of 
compliance scale did not load on any specific factors, a lot of data were missing, and to manage the 
problem with social desirability, I decided to remove most of the items on the scale from the factor 
analysis. Qualitative data from document studies of NVE’s supervision reports and interviews with 
representatives from the contingency planning department in NVE were used instead. Three items 
from the perception of compliance scale were retained for subsequent factor analyses: item 3 
regarding the use of checklists when preparing risk and vulnerability analysis, item 7 regarding the use 
of NVE’s guideline when preparing risk and vulnerability analysis, and item 8 regarding the use of 
standards when preparing risk and vulnerability analysis, information safety/security policy, and 
safety/security instructions. These items were retained as data material for article 2. 
     After removing all the items from the perception of compliance scale, the suitability of the data for 
factor analysis was assessed. The sample size was 103, which by some is considered too small. 
However, inspection of the correlation matrix from the initial factor analysis of all the chosen items 
revealed the presence of many coefficients of .3 and above, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was .614, 
exceeding the recommended value of .6, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity reached statistical significance 
(.000), supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix (Pallant, 2010). These results are shown in 
Table 11. 
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Table 11 - KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy ,614 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 3316,637 
df 1225 
Sig. ,000 
     Several factor analyses with different numbers of specific factors were undertaken to determine 
the number of factors that represented the dimensions of the constructs being measured. By 
examining the results of extracting different numbers of factors, it is easier to arrive at that 
parsimonious set of factors that makes the most intuitive sense given the problem area (Pett, Lackey, 
and Sullivan, 2003). 
     One approach to determining the number of initial factors is to select only factors with an 
eigenvalue greater than 1.00. This means that these factors account for more than their share of the 
total variance in the items (the Kaiser-Guttman rule). Another approach for determining the number 
of factors is the cumulative percentage of variance extracted by successive factors. However, there are 
no definitive guidelines for what the threshold for maximum variance extracted should be. According 
to some authors, the first few components should extract a sizable percentage of the total variance 
(50% or more) or there is little to be gained from the application of PCA. A third method, called the 
scree plot, is to plot the extracted factors against their eigenvalues in descending order of magnitude 
to identify distinct breaks in the slope of the plot. It is necessary to use subjective judgment to 
determine where the discontinuity of eigenvalues occurs, and one often needs to examine the loadings 
of items on the factors to determine which solution makes the most theoretical and intuitive sense. 
One way to make it easier to discern the patterns of high and low loadings is to suppress absolute 
values less than .4. This does not delete any of the item-to-factor correlations, but the loadings that 
remain in view are strong (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). 
     The items on the knowledge of safety and security scale and the attitude toward safety and security 
scale did not load on any specific factors/components. A source of confusion is often the distinction 
made between perceptions and attitudes. Perceptions are regarded as descriptive and referring to 
external objects, whereas attitudes are considered personal evaluations of the same objects 
(Guldenmund, 2007). However, according to Guldenmund (2007), perceptions are infused with the 
attitudes that underlie them in that perceptions are not mere descriptions, but rather evaluations of 
what people see around them and, consequently, perceptions reflect attitudes. The main focus in this 
research project (in article 3) is on risk perception. Therefore, I decided to remove the items on the 
knowledge of safety and security scale and the attitude toward safety and security scale from the 
factor analysis and concentrate on using the data from the risk perception scale. 
     Most of the items on the risk perception scale loaded substantially on one component. However, 
two items from the scale did not load as strongly on the same component. These items were item 17 
(the risk of a fracture in a power line) and item 18 (the risk of a power line being destroyed by bad 
weather). The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the total risk perception scale was .95 and removing 
these two items did not change the value of the coefficient alpha. The two items’ contribution to the 
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overall instrument was of little importance; hence, I decided to delete these two items from the risk 
perception scale. 
     A new PCA was performed after removing all the items on the knowledge of safety and security 
scale and the attitude toward safety and security scale, in addition to items 17 and 18 on the risk 
perception scale. The three items that I chose to retain from the perception of compliance scale were 
also added to the analysis (items 3, 7, and 8). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value now increased to .690, and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity still reached statistical significance (.000). These results are shown in Table 
12. 
Table 12 - KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,690 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1642,317 
df 666 
Sig. ,000 
 
     The PCA revealed the presence of eight components with eigenvalues exceeding 1. However, this 
survey contained a large number of items, which led to a large number of eigenvalues that met the 
criterion. An inspection of the scree plot revealed a break after the third component. However, all the 
retained items on the risk perception scale loaded strongly (above .4) on one component, and all the 
items on the safety and security management scale and the awareness creation and training scale 
loaded strongly on another component. The two-component solution explained a total of 43.1% of the 
variance, with Factor 1 contributing 27.4% and Factor 2 contributing 15.7%. According to Pett, Lackey, 
and Sullivan (2003), the decision regarding how many factors to extract should not be based solely on 
statistical criteria; it should also make theoretical sense. The ultimate criteria for determining the 
number of factors are factor interpretability and usefulness. The four items on the attitude toward 
regulation scale and the three items from the perception of compliance scale did not load strongly on 
any specific components. Thus, it made more theoretical sense to choose a two-factor solution.  
     Based on this reasoning, I removed the four items on the attitude toward regulation scale and the 
three items from the perception of compliance scale and performed a new PCA with the remaining 
items (the items from the risk perception scale minus items 17 and 18, the items on the safety and 
security management scale, and the items from the awareness creation and training scale). The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin value now increased to .813 (Table 13).  
 
Table 13 - KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,813 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 2155,927 
df 435 
Sig. ,000 
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     I chose a two-factor solution and rotated this using both direct oblimin and varimax rotation. A 
simple two-factor solution for the items was found using direct oblimin rotation. This two-component 
solution explained a total of 51.5% of the variance, with Factor 1 contributing 33.5% and Factor 2 
contributing 18%. The rotated solution showed a simple structure, with both components showing a 
number of strong loadings and all variables loading substantially on only one component (Pallant, 
2010). All the chosen items from the risk perception scale loaded on Factor 1, and all the items on the 
safety and security management scale and the awareness creation and training scale loaded on Factor 
2. There was a very weak negative correlation between the two factors (r = -.09). I named Factor 1
“Risk perception” and Factor 2 “Safety and security management, awareness creation, and training.” 
     Using factor analysis, factors can be refined through successive factoring of a set of items within a 
single factor (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). The items that loaded on Factor 2 originally came from 
two different scales (i.e., the safety and security management scale and awareness creation and 
training scale). Based on this, I chose to factor analyze Factor 2 a second time to determine whether 
the items represent a single factor or several smaller factors. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was now 
.885, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity reached statistical significance (.000), supporting the factorability 
of the correlation matrix (Pallant, 2010). Again I chose a two-factor solution, and a simple solution for 
the items was found using direct oblimin rotation. This two-component solution explained a total of 
62.6% of the variance, with Factor A contributing 49.5% and Factor B contributing 13.1%.  
     The rotated solution showed a relatively simple structure, with both components showing a number 
of strong loadings. All the items from the safety and security management scale loaded on Factor A, 
and all the items from the awareness creation and training scale loaded on Factor B. Some items had 
strong loadings on both the components. However, these items were placed with the factor on which 
they had the highest loading, which was also the factor with which the items were most closely related 
conceptually (Pett, Lackey, and Sullivan, 2003). Based on these results, Factor 2 was divided into two 
smaller factors called “Safety and security management” and “Awareness creation and training.” There 
was a medium positive correlation between these two factors (r = .46). 
     As described earlier in the thesis, PCA with direct oblimin rotation finally resulted in a two-factor 
solution, where Factor 1 was named “Risk perception” and Factor 2 was named “Safety and security 
management, awareness creation, and training.” After further analysis, Factor 2 was divided into two 
smaller factors named “Safety and security management” (Factor A) and “Awareness creation and 
training” (Factor B). The risk perception scale (Factor 1) was analyzed as data material for article 3, and 
the safety and security management scale and the awareness creation and training scale (Factor 2) 
were analyzed as data material for article 4. The four items on the attitude toward regulation scale 
were still retained as data material for the research project, and descriptive statistics for each item 
were used in article 1. In addition, the three aforementioned items from the perception of compliance 
scale were retained (items 3, 7, and 8). Descriptive statistics for each of these three items were used 
as data material for article 2. Finally, I also decided to keep the data from the knowledge of safety and 
security scale, which is discussed in article 3. 
